Mays v. Sudderth

• Citation: 97 F.3d 107
• Decision Date: 15 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-10591,95-10591
• Parties: Melissa V. MAYS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ben D. SUDDERTH; Thomas Pack; Erath County, Texas, Defendants, and David Coffee, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 107

97 F.3d 107

Melissa V. MAYS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ben D. SUDDERTH; Thomas Pack; Erath County, Texas, Defendants and David Coffee, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-10591.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 15, 1996.

Douglas R. Larson, Law Office of Douglas R. Larson, Mesquite, TX, for plaintiff-appellee.

Charles Rex Hall, Jr., Allison and Associates, Austin, TX, for defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, EMILIO M. GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DENNIS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we determine whether a sheriff is absolutely immune from suit and liability for damages in a civil action brought against him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries resulting from the sheriff's attachment of the plaintiff in accordance with a judicial order, facially valid and within the court's jurisdiction. The district court, in ruling on the defendant sheriff's motion for summary judgment, held, in pertinent part, that the sheriff was only qualifiedly immune from suit and refused to enter a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the sheriff in his individual capacity. We conclude that a government official's strict compliance with a facially valid judicial order issued by a court acting within its jurisdiction clothes the official with the absolute judicial immunity enjoyed by the judge issuing the order. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling that Sheriff Coffee is not entitled to absolute immunity, render partial summary judgment dismissing the § 1983 action for damages against the Sheriff, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This suit arises out of the arrest and detention of the plaintiff, Melissa Mays, pursuant to a writ of attachment ordered by Judge Don Jones, a duly elected judge of the 266th Judicial District of Texas, and issued by defendant Thomas Pack, the District Clerk of that court. During June and July 1990, Judge Jones presided over the capital murder trial of Jerry Roland Garrett, who received legal representation from defendant Ben D. Sudderth. In the course of that representation, defendant Sudderth sought to subpoena Mays as a material defense witness and, at his request, defendant Pack twice issued a subpoena to secure her appearance at trial. Both subpoenas, issued respectively on June 11 and June 15, 1990, were returned unserved because they did not contain a correct address for Mays. ¹

Mr. Garrett personally filed an application for writ of attachment, dated July 3, 1990, requesting the court to issue a writ of attachment against two persons, other than Mays, who had failed to appear at trial in accordance with subpoenas served upon them. Some time thereafter, Judge Jones met in his chambers with defendants Sudderth and Pack concerning the application. Defendant Sudderth orally informed Judge Jones that Mays was a material witness whose presence On July 11, 1990, Mays was taken into custody by Parker County Sheriff's deputies at her parent's home in Aledo. She was subsequently picked up by deputies of Erath County Sheriff David Coffee, the appellant herein, and booked into the Erath County jail pursuant to the writ of attachment served on Sheriff Coffee's office. Mays alleges that defendant Coffee complied with the writ despite knowledge that no legal basis existed for her attachment because the subpoenas that had been issued for Mays had been returned unserved. Mays was held overnight at the Erath County jail ³ and taken to court the next morning where she testified briefly that she had no knowledge of facts relevant to the case and was dismissed.

                he had been unable to secure although he had unsuccessfully attempted to serve her with a subpoena. 2  Judge Jones instructed Sudderth to add Mays' name in handwriting to the application for writ of attachment and ordered Pack to issue a writ of attachment for Mays.  A "writ of attachment on body," signed by Judge Jones, was issued on July 11, 1990, ordering "any sheriff or constable within the State of Texas ... to forthwith attach the body of Malissa [sic] Mays ... and deliver said body safely to the possession of David Coffee, Sheriff, Stephenville, Erath County, TX to be produced before the 266th Judicial District Court of Erath County, Texas, on the 12th day of July, 19__ at 9:00 o'clock A.M. ..."
                

Mays brought a § 1983 action seeking compensatory and exemplary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against attorney Sudderth, ⁴ District Clerk Pack, Sheriff Coffee and Erath County, Texas. ⁵ Pack and Coffee were sued in both their individual and official capacities. Mays alleged that Sheriff Coffee, "knowing that the first two subpoenas naming the Plaintiff had been returned unserved to the Erath County Sheriff's Department, and knowing that there was no legal basis for the arrest of the Plaintiff, agreed and conspired with Sudderth, Pack and Judge Jones to serve the unlawful Writ of Attachment and cause the illegal arrest of the Plaintiff." ⁶ Defendants Pack, Coffee and Erath County jointly filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in pertinent part that Pack and Coffee were absolutely immune from suit based on their execution of Judge Jones' order. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of District Clerk Pack on the ground that, in his individual capacity, he was absolutely immune from Mays' § 1983 damages claims.

The court held, however, that Sheriff Coffee enjoyed only qualified immunity and that plaintiff was entitled to seek discovery on her § 1983 claims against him. Sheriff Coffee here appeals the district court's denial of his summary judgment motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Although ordinarily only final judgments are reviewable on appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, "the denial of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)(citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982)); see Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 848-49 (Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1976) 5th Cir.1991). We thus have jurisdiction to review Sheriff Coffee's claim that the district court erred in denying him summary judgment on the ground that he is not absolutely immune from suit. ⁷ We review the district court's decision to deny summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria employed by the court in the first instance. See Johnson v. Odom, 910 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (5th Cir.1990)(denial of qualified immunity reviewed de novo ), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 1387, 113 L.Ed.2d 443 (1991). Thus, we will reverse if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

B. Absolute Immunity

Sheriff Coffee contends that he shares Judge Jones' absolute immunity from suit for claims arising from the arrest and detention of Mays pursuant to the writ of attachment issued by the judge. The district court, relying on a decision that recognized that "[s]heriffs enjoy qualified immunity from damages for official actions taken in good faith," Hamill v. Wright, 870 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.1989), held that Coffee was entitled only to qualified immunity for his actions in executing Judge Jones' order. The district court, however, erred in resting its analysis of the question solely on Sheriff Coffee's identity as sheriff, rather than evaluating his role in the context of this case. In order to determine "whether particular actions of government officials fit within a common law tradition of absolute immunity, or only the more general standard of qualified immunity, [courts] have applied a 'functional approach,' ... which looks to 'the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.' " Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993)(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). Whether Sheriff Coffee is entitled to absolute immunity requires us to evaluate his role in executing a facially valid order in light of the judicial process of which he was a part.

It is well established that judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial acts performed in judicial proceedings. Pierson v Absolute immunity applies to the judicial acts of judges acting within their jurisdiction even in suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, despite that statute's obvious focus on the unlawful acts of state officials. ⁸ See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218 (section 1983 does not abrogate absolute immunity afforded judges under the common law). Although the presumption in § 1983 actions is that government officials are protected in the exercise of their duties by qualified rather than absolute immunity, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (citations omitted), § 1983 "is to be read 'in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.' " Id. at 484, 111 S.Ct. at 1938 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418, 96 S.Ct. 984, 989, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). To determine whether a government official is absolutely immune from suit, the court must " 'undertake[ ] a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at...