Hylton v. Gunter

• Decision Date: 09 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19159.,19159.
• Citation: 313 Conn. 472,97 A.3d 970
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Richard HYLTON v. Garfield GUNTER et al.

313 Conn. 472

97 A.3d 970

Richard HYLTON

v.Garfield GUNTER et al.

No. 19159.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 23, 2014.

Decided Sept. 9, 2014.

Houston Putnam Lowry, with whom, on the brief, was Julie A. Morgan, Meriden, for the appellant (named defendant).

Gerald M. Beaudoin, with whom, on the brief, was Francisco A. Cardona, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ROBINSON, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether we should overrule Lord v. Mansfield, 50 Conn.App. 21, 717 A.2d 267, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 943, 723 A.2d 321 (1998), in which the Appellate Court held that a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal under General Statutes § 52–263¹ when the trial court has awarded, but not yet determined the amount of, common-law punitive damages, which are limited under Connecticut law to attorney's fees and certain litigation costs. See, e.g., Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 237–38, 477 A.2d 988 (1984). The defendant Garfield Gunter ² appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal, pursuant to Lord, from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Richard Hylton, $342,648 in compensatory damages, and “ ‘punitive damages in the form of attorney's fees' ” on the counts of his complaint alleging, inter alia, fraud and civil theft. Hylton v. Gunter, 142 Conn.App. 548, 551, 66 A.3d 517 (2013). We agree with the defendant's claim that Lord was wrongly decided because, among other reasons, it is inconsistent with this court's decision in Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 523, 544 A.2d 634 (1988), which adopted the “bright line rule” that “a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record and the Appellate Court's opinion reveal the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant are equal members of Progressive Electric & Telecommunications, LLC (Progressive). The plaintiff stopped working for Progressive in July, 2008, leaving the defendant to manage its operations and finances. After the plaintiff learned that the defendant was misappropriating Progressive's moneys for his own personal use, he brought this action seeking damages from the defendant in an eight count complaint alleging fraud, negligence, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil theft, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 142 Conn.App. at 551 and n. 3, 66 A.3d 517. The case was tried to the court. See id. at 550–51, 66 A.3d 517.

“On March 14, 2011, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it found in favor of the plaintiff on the eight counts of his complaint and awarded him $342,648 in compensatory damages. The court also found that the plaintiff was entitled to ‘punitive damages in the form of attorney's fees' on the counts alleging fraud, civil theft, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,⁴ and it instructed the plaintiff to file an affidavit of attorney's fees within thirty days. On April 6, 2011, the defendant filed this appeal [in the Appellate Court]. On May 20, 2011, after a hearing, the trial court awarded the plaintiff $23,400 in punitive damages, which represented the amount claimed in attorney's fees. The defendant did not amend his appeal subsequent to the trial court determining the amount of the punitive damages. On September 12, 2012, this appeal was placed on the [Appellate Court's] own motion calendar for dismissal for lack of a final judgment on the ground that, at the time the appeal was filed, the trial court had not yet resolved the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. After the motion hearing, the [Appellate Court] marked the matter over and ordered the parties to brief whether the defendant's appeal from the March 14, 2011 judgment was an appeal from a final judgment. Both parties subsequently briefed the issue and argued the issue as part of this appeal.” (Footnotes altered.) Id. at 550–51, 66 A.3d 517.

The Appellate Court subsequently dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment pursuant to § 52–263. See id. at 552–54, 66 A.3d 517. The Appellate Court noted that, in Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. at 522–23, 544 A.2d 634, this court held that “ ‘a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined.’ ” Hylton v. Gunter, supra, 142 Conn.App. at 552, 66 A.3d 517. The Appellate Court then relied, however, on its subsequent decision in Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 50 Conn.App. at 21, 717 A.2d 267, which “distinguished the reimbursement of attorney's fees from the awarding of punitive damages. Punitive damages ... serve the purpose of vindicating the public interest and deterring others from committing similar wrongs.... This court held that an appeal taken prior to a determination by the trial court as to the recoverability and amount of punitive damages was not an appeal from a final judgment.” (Citation omitted.) Hylton v. Gunter, supra at 552, 66 A.3d 517; see also id. at 550, 66 A.3d 517 (“this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide an appeal prior to a determination by the trial court of the recoverability and amount of punitive damages; a judgment is final only after such a determination is made”). The Appellate Court then concluded that, because the trial court's award of attorney's fees was not made pursuant to an authorizing statute, but rather, was “explicitly called ... punitive damages, its manifest intention was to award the plaintiff punitive damages.” Id. at 554, 66 A.3d 517. Accordingly, the Appellate Court followed Lord and dismissed the defendant's appeal for lack of a final judgment. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed his appeal for lack of a final judgment. Specifically, he relies on this court's endorsement of bright line rules in the final judgment context in Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. at 522–23, 544 A.2d 634, as explained in Benvenuto v. Mahajan, 245 Conn. 495, 498–500, 715 A.2d 743 (1998). The defendant contends that there was a final judgment in this case because all that remained for the trial court to do was set the amount of attorney's fees, despite the fact that those fees were awarded in the context of common-law punitive damages rather than pursuant to a statute. The defendant further contends that the decision that controlled this case before the Appellate Court, Lord v. Mansfield, supra, 50 Conn.App. at 23–28, 717 A.2d 267, was wrongly decided. He argues that Lord is inconsistent with Paranteau and Benvenuto because the case-by-case determination regarding the finality of judgments in Lord, which depends on whether an attorney's fees order is compensatory and integral to the judgment on the merits or collateral in nature, spawns confusion. In response, the plaintiff notes the policy behind the final judgment rule, namely, discouraging piecemeal litigation, and relies on the doctrinal distinction between attorney's fees awarded pursuant to a statute and those awarded as punitive damages, in arguing that the Appellate Court properly followed Lord in dismissing the defendant's appeal.⁵ We agree with the defendant, and conclude that an appealable final judgment existed when this appeal was filed, despite the fact that the trial court had not yet determined the amount of the attorney's fees that comprised its common-law punitive damages award.

“As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an appeal. A determination regarding ... subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law ... [and, therefore] our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Khan v. Hillyer, 306 Conn. 205, 209, 49 A.3d 996 (2012).

“The right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met.... It is ... axiomatic that, except insofar as the legislature has specifically provided for an interlocutory appeal or other form of interlocutory appellate review ... appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments of the trial court. General Statutes § 52–263....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jamar D., 300 Conn. 764, 770, 18 A.3d 582 (2011).

It is well settled that a “judgment rendered only upon the issue of liability without an award of damages is interlocutory in character and not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 294 Conn. 280, 297, 984 A.2d 658 (2009); see also, e.g., Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., 222 Conn. 211, 212, 608 A.2d 682 (1992); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985). Nevertheless, “a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the recoverability or amount of attorney's fees for the litigation remains to be determined.” Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. at 523, 544 A.2d 634.

In concluding that a judgment of the trial court awarding common-law punitive damages limited to attorney's fees is final, despite the fact that the court has not yet determined the amount of those fees, we begin with a review of the leading case, Paranteau v. DeVita, supra, 208 Conn. at 515, 544 A.2d 634. In Paranteau, this court considered whether an appealable final judgment existed when a trial court found...