97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 10/22/97, Tomas v. Conco Food Distributors

• Decision Date: 22 October 1997
• Citation: 702 So.2d 944
• Parties: 97-426 La.App. 3 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 944

702 So.2d 944

97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 10/22/97

Gregory L. TOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONCO FOOD DISTRIBUTORS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-426.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

Oct. 22, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1998.

Roy Maughan, Baton Rouge, for Gregory L. Tomas.

Denis Paul Juge, Patrick J. Browne, Jr., Metairie, for Conco Food Distributors.

Richard McGimsey, Assistant Attorney General, for State.

Before THIBODEAUX, COOKS and SULLIVAN, JJ.

[97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 1] COOKS, Judge.

Gregory L. Tomas sought workers' compensation benefits after suffering a stroke while attending a meeting at work. The Office of Workers' Compensation Administration denied benefits and found it lacked jurisdiction to determine Tomas' constitutional challenge to Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1021(7)(e) which provides recovery for heart-related or perivascular injuries when caused only by extraordinary physical stress. Subsequently, we too agreed hearing officers are not vested with authority to rule on the constitutionality of workers' compensation statutes. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the hearing officer instructing her to transfer the case to the appropriate district court for proceedings on the constitutional issue. Tomas now appeals the trial court's finding that La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) does not violate the Louisiana State Constitution. For the following reasons, we affirm.

[97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 2] BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 2, 1992, Tomas, Conco's marketing director, suffered a stroke while attending a Conco executive meeting. He was immediately transported to the hospital where diagnostic work, including an angiogram, was performed. As a result of complications related to the angiogram, Tomas suffered a second stroke which resulted in him sustaining severe, irreversible brain damage. Tomas filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits grounded on La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) which, as it stands, limits recovery to employees who suffer heart-related or perivascular injuries caused by extraordinary physical stress only. Tomas could have filed suit relying on general tort law. Instead, he claimed entitlement to benefits pursuant to the special, remedial provisions of Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Act. To avoid dismissal, Tomas amended his petition to challenge the constitutionality of La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e).

Hearing Officer Sharon M. McCauley found Tomas' stroke resulted from extraordinary and unusual work-related mental stress as opposed to physical stress and, hence, denied Tomas' workers' compensation claim. McCauley further concluded the workers' compensation tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on Tomas' constitutional challenge to La.R.S. 23:1201(7)(e)(i) and (ii). On rehearing, we remanded the case to the Office of Workers' Compensation with instructions to transfer it to the district court of proper jurisdiction. The trial court found La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) was constitutional. Tomas' subsequent Motion for New Trial was denied.

Tomas assignments of error read:

1. The trial judge committed reversible error in not finding a "class of disabled employees" who demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the predominant and major cause of their heart attack or stroke was extraordinary and unusual non-physical work stress in comparison to the stress or exertion experienced by the average employee in that occupation not some other source of stress or pre-existing condition are in a "class" protected by Article I, [97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 3] Sec. 3 of the Louisiana Constitution which prohibits discrimination based on "physical condition."

2. The trial court committed reversible error in not finding that the proponents of R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) failed to meet their burden of proof that excluding workers' compensation benefits to a "class of disabled employees" who demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the predominant and major cause of the heart attack-stroke was extraordinary and unusual work stress in comparison to the stress or exertion experienced by the average employee in that occupation and not some other source of stress or pre-existing condition, substantially furthers an important governmental objective.

3. The trial judge committed reversible error in not declaring LSA-R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) unconstitutional because it denied equal protection guaranteed by Art. I Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Louisiana Constitution insofar as it excludes workers' compensation benefits for a "class of disabled employees" who demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that their stroke or heart attack was caused by extraordinary or unusual non-physical work stress in comparison to the stress or exertion experienced by average employees occupation and not some other source of stress or pre-existing condition.

4. The trial judge committed reversible error in not finding R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) is unconstitutional under the facts of this case because it denies a fundamental right of adequate remedy by due process of law guaranteed by Art. I, Secs. 1, 2, 3 and 22 of the Louisiana Constitution to "disabled employees who demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the predominant and major cause of strokes or heart attacks is extraordinary and unusual non-physical work stress in comparison to the stress or exertion experienced by the average employee in his occupation and not some other source of stress or pre-existing condition."

LAW & DISCUSSION

Our role in determining the constitutionality of statutes was discussed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Chamberlain v. State, through DOTD, 624 So.2d 874 (La.1993). In Chamberlain, the supreme court stated:

"It is not our role to consider the policy or wisdom of the [legislature] in adopting [the statute]. It is our province to determine only the [97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 4] applicability, legality and constitutionality of the [statute]." City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So.2d 215, 219 (La.1987) (collecting cases); Board of Commissioners of Orleans Levee District v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281, 298 n. 5 (La.1986) (noting that separation of powers precludes court from considering wisdom of statute).

Id. at 879. With the Chamberlain opinion in mind, we must consider "not whether the constitution empowers, but rather whether the constitution limits the legislature, either expressly or impliedly, from enacting the statute at issue." Id. Because the issues Tomas raises are interrelated, we elect to address all assignments of error together.

Tomas contends the trial judge erred in failing to find him in a class protected by Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution which prohibits discrimination based on physical condition. In addition, Tomas alleges the trial judge erred in failing to find that La.R.S. 23:1201(7)(e) does not substantially further an important governmental objective which may be required where persons or interests are classified differently.

The trial court found Tomas was not in a class of disabled employees protected by Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution which prohibits discrimination against persons because of "physical condition." In his oral reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated:

"The--I see no derivative class in the sense as one group, which can be determined as being discriminated against. It is gender neutral. It is race neutral--the statute, that is. It is generic neutral. It is nationality neutral. Only after there has been a condition resulting does the argument that plaintiff has used, and very effectively, too--that now that this condition has arose--i.e., stroke, heart attack--then the person so affected becomes a member of a class.

[97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 5] I don't think that is a kind of class that the Constitution prescribes, but even if it is, I think that there is a sufficient interest in the legislature in dealing with a perceived problem that was brought to the fore in the [Reid] decision, expanding the coverage to those non-physical work type heart attacks or strokes.

To that end, I must hold that the statute is constitutional and is an appropriate and proper action on the part of the legislature to deal with the problem that they reasonably perceived as an existence."

In brief, Tomas contends the trial judge's findings are contrary to the law as set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985). In Sibley, the plaintiff proved that acts of malpractice consigned her to a lifetime of institutional care and that her total damages exceeded the $500,000.00 statutory limit legislatively established for recovery in medical malpractice suits. The Sibley plaintiff argued the $500,000.00 statutory limitation was invalid because it conflicted with the equal protection clause of Article I, Section 3 which prohibits discrimination based on "physical condition." The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a provision affecting "severely injured plaintiffs" who were singled out by the statute and denied full recovery was a legislative classification based on "physical condition" as defined by Art. I, Sec. 3 of the Louisiana Constitution. The Supreme Court reasoned, in pertinent part:

"The statute creates two classes: one, a group of malpractice victims each of whom has suffered damage that would oblige a defendant under our basic law to repair it by paying in excess of 500,000 dollars; another, a class consisting of victims whose damages would not require an award over this amount to make individual reparation. Victims in the former class are prevented from recovering for all their damage, while those in the latter class are allowed full recovery. Damage to the physical condition of [97-426 La.App. 3 Cir. 6] each malpractice victim is the primary element of his damage and a primary cause of his being assigned to one of the two classes. Thus, the statutory classification...