Hale v. State of Ariz.
| Citation | 967 F.2d 1356 |
| Decision Date | 16 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 88-15785,89-15162,s. 88-15785 |
| Parties | 30 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1569, 61 USLW 2063, 122 Lab.Cas. P 35,664, 23 Fed.R.Serv.3d 159, 1 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 536 Felton HALE and Richard S. Berry, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF ARIZONA; ARCOR Enterprises, a subdivision of the state; James Ricketts, former director of the Arizona Department of Corrections; Samuel Lewis, director of the DOC; Mariln Wilkens, director of Arizona Correctional Industries; Thomas Lescault, director of ARCOR; David Tierney, Earl Cobb, Thomas Donnelly, Henry Evans, Marcus Englemen, Delbert Householder, and Ray Shaffer, members of the Board of Directors, ARCOR Enterprises, Defendants-Appellees. John Leroy FULLER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF ARIZONA; ARCOR Enterprises, a subdivision of the state; James Ricketts, former director of the Arizona Department of Corrections; Samuel Lewis, director of the DOC; Mariln Wilkens, director of Arizona Correctional Industries; Thomas Lescault, director of ARCOR; Tony West, David Tierney, Earl Cobb, Thomas Donnelly, Henry Evans, Marcus Englemen, Delbert Householder, and Ray Shaffer, members of the Board of Directors, ARCOR Enterprises; Richard Orberg, ARCOR Vice President of Operations; Kenneth Van De Veer, ARCOR Vice President of Business and Finance; John F. Wright, former interim CEO, ARCOR; James Kinsella, former ARCOR Vice President of Business and Finance; Gilbert Evans, former ARCOR director of operations; Ralph Cluff, ARCOR operations and control officer; Michael Ullery, former interim ARCOR operations and control officer, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Michael E. St. George, St. George & Reed, Tempe, Ariz., for plaintiffs-appellants.
June Ava Florescue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before: FLETCHER, PREGERSON, and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Appellants in both Hale and Fuller are inmates in an Arizona penitentiary who work for Arizona Correctional Industries (hereinafter "ARCOR"), making products for sale in the outside world. They brought these actions against Arizona, ARCOR and prison officials, claiming that under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1989), they were entitled to be paid the federal minimum wage for their work. Appellants in both cases also sought relief under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 31-254 and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court in Fuller dismissed appellants' suit, and the district court in Hale granted summary judgment for the defendants. We conclude that the inmates are entitled to receive a minimum wage for their work. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand both cases.
Inmates within the Arizona prison system have a statutory obligation to "engage in hard labor for not less than forty hours per week." Ariz.Rev.Stat. 31-251. About ten percent of the inmates satisfy this obligation by working for the ARCOR correctional industries program (known as ACI since 1987), which makes a variety of products for sale or use outside the prison. ARCOR consists of several divisions or "enterprises" which are all owned and run by ARCOR but which produce different We have consolidated two separate appeals from inmates in the ARCOR program: Fuller and Hale. The claims of 296 similarly-situated plaintiffs are consolidated in Fuller. All of those plaintiffs have appealed to this court. The appellants in Fuller work for a number of ARCOR enterprises and produce a wide variety of goods, from hogs for Farmer John meats to license plates. In order to work for the ARCOR program, appellants must apply to and be accepted by the prospective department or division and pass an institutional security review. All revenue from ARCOR enterprises is placed in a revolving fund, out of which ARCOR pays wages and expenses.
products. An ARCOR enterprise is "deemed a private enterprise and subject to all the laws and lawfully adopted rules of this state governing the operation of similar business enterprises elsewhere." Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 41-1623(D)(3)
Berry, the only plaintiff in Hale who has appealed to this court, worked as a clerk and office manager for a business operated within a division of ARCOR. 1 The business was part of the ARCOR Inmate-Operated Business Enterprise ("IOBE") program. As the name suggests, selected inmates in the IOBE program organize and operate their own businesses under ARCOR's supervision. Workers are selected by the inmate-owner and then apply to the Department of Corrections ("DOC") for the right to work. The profits from the businesses belong to the inmate owners, and the businesses can be sold. The businesses market their goods to the private sector. The DOC monitors the businesses and exacts a portion of the profits along with a monthly rent. Inmate wages are paid to the DOC, which in turn pays the inmates by depositing the funds into their commissary accounts. Inmates are paid 50 cents an hour for their work.
The plaintiffs in both cases sued for minimum wages under Arizona law, the FLSA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court in Fuller dismissed the FLSA claim because it found that it had no jurisdiction over the state on any claims for monetary relief under either state or federal law. The court retained jurisdiction, however, over the plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief against the state under section 1983. 2 The district court in Hale granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It found no employer/employee relationship under the FLSA and no jurisdiction over state claims or retrospective federal claims because of the 11th Amendment. There was no request in Hale for prospective relief. The plaintiffs in both cases appealed, and we have consolidated the cases for purposes of this appeal.
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Kruso v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990). The appellate court must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire and Casualty co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989). Whether an employer-employee relationship existed under the FLSA is a question of law. Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1983).
A dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Kruso, 872 F.2d at 1421. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1989).
Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) provides that "[t]he notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal ..." This requirement is jurisdictional and may not be waived. Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2409, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988). Arizona contends that the notice of appeal in Fuller was defective because the caption did not list all 296 parties whose actions were consolidated below and that the notice in Hale was defective because not all the defendants below were listed in the caption. We find that both notices meet the requirements of Rule 3.
On December 1, 1988, the district court filed a supplemental order consolidating 296 cases into Fuller. The caption of the notice of appeal in Fuller simply lists "JOHN LEROY FULLER Plaintiffs." However, the body of the notice reads: "Come now plaintiff consolidated in the captioned cause do hereby appeal." In Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.1991), we construed language identical to that used in Fuller's notice of appeal to mean that all the consolidated plaintiffs were appealing:
[A]ppellants in this case accurately listed the parties to the appeal by describing them as all plaintiffs consolidated below. There was no need for appellants to list each party individually, since appellees could have [dis]covered their identities by referring to records of the lower court proceedings. The policy behind Rule 3(c) thus was adequately served.
Gilbreath is dispositive here.
The notice of appeal in Hale names as defendants in the caption "STATE OF ARIZONA; ARCOR ENTERPRISES, a subdivision of the state; ARIZONA CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES, a subdivision of the state et al." The body of the notice states that the Neither in the caption nor the body of the notice did appellants list the individual defendants they had sued in the district court. However, Rule 3(c) does not require that appellees be listed, only appellants. Since only Berry is appealing, Rule 3 is satisfied. 3
Appellants in both cases filed adequate notices of appeal.
The FLSA governs the relationship between employers and employees. It requires employers to pay their employees a minimum wage of $4.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). The defendants contend that the FLSA does not apply to them for two reasons. First, they assert that the FLSA cannot apply to state governments under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, they claim that the inmates were not employees of the state within the meaning of the Act. We address each argument in turn....
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