97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98, Byers v. Edmondson

• Decision Date: 15 May 1998
• Citation: 712 So.2d 681
• Parties: 97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 681

712 So.2d 681

97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98

Patsy Ann BYERS, et al. v. Sarah EDMONDSON, et al.

No. 97 CA 0831.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana First Circuit.

May 15, 1998.

Rick A. Caballero, Randolph A. Piedrahita, Baton Rouge, Joseph H. Simpson, Amite, Ronald S. Macaluso, Hammond, for Plaintiffs/Appellants Patsy Ann and Lonnie Wayne Byers.

James Boren, Baton Rouge, for Defendant Sarah Edmondson.

Timonthy G. Schafer, New Orleans, for Defendants James and Suzanne Edmondson.

Jack M. Weiss, New Orleans, Alton B. Lewis, Hammond, for Defendants/Appellees Time Warner Entertainment Company, et al.

Kyle Schonekas, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellee Time Warner, Inc.

Before CARTER and FITZSIMMONS, JJ., and CHIASSON, ¹ J. Pro Tem.

[97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 3] CARTER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a trial court judgment dismissing a negligence and intentional tort claim on a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.

FACTS

This suit arises from the shooting of plaintiff, Patsy Byers (Byers) by Sarah Edmondson (Edmondson) and Benjamin Darrus (Darrus). According to the allegations of Byers' ² petition, Edmondson and Darrus acted together when Edmondson shot and seriously wounded Byers during an armed robbery of a Time Saver convenience store in Ponchatoula, Louisiana. Darrus accompanied Edmondson upon the shooting spree, encouraged her to engage in the shooting spree and assisted Edmondson by driving her to and from the armed robbery and shooting. Neither Edmondson nor Darrus attempted to obtain medical assistance for Byers after shooting her. The shooting, which took place on March 8, 1995, rendered Byers a paraplegic.

On July 26, 1995, Byers filed suit against Edmondson and Darrus for the damages sustained by Byers and her family as a result of the armed robbery and shooting. In early March 1996, Byers filed a first supplemental and amending petition for damages, adding Edmondson's parents and several insurance companies as defendants. In this petition, Byers alleged that the gun used in the shooting was obtained from a cabin owned by Edmondson's parents.

On the same date, Byers filed a second supplemental and amending petition for damages, through which she named Warner Home Video, Inc., Warner Brothers, Inc., Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P., Time Warner, Inc., Regency Enterprises, ³ Alcor Films, J.D. Productions and Oliver Stone as additional defendants. Byers restated the same prior allegations with respect to the occurrence of the shooting and the obtaining of the weapon used in the shooting. The new allegations asserted that Edmondson and Darrus "went upon a crime spree culminating in the shooting and [97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 4] permanent injury to Patsy Ann Byers as a result of seeing and becoming inspired by the movie 'Natural Born Killers' produced, directed and distributed by the Hollywood defendants." ⁴ The amended petition further alleged that "[a]ll of the Hollywood defendants are liable, more particularly, but not exclusively for, distributing a film which they knew or should have known would cause and inspire people such as ... Edmondson and ... Darrus, to commit crimes such as the shooting of Patsy Ann Byers, and for producing and distributing a film which glorified the type of violence [Edmondson and Darrus] committed against Patsy Ann Byers by treating individuals who commit such violence as celebrities and heroes, as well as for such other negligence as will be learned during discovery and shown at trial of this matter."

On September 25, 1996, defendant Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. (TWEC), filed a motion to strike any references to Warner Home Video, Inc., and Warner Brothers, Inc., as defendants. TWEC contended that these two entities were unincorporated divisions of TWEC, which was already a named defendant in the suit. ⁵ On this same date, Time Warner, Inc., filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of personal jurisdiction and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. Additionally, TWEC, Alcor Film & TV GMBH & Co. Produktions KG, Jane and Don Productions Inc., and Oliver Stone (the Warner defendants) ⁶ filed their own peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action on September 25, 1996. In the exception, the Warner defendants asserted that they owed no duty to plaintiffs to ensure that none of the viewers of the movie would decide to imitate actions depicted in the fictional film. The Hollywood defendants also denied that they owed a duty to prevent harm inflicted by others absent a "special relationship" obligating the defendant to protect the plaintiff from such harm. They further asserted that imposition [97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 5] of such a duty would violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution. A hearing on the exception was set for December 16, 1996.

