Eaton v. Jarvis Products Corp., 91-1089

Decision Date29 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1089,91-1089
Citation965 F.2d 922
PartiesProd.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,194 Paul EATON and Monfort, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JARVIS PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Connecticut corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Colorado Trial Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Thomas J. Herd (David L. Quicksall with him on the briefs) of Cross, Gaddis, Kin & Quicksall, P.C., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant, Eaton.

Jeffrey J. Cowman of Fowler, Schimberg and Cowman, P.C., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant, Monfort.

Michael G. Cooksey of Cooksey & Cooksey, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellee, Jarvis.

Robert A. Millman, Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Colorado Springs, Colo., on the amicus curiae brief.

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, Circuit Judges, and COOK, * Senior District Judge.

STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Paul Eaton filed this diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging that defendant Jarvis Products Corporation ("Jarvis") was strictly liable and liable under a theory of negligence for injuries Eaton suffered while sharpening a piece of equipment manufactured by Jarvis. Eaton's injuries occurred during the course of his employment with Monfort of Colorado, Inc. ("Monfort"). Monfort, as a self-insured employer, asserted a subrogation claim against Jarvis to recover the workers' compensation benefits paid to Eaton. Monfort's and Eaton's claims against Jarvis were then consolidated.

Applying Colorado's seven year statute of repose, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-107, which bars certain claims involving "new manufacturing equipment," the district court granted Jarvis' motion for summary judgment, holding that Eaton's action was barred because it was brought more than seven years after the particular piece of equipment which injured Eaton was first used by Monfort. Eaton and Monfort appeal, arguing that the district court erred in its interpretation and application of the statute of repose, and that the statute violates plaintiffs' federal and state rights of equal protection and due process. The Colorado Trial Lawyers Association has filed an Amicus Curiae brief in support of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs have made two motions which are pending--one to certify various questions to the Colorado Supreme Court and one to supplement the record on appeal. We deny both motions and affirm the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

At the time he suffered his injuries, Eaton worked as a maintenance man in Monfort's slaughterhouse in Greeley, Colorado, where live cattle were butchered and the carcasses cut up prior to preparation and packaging for sale as beef products. 1 Eaton's injuries were caused by a hockcutter manufactured by Jarvis and sold and delivered to Monfort by Jarvis. A hockcutter is a hydraulic meat cutting device with blades, which is used to sever the legs from cattle. Eaton was injured while sharpening the blades on one of several hockcutters used in the Monfort slaughterhouse. As he was setting the hockcutter down on the ground and positioning it for sharpening, the blades closed on his left hand, severing four fingers. He asserted in his affidavit that neither of his hands was on the trigger button, which is intended to activate the hockcutter, at the time of the accident. The parties stipulated that Eaton's injury was caused by the inadvertent operation of the hockcutter through the accidental depression of the unguarded trigger as it lay against the ground.

The parties agree that Monfort purchased three or four hockcutters from Jarvis in the late 1960s and/or early 1970s. Jarvis manufactured both the hockcutters and the trigger unit component of the hockcutters that is the focus of this lawsuit. No one has been able to identify the precise hockcutter which caused Eaton's injuries because it did not have a serial number. 2

                Monfort's slaughter division plant manager, Donald Anderson, provided an affidavit stating that he knew personally that Monfort had purchased "at least two and probably three trigger unit components and placed them on Jarvis hockcutters in the time period from 1982 to December 22, 1987."   Anderson Affidavit at p 5, Appendix Vol.  I at 149
                

No one disputes that the hockcutter Jarvis originally sold to Monfort did not have an external guard on the trigger or an internal interlock device to prevent inadvertent operation of the machine. And Jarvis does not dispute that it did not provide users of its hockcutters, like Monfort, with written notification of the availability of a retro-fitted trigger guard, which it developed in 1974 or 1975, until some point after Eaton's injury occurred. 3

Eaton's strict liability and negligence action focuses on the trigger unit, alleging (1) that it was defective in its original design and that Jarvis failed to redesign it properly; (2) that Jarvis subsequently developed a trigger guard but that the guard was insufficient and, in any event, Jarvis failed to give written notice to Monfort of the availability of the guard; and (3) that Jarvis had failed to provide warnings cautioning users to disconnect power before sharpening the blades. Plaintiffs specifically do not claim that the entire hockcutter or the blades which severed Eaton's fingers were defective. They only assert a defect in the trigger unit.

The district court held: (1) the statute of repose was applicable to plaintiffs' claims, inasmuch as the hockcutter constituted "new manufacturing equipment" under the statute; (2) the statute barred the claims, because the hockcutters were purchased and first put to their intended use more than seven years before Eaton's injury; (3) plaintiffs' action does not fall under an exception to the statute of repose, because the alleged defect was not a "hidden defect" nor did Jarvis intentionally withhold or fraudulently conceal safety information concerning the hockcutter; and (4) the statute of repose is constitutional. It therefore denied plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs appeal from the grant of summary judgment to Jarvis. "We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. We apply the same legal standard used by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990) (citation omitted); Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriately granted "when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir.1991). We view the evidence and draw any inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Deepwater Investments, Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "In reviewing the grant of summary judgment in a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, we apply the law of the forum." Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 907 F.2d 1026, 1027 (10th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Thus, Colorado provides the substantive law to be applied. We "review de novo a district court's determination of state law." Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).

Jarvis was granted summary judgment on the ground that the statute of repose barred plaintiffs' claims. " 'The moving party carries the burden of showing beyond Colorado's statute of repose provides as follows:

                a reasonable doubt that it is entitled to summary judgment....' "  Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir.1987)).   Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding that Jarvis had met its burden of showing that the statute of repose barred plaintiffs' claims.   We disagree
                

Limitation of actions against manufacturers, sellers, or lessors of new manufacturing equipment. (1)(a) Notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, all actions for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage brought against a person or entity on account of the design, assembly, fabrication, production, or construction of new manufacturing equipment, or any component part thereof, or involving the sale or lease of such equipment shall be brought within the time provided in section 13-80-102 and not thereafter.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (1), no such action shall be brought on a claim arising more than seven years after such equipment was first used for its intended purpose by someone not engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, or leasing such equipment, except when the claim arises from injury due to hidden defects or prolonged exposure to hazardous material.

Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-107. The statute defines "manufacturing equipment" as "equipment used in the operation or process of producing a new product, article, substance, or commodity for the purposes of commercial sale and different from and having a distinctive name, character, or use from the raw or prepared materials used in the operation or process." Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-107(2).

I.

We first address, as did the district court, whether the Jarvis hockcutter at issue is "manufacturing equipment" within the meaning of the statute. Although a definition of "manufacturing equipment" is provided, it does not conclusively resolve whether a hockcutter used in a cattle slaughterhouse is "manufacturing equipment." Both parties assert that common sense supports their position--plaintiffs arguing that it is obvious that slaughterhouse equipment merely processes live cattle into beef products without altering their essential character, so that it cannot be "manufacturing equipment," and Jarvis arguing that...

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