Fauconier v. Clarke

Decision Date20 July 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-6489,18-6489
Citation966 F.3d 265
Parties Douglas FAUCONIER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director for the Department of Corrections ; Jeffrey N. Dillman, Warden of Powhatan Correctional Center; Luke Isaiah Black, Institutional Programs Manager; Lakenesha Spencer, Programs Assignment Reviewer, Defendants - Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

John J. Korzen, Hayley F. Degnan, Third-Year Law Student, Olivia G. Doss, Third-Year Law Student, Shameka C. Rolla, Appellate Advocacy Clinic, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Victoria N. Pearson, Deputy Attorney General, Margaret O’Shea, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor General, Martine E. Cicconi, Deputy Solicitor General, Michelle S. Kallen, Deputy Solicitor General, Zachary R. Glubiak, John Marshall Fellow/Attorney, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting opinion.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

For years, Douglas Fauconier, an inmate in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (the "VDOC"), performed various jobs while in prison, despite suffering from myasthenia gravis

, a neuromuscular disease that had, from time to time, required his hospitalization. Moreover, Fauconier performed these jobs "competently" and without any accommodation. Typically, after returning from a hospitalization, VDOC officials simply let Fauconier resume his then-current job.

When Fauconier returned from a short hospitalization in October 2010, however, he was not allowed to resume his job but was instead required to reapply for it. His application was then rejected on the basis that the "Work Code D" medical classification that had been assigned to him prior to this hospitalization precluded his employment in any prison job.

After unsuccessfully pursuing the VDOC’s administrative process to challenge this prohibition on his employment, Fauconier commenced this action pro se against Harold W. Clarke, Director of the VDOC, and three other VDOC officials, alleging that the defendants, in denying him a job, violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Fourteenth Amendment. After a protracted procedural course, the district court dismissed Fauconier’s complaint on the grounds that (1) his claims were time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; (2) he failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under either the ADA or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his constitutional claim; (3) his claims for damages were, in any event, barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity; and (4) his request for injunctive relief had become moot when he was transferred to another prison.

From the district court’s order of dismissal, Fauconier filed this appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing (1) Fauconier’s ADA claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities and (2) his ADA and equal protection claims for injunctive relief against Clarke in his official capacity. Otherwise, we affirm.

I

Fauconier has been a VDOC inmate since 2004. While at the Wallens Ridge State Prison, he was employed as a cart-pusher, and while at the Powhatan Correctional Center, he was employed as a cafeteria worker and as a janitor (referred to as a "houseman"). In these jobs, Fauconier performed a range of physical tasks, including "serving his peers meals during mealtimes" and "clean[ing] specific areas within the living quarters where he and other prisoners were imprisoned." He has alleged that he performed these jobs "competently" and without any accommodation for his medical condition. In a pro se memorandum filed with the district court, Fauconier explained that he had been diagnosed in 2006 with a neuromuscular disease, which had led to his classification as a "Work Code D" inmate.

On October 14, 2010, while Fauconier was at the Powhatan Correctional Center working as a houseman, he was hospitalized for approximately 24 hours. Upon his return to Powhatan, however, he was required to reapply for his houseman position and then was "automatically disqualified" from that position because of his "Work Code D" medical classification, which he had received even before the October 2010 hospitalization. Fauconier alleged that "prior to the October 14, 2010 [hospital] admission, whenever [he] was admitted to [the hospital], he was always returned to his job assignment upon returning" to the prison. Moreover, he alleged that "[t]here was no change in [his] medical status or classification on account of [the October 2010] hospitalization."

Fauconier thereafter applied for several other jobs, but each application was uniformly and automatically rejected based on his "Work Code D" medical status. These included applications for a "Game-Man" position, denied on June 26, 2012, with the comment "Medical Work code D — per policy"; an application for a "Band Room Assistant" position, denied on January 8, 2013, with the comment "Medical Work Code ‘D’ "; an application for a "Game Issuer" position, denied on January 8, 2013, with the comment "Medical Work Code ‘D’ "; and an application for a janitor position, denied on October 25, 2013, with the comment "Medical Work Code D." The criteria for assigning the Work Code D status to an inmate, however, were never explained and are not in the record.

Five days after the rejection of his last application, Fauconier submitted an informal complaint to prison officials alleging that the "department’s prison employment eligibility criterion continuously denie[d] [him] the opportunity to obtain employment because of [his] medical classification." On November 4, 2013, a Powhatan Correctional Center official responded:

Your medical work code is "D." Medical work code "D" means no work, making you ineligible for all jobs. Your medical work code is set by the doctor. Please consult the doctor about the reasoning behind this classification. Action was in accordance with [Operating Procedure 841.2].

Within two weeks, Fauconier filed a formal grievance reiterating his arguments. Specifically, he explained that he was "not bed-ridden, and [could] move around [the prison] with no serious impediments." The Warden responded to the grievance, ruling that it was "unfounded." He explained that prison officials had properly applied Operating Procedure 841.2 to deny Fauconier employment based on his Work Code D medical status.

Fauconier then appealed the Warden’s decision to the Regional Administrator, who, on January 8, 2014, upheld the decision, stating that "[Fauconier’s] grievance [was] unfounded ." The Administrator also advised, "[T]his is your last level of appeal. You have exhausted all administrative remedies."

In his appeals within the prison system, Fauconier asserted that he was "clearly qualified to perform any job offered by [the VDOC] to prisoners" and "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, etc., [he] would clearly be able to participate in any work program." He emphasized that he had received "satisfactory or better job performance reviews" when he was allowed to work and that, since 2010, he had been "able-bodied enough to attend and graduate from Business Software Applications, and enroll in print school," where his "disability ha[d] neither prevented [him] from attending nor functioning well."

In October 2014, Fauconier was transferred to the Augusta Correctional Center, another VDOC prison facility, as the Powhatan Correctional Center was slated for closure. Sometime after his transfer, Fauconier was designated as having Work Code C medical status, which, according to the VDOC, allows inmates to engage in "light work."

On December 3, 2014, Fauconier, acting pro se, commenced this action, naming as defendants Director Clarke and three officials of the Powhatan Correctional Center. He alleged that the defendants had violated his rights under Title II of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, premised on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fauconier claimed that, as a result of the defendants"policies and actions[,]" "he has been automatically disqualified from seeking any employment as a prisoner ... due to his medical classification; a status bestowed upon him because he is disabled." Fauconier sought, among other relief, monetary damages and an injunction "ordering the defendants ... to end their discrimination against [him] because of his disability."

The district court sua sponte dismissed Fauconier’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. Construing the complaint as raising claims under only the Due Process Clause and Title II of the ADA, the court concluded (1) that the complaint stated "no claim of constitutional dimension" because prisoners have no due process right to participate in prison employment programs and (2) that the ADA claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Fauconier appealed the district court’s decision, arguing mainly that the district court erred in failing to address several viable claims that he had asserted, including a claim under the Equal Protection Clause and a request for injunctive relief. We agreed and vacated the district court’s judgment, remanding the case to the district court to address those claims in the first instance. See Fauconier v. Clarke , 652 F. App'x 217 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

On remand, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss raising numerous arguments, and the district court granted the motion in its entirety, relying on several alternative grounds. First , the court concluded that Fauconier’s...

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