United States v. Wilson
Citation | 967 F.Supp.2d 673 |
Decision Date | 04 September 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 04–CR–1016 (NGG).,04–CR–1016 (NGG). |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Ronell WILSON, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Carter H. Burwell, Colleen Elizabeth Kavanagh, Jason Allen Jones, Celia Cohen, Shreve Ariail, United States Attorneys Office, Jack Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for United States of America.
Colleen Quinn Brady, The Law Office of Colleen Quinn Brady, David Stern, Robert Soloway, Rothman, Schneider, Soloway & Stern, P.C., Richard Jasper, Law Offices of Richard Jasper, New York, NY, Michael N. Burt, Law Office of Michael Burt, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
After a jury of his peers unanimously issued its binding recommendation that Defendant Ronell Wilson be sentenced to death, he has moved for an order setting aside that jury's verdict and granting him a new penalty phase trial. Because each of the alleged errors in the recent trial identified by Wilson is either (1) not an error at all, or (2) not sufficiently prejudicialto warrant a new trial, Wilson's motion is DENIED. The court will sentence him to death on Tuesday, September 10, 2013, at 2:00 p.m. in the Ceremonial Courtroom.
I. BACKGROUND
The history of this long-running case is well known. On March 10, 2003, Defendant Ronell Wilson murdered New York City Police Detectives James V. Nemorin and Rodney J. Andrews by shooting each of them once in the back of the head at point-blank range, killing them instantly. Following a trial that began in October 2006, the jury found Wilson guilty of all the crimes charged in the Second Superseding Indictment and returned a death sentence. (Jury Verdict (Dkt. 351); 1st Special Verdict Form (Dkt. 360).) On appeal, the death verdict—but not the underlying convictions—were abrogated by a divided court. United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2010).
On remand, Wilson argued that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), and the Federal Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). The court held a nine-day hearing and rejected this claim. ( See Feb. 7, 2013, Mem. & Order (Dkt. 1015).)
The court then conducted seven weeks of voir dire—during which nearly 2,000 prospective jurors completed questionnaires and 419 were interviewed in person—followed by a five-week penalty phase re-trial. ( See generally June 6, 2013, Mem. (Dkt. 1273).) On July 24, 2013, the second jury unanimously issued its binding recommendation that Wilson be sentenced to death. (2d Special Verdict Form (Dkt. 1437).)
Wilson now moves for a third penalty phase pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution, and 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c). (New Trial Mem. (Dkt. 1461).) The Government filed its opposition (New Trial Opp'n (Dkt. 1463)), and Wilson replied (New Trial Reply (Dkt. 1464)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW1A. Rule 29
After a jury recommends a sentence of death, the defendant may attack the verdict by challenging the sufficiency of evidence underlying a particular aggravating factor.2 the aggravating factor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Praddy, 725 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2013) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor,” id., and “choices between competing interests [and] [a]ssessments of witness credibility ... lie solely within the province of the jury,” United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir.2010).
“Upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.R. Crim.P. 33(a). “A defendant asserting that a prosecutor's remarks warrant a new trial [under Rule 33] ‘face[s] a heavy burden, because the misconduct alleged must be so severe and significant as to result in the denial of [his] right to a fair trial.’ ” United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 120 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 945 (2d Cir.1993)) (first alteration added). “Even if a remark is deemed improper, it must cause ‘substantial prejudice’ to result in a new trial.” Id. (quoting United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir.1999)). And to determine whether a defendant has suffered “substantial prejudice,” the court should consider “[1] the seriousness of the misconduct, [2] the measures adopted by the trial court to cure the misconduct, and [3] the certainty of conviction absent the improper statements.” United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1990); accord Banki, 685 F.3d at 120.
III. DISCUSSIONA. Sufficiency of the Future Dangerousness Evidence
Wilson first argues that a new penalty phase is warranted because the evidence presented in support of the Government's future dangerousness aggravating factor was legally insufficient. He is mistaken.3
Simply put, overwhelming evidence supported the jury's future dangerousness finding. Among other things, the Government elicited testimony documenting Wilson's pattern of violence beginning from age eleven. ( See June 26, 2013, Trial Tr. at 4780:21–4800:2 ( ).) This behavior persisted during adolescence and continued throughout his recent time at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), where he verbally threatened staff and inmates, refused to obey orders knowing that use of force by staff would be necessitated, and brandished a makeshift weapon, or “shank.” ( See July 3–8, 2013, Trial Tr. at 5814:21–5989:22, 5919:9–5933:17 ( ); July 9, 2013, Trial Tr. at 6179:8–6283:17 ( ); Ex. PP–80 ( ).) The jury also heard extensive testimony about Wilson's membership in the Bloods gang, including (1) his desire to obtain higher status; (2) how he intimidated others and was capable of inciting violence because of his Bloods membership; and (3) assaults he committed that were characteristic of Bloods members. ( See, e.g., June 27, 2013, Trial Tr. at 4995:11–5070:14 ( ); July 1, 2013, Trial Tr. at 5419:4–5462:24, July 2, 2013, Trial Tr. at 5502:10–5615:8 ( ); July 2, 2013, Trial Tr. at 5630:16–5646:14 ( ).)
Wilson's attempt to characterize this future dangerousness evidence as not very serious ( see New Trial Mem. at 3–8) fails. Because the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor,” U.S. v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1371 (11th Cir.2006), and given the mountain of evidence documenting Wilson's violent behavior in prison and out, a rational trier of fact certainly could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson is “likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing and serious threat to the lives and safety of others,” (Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty (Dkt. 174) at 4). See Praddy, 725 F.3d at 152–53. Wilson's arguments to the contrary were better suited for cross-examination and summation; at this stage, they must be rejected. See Payne, 591 F.3d at 60.
Wilson also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the Government purportedly failed to introduce evidence that the future dangerousness subfactors—Wilson's (a) continuing pattern of violence; (b) lack of remorse; (c) low rehabilitative potential; and (d) membership in a criminal street gang ( see Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty at 4–5)—are indicative of future dangerousness in prison. Assuming that such link is even necessary, however, the Government did proffer evidence connecting these subfactors with future instances of violence. For instance, Wilson's long history of past criminal conduct obviously correlated with his commission of the two murders and with more recent acts of violence in prison. Similarly, Wilson repeatedly told another inmate at the MDC that “he had killed policem [e]n and he didn't care anymore”—a clear, recent expression of a lack of remorse—meaning that “with the type of case against him, he could do anything, he could attack any person because he was a violent person.” (July 8, 2013, Trial Tr. at 5964:16–5965:7 (testimony of Inmate Tommy Germosen).) In other words, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence presented demonstrates that Wilson himself described how his lack of remorse increased the likelihood of future violence.
Moreover, the evidence relating to Wilson's admitted Bloods membership correlates with his future dangerousness and supports the jury's finding. Both Investigator William Sheridan and Shabucalik Geralds competently discussed how Bloods members accomplish acts of violence in federal prison. As the Second Circuit indicated concerning Geralds's testimony at the first penalty phase, the jury was free to credit such evidence because a reasonable factfinder could believe that Geralds had personally witnessed the behavior of Wilson and other Bloods members in federal prison. See...
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