966 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1992), 91-3569, Falls v. Nesbitt
|Citation:||966 F.2d 375|
|Party Name:||T.S. FALLS, Sergeant Cummins Unit, ADC, Appellant, v. John NESBITT, Appellee.|
|Case Date:||June 04, 1992|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit|
Submitted April 16, 1992.
Melissa K. Rust, Little Rock, Ark., argued (John D. Harris, on the brief), for appellant.
Stephen E. Snider, Little Rock, Ark., argued, for appellee.
Before FAGG and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, [*] Senior District Judge.
BOGUE, Senior District Judge.
This case represents another chapter in the continuing saga of inmate violence in our nation's prisons. While an inmate at the Cummins Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, Respondent John Nesbitt (Nesbitt) was stabbed by fellow inmate Kenny Hamm (Hamm). Nesbitt, a pro se complainant, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking money damages and injunctive relief. The magistrate judge 1 entered judgment for Nesbitt and against Petitioner Lieutenant T.S. Falls (Falls) in the amount of $250; and the magistrate enjoined Falls from housing in the future protective custody (PC) inmates with general population inmates. We reverse.
The operative facts in this case are not in dispute. On October 21, 1989, Nesbitt was housed in protective custody in 14 Barracks 2 in the Cummins Unit. PC, as it is called, is a special section of the prison reserved for those prisoners who are slight of build, physically weaker than the typical inmate, preyed upon, or, in many cases, homosexuals. Nesbitt is both small in stature and a homosexual.
While in PC on October 21, 1989, Nesbitt left his cell to inform Sergeant Parker and, later, Lieutenant Falls, both Arkansas Department of Corrections officers, that he (Nesbitt) and his current cellmate were not getting along. Nesbitt then requested that he be moved to another cell. Whether Sergeant Parker refused Nesbitt's request or simply stated that he lacked the authority to make such a change, Nesbitt's request for a cell change was denied. Nesbitt refused to return to his cell and, thereafter, was escorted to another building to meet with Lieutenant Falls (Falls). At this time, Nesbitt was "written up" for failing to return to his cell as ordered by Sergeant Parker.
Falls decided to transfer Nesbitt temporarily to 16 Barracks, which houses inmates on Administrative Segregation pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. Prior to the transfer, Falls checked Nesbitt's "enemy alert list" to determine if anyone on Nesbitt's list was presently housed in 16 Barracks, and none were found. Next, Nesbitt was asked to fill out a housing roster, in which he stated that he could share a cell with anyone except black inmates. Nesbitt was finally placed in Cell 312 with Hamm, a white inmate. On October 24, 1989, Hamm stabbed Nesbitt in the chest with a homemade knife. On this same day, Nesbitt executed an affidavit stating that he (Nesbitt) had no reason to believe that Hamm would harm him.
Nesbitt brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Falls, Parker, and Officer Starks, the officer who escorted Nesbitt to Cell 312. The magistrate dismissed Nesbitt's suit against officers Starks and Parker; Falls, however, was ordered to pay Nesbitt $250 in damages, and was enjoined from housing PC inmates with non-PC inmates.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial judge's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are found to be "clearly erroneous." Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Mixed questions of law and fact that require the consideration of legal concepts and involve the exercise of judgment about the values underlying legal principles are reviewable de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-1204 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). Because our decision is predominantly one of determining whether the established facts fall within the relevant legal definition, 3 albeit a constitutional definition, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. at 1202-03.
IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Until recent years, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause was not deemed to apply at all to deprivations that were not inflicted as part of the sentence for a crime. For generations, judges and commentators regarded the Eighth Amendment as applying only to torturous punishments meted out by statutes or sentencing judges, and not generally to any hardship that might befall a prisoner during incarceration. See Hudson v. McMillian, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1005, 117 L.Ed.2d 156, dissent, J. Thomas (1992). In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), however, the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
In Estelle, the Court addressed the application of the Eighth Amendment to an inmate allegedly denied adequate medical services while in prison. Citing the historical roots of the Eighth Amendment, and its ultimate expansion beyond the narrow moorings of "comparing challenged methods of execution to concededly inhuman techniques of punishment," Id. 97 S.Ct. at 290, citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136, 25 L.Ed. 345 (1879), the Court highlighted those ideals...
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