Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College
| Decision Date | 02 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-8540,90-8760 and 90-8930,s. 90-8540 |
| Citation | 970 F.2d 785 |
| Parties | Melba J. BURRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GA. MILITARY COLLEGE, et al., Defendants, Jacob L. Goldstein, etc., and Alva L. Baggarly, etc., Defendants-Appellants. Melba J. BURRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The BD. OF TRUSTEES OF GA. MILITARY COLLEGE, Alva L. Baggarly, Individually & in his official capacity as Chief Exec. Officer of First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Milledgeville, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Milledgeville and Unknown Co-Conspirators, Defendants, James E. Baugh, Indiv. & in his official capacities as Mayor of the City of Milledgeville, Ga. & Chairman of the Bd. of Tr. of Ga. Military College, Jacob L. Goldstein, Indiv. & in his official capacities as a member of the Bd. of Dir. of First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Milledgeville & as a member of the Bd. of Tr. of Ga. Military College, Defendants-Appellants. Melba J. BURRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GA. MILITARY COLLEGE, James E. Baugh, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, Jacob L. Goldstein, as a member of the Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, and the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Milledgeville, Defendants-Appellants, Alva L. Baggarly, etc., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Craig N. Cowart, Carr G. Dodson, Jones, Cork and Miller, Macon, Ga., for Jacob L. Goldstein and Alva L. Baggarly.
Christopher Coates, Milledgeville, Ga., for Melba J. Burrell.
Charles A. Mathis, Jr., D. James Jordan, Mathis, Sands, Jordan and Adams, P.C., Milledgeville, Ga., for James E. Baugh et al.
Carr G. Dodson, Craig N. Cowart, Macon, Ga., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Fordham University School of Law, New York City, for amicus-First Federal, Goldstein and Baggarly.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, BIRCH, Circuit Judge, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
This opinion consolidates three appeals, Nos. 90-8540, 90-8760, and 90-8930, from an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denying motions for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Melba J. Burrell (Burrell) has brought an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against James E. Baugh, mayor of Milledgeville, Georgia, and chairman of the board of trustees of Georgia Military College (GMC); Jacob L. Goldstein, a member of the board of directors of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Milledgeville (First Federal) and of GMC's board of trustees; 1 Alva L. Baggarly, First Federal's chief executive officer and president, and a member of First Federal's board of directors; GMC's board of trustees; the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Milledgeville; and unknown co-conspirators, alleging that she was fired from her job as First Federal's senior vice president in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 2 and 1985(3) 3 (1988). 4 Specifically, Burrell alleges the following conspiracy in her complaint: "Baugh, Goldstein, Baggarly, and unknown co-conspirators ... reached an agreement and entered into a conspiracy, the object of which was to discharge [Burrell] from her employment with ... First Federal in retaliation for her and her husband's public criticism of ... GMC." The complaint further asserts that
[i]n concert[, Baugh, Goldstein, Baggarly, and unknown co-conspirators] participated in certain overt acts in furtherance of said conspiracy, including but not limited to, conversations involving themselves and employees of the City of Milledgeville pertaining to how acts of retaliation might be carried out against [Burrell] and her husband and how [Burrell] could be discharged from her employment with ... First Federal for alleged job-related reasons.
Burrell seeks reinstatement to her position as senior vice president with backpay and compensatory and punitive damages.
Baugh, Goldstein, and Baggarly moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. 5 The district court denied their motions, and the three now appeal in Nos. 90-8540 and 90-8760. Baugh and Goldstein also join the Mayor and Aldermen of Milledgeville and GMC's board in their appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) in No. 90-8930.
In appeal No. 90-8540, we reverse the denial of qualified immunity to Baugh and Goldstein as public officials against Burrell's section 1983 claim, and affirm the denial of qualified immunity to Baugh and Goldstein against Burrell's section 1985(3) claim and to all other appellants. In appeal No. 90-8760, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity to all appellants. We dismiss appeal No. 90-8930 for lack of jurisdiction. After disposing of the jurisdictional issues, we will discuss the merits of appeals Nos. 90-8760 and 90-8540 in order. 6
We have jurisdiction to entertain appeals Nos. 90-8540 and 90-8760 under Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), which held that a "denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law," id. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817, constitutes an appealable collateral order as defined by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Even assuming, without deciding, that some facts remain disputed in this case, the mere existence of a factual quarrel does not affect the appealability of a denial of qualified immunity. See Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 717-18 (11th Cir.), vacated as moot, 931 F.2d 711 (11th Cir.1991); see also Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1535-37 (11th Cir.1990) (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991).
Appeals Nos. 90-8540 and 90-8760 do not escape our jurisdictional grasp simply because Burrell seeks equitable as well as legal relief. Qualified immunity does not shield against equitable claims. Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 787 (11th Cir.1988). We recently have held, however, that a denial of qualified immunity remains immediately appealable, even where the government official would have to stand trial on the equitable claims left undisturbed by a grant of qualified immunity as to the legal claims. Id. at 786-88. Although Marx alone disposes of the jurisdictional question, we point out that Baugh, Goldstein, and Baggarly would not have to face the tribulations of trial on the equitable claims even if they should not be immune from the legal claims. With the possible exception of Baggarly, 7 they could not provide Burrell with the equitable relief she seeks because they would be in no position to reinstate her as senior vice president at First Federal.
Our jurisdiction over appeals Nos. 90-8540 and 90-8760 also remains untainted by our ultimate conclusion that certain defendants were not entitled to raise the qualified immunity defense in the first place. If we have jurisdiction to determine whether a particular defendant generally eligible to raise qualified immunity may benefit from it in the particular case at hand, we surely have jurisdiction to determine whether qualified immunity may shield that defendant as a general matter.
Appeal No. 90-8930 reaches us from an order entered by the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988). An administrative panel of this court granted GMC's board, Baugh, Goldstein as a member of GMC's board, and the Mayor and Aldermen of Milledgeville leave to appeal pursuant to section 1292(b). We have concluded that their motion for leave to appeal was improvidently granted and vacate the order allowing this appeal to proceed.
Under section 1292(b), a district court may certify for appeal a non-final order if the court finds that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion" and that resolution of the question "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 8 The district court certified the following issue for appeal pursuant to section 1292(b):
After reviewing the briefs submitted by the parties, it appears to the court that a prima facie case of conspiracy to commit unconstitutional acts under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) can be based upon circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence has no less weight than direct evidence as long as it reasonably establishes that fact rather than anything else. The Supreme Court, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), thought "it would be open to a jury, in light of the sequence that followed, to infer from the circumstances ..." that the state actor and private party had a "meeting of the minds." The court finds that plaintiff has submitted enough circumstantial evidence regarding the elements necessary for a conspiracy to withstand defendants' motions for summary judgment.
This passage identifies one question of law: whether a prima facie case of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) may rely on circumstantial evidence. We fully agree with the district court that this question must be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, our agreement with the district court is so complete and unequivocal that we cannot make out the "substantial ground for difference of opinion" required by section 1292(b). Accordingly, we dismiss appeal No. 90-8930. 9 Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 832 F.2d 554, 557 (11th Cir.1987) (); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 777 F.2d 598, 607 (11th Cir.1985) (), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116, 106 S.Ct. 1973, 90 L.Ed.2d 656 (1986).
Having settled the jurisdictional question, we now address appeals Nos. 90-8760 and 90-8540 in turn.
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