A week before the hearing, on December 9, 1996, Byers filed a third supplemental and amending petition for damages through which she added and supplemented the allegations with respect to the actions and liability of the Warner defendants. Paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' third supplemental and amending petition for damages provides:

Plaintiffs desire to supplement and amend paragraph V. (E). of their Petition to read as follows:

V.(E).

All of the Hollywood defendants are liable, more particularly, but not exclusively:

A) for producing and distributing a film (and marketing same on videotape) which they knew, intended, were substantially certain, or should have known would cause or incite persons such as defendants, Sarah Edmondson, and Benjamin Darrus (via subliminal suggestion or glorification of violent acts) to begin, shortly after repeatedly viewing same, crime sprees such as that which led to the shooting of Patsy Ann Byers;

B) for negligently and/or recklessly failing to take steps to minimize violent content of the video or to minimize glorification of senselessly violent acts and those who perpetrate such conduct;

C) by intentionally, recklessly, or negligently including in the video subliminal images which either directly advocated violent activity or which would cause viewers to repeatedly view the video and thereby become more susceptible to its advocacy of violent activity; ⁷

D) for negligently and/or recklessly failing to warn viewers of the potential deleterious effects upon teenage viewers caused by repeated viewing of the film/video and of the presence of subliminal messages therein; and

E) as well as for other such intentional, reckless, or negligent acts will [sic] be learned during discovery and shown at trial of this matter.

Two days later, Byers filed a memorandum opposing the Warner defendants' exceptions raising the objection of no cause of action. In this opposition, Byers asserted that Edmondson and Darrus 1) repeatedly viewed the movie on videotape, [97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 6] sometimes under the influence of mind-altering drugs; 2) desired to emulate the protagonists of the video by obtaining a gun and ammunition; and 3) began their own reenactment of the "Mickey and Mallory" story from the film, resulting in the murder of a Mississippi cotton gin owner and brutal attempted murder of Patsy Byers.

On the morning of the hearing, the Warner defendants filed a reply memorandum, noting that a similar claim filed in Georgia against the Warner defendants as a result of a Georgia murder by a couple who was allegedly imitating the actions of the characters "Mickey and Mallory" from "Natural Born Killers," had recently been dismissed for the failure to state a cause of action. Subsequently, on December 23, 1996, defendant Time Warner, Inc., filed a declinatory exception of lack of jurisdiction and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action in response to Byers' third supplemental and amending petition.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted the peremptory exceptions raising the objection of no cause of action, finding that the "law simply does not recognize a cause of action such as that presented in [Byers'] petition." Because counsel for Byers did not contend Byers could otherwise amend the petition to attempt to state any other cause of action as against the Warner defendants, the court did not grant leave to amend. A judgment was signed on January 23, 1997, sustaining the peremptory exceptions raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissing Byers' suit as to those claims against the Warner defendants. ⁸ Byers filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. ⁹

[97-0831 La.App. 1 Cir. 7] Byers appealed the judgment of the trial court, assigning as error the trial court's finding that Byers' cause of action was proscribed by Louisiana law and United States and Louisiana constitutional guarantees of free speech.

PEREMPTORY EXCEPTION RAISING OBJECTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

The objection of no cause of action is properly raised by the peremptory exception. The exception of no cause of action questions "whether the law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition." Louisiana Paddlewheels v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission, 94-2015, p. 5, n. 3 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 885, 888, n. 3; Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 96-1010, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 751, 754, writ denied, 97-1066 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 982. The purpose of an exception pleading the objection of no cause of action is to determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 93-0690, p. 2 (La.7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 241; Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 So.2d at 754.

Generally, no evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 691 So.2d at 754....