People v. Smith, 97SC432

Decision Date11 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97SC432,97SC432
Citation971 P.2d 1056
Parties1999 CJ C.A.R. 135 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Kimberly SMITH, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Robert Mark Russel, First Assistant Attorney General, Catherine P. Adkisson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Enforcement Section Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Anne Stockham, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent

Chief Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a defendant serving a mandatory sentence for child abuse resulting in death is eligible for sentence modification upon completion of the regimented inmate training program. We hold that, in general, such a defendant is eligible for sentence reduction. However, because we conclude that a court may not impose a sentence below the statutory minimum, and the defendant in this case received the statutory minimum sentence, she was not eligible for sentence reduction. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment in People v. Smith, 946 P.2d 570 (Colo.App.1997) and return the case to the court of appeals with directions to consider the defendant's constitutional claims.

I. FACTS AND PRIOR DISPOSITION

The defendant, Kimberly Smith, was the stepmother of Shamika Smith. On February 4, 1991, Shamika Smith, then six years old, was admitted to Memorial Hospital with a severe closed-head injury. She remained in a coma until March 12, 1991 when she died as a result of her injury. Kimberly Smith was the only person present when her stepdaughter was injured. On March 25, 1991, Smith was charged by information with child abuse resulting in death, in violation of section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

On November 7, 1991 a jury returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced Smith to sixteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. In November 1994, Smith filed a Motion for Sentence Reconsideration pursuant to Crim. P. 35(b). The trial court denied her motion, explaining that it did not have legal authority to reduce her sentence below the mandatory minimum of sixteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. See People v.Smith, 932 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1996), cert. denied, No. 96SC558 (Colo. Mar. 17, 1997).

While Smith's appeal from denial of her Crim. P. 35(b) motion was pending, the Department of Corrections assigned her to the regimented inmate training program (RITP) or "boot camp." See §§ 17-27.7-101 to -104, 6 C.R.S. (1998). She successfully completed the program and filed a timely motion for reduction of her sentence pursuant to section 17-27.7-104. At the resentencing hearing, Smith presented testimony from, among others, Lieut. Patrick Drawbridge, her senior case manager for the RITP. Lieut. Drawbridge praised Smith's conduct and recommended her for sentence reduction or placement in a community corrections program. In other testimony, Smith's RITP conduct was described as being "an example to her peers." Despite this testimony, the trial court denied her motion, again finding that it did not have authority to reduce her sentence below the statutory minimum. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision. See Smith, 946 P.2d at 573. The court of appeals relied on a distinction between "suspending" a sentence and "modifying" a sentence. The court found that although section 18-1-105(9)(d)(II) prohibited the trial court from suspending any part of Smith's sentence, it did not bar the trial court from modifying her sentence pursuant to section 17-27.7-104. See id. at 572-73. We granted certiorari, and we now reverse the court of appeals' judgment.

II. Analysis
A.

This case raises an issue regarding the interplay between resentencing under the RITP act and mandatory sentencing following a conviction for child abuse resulting in death. The People argue that although Smith was eligible to participate in the RITP or "boot camp" program, she was not eligible to take advantage of the "reward" provision. According to their reading, the mandatory sentencing provision and the RITP act conflict in this case because successful completion of the RITP qualified Smith for sentence reduction under section 17-27.7-104, yet she had already received the mandatory minimum sentence. See § 18-1-105(9)(d), 6 C.R.S. (1998) (mandatory sentencing provision). The People reason that the mandatory sentencing provision must govern these circumstances because it is specific to sentencing, and the legislature intended to establish an absolute minimum sentence that could not be lowered by the sentencing court.

According to Smith the plain language of section 17-27.7-104 establishes the trial court's discretion to "issue an order modifying the offender's sentence and placing the offender on probation or in a community corrections program." 1 Smith asserts that the General Assembly has not restricted the sentencing court's exercise of this discretion in any manner. To resolve any conflict with the mandatory sentencing statute, she relies on the court of appeals' distinction between "modification" of a sentence, allegedly permissible under section 17-27.7-104, and "suspension" of a sentence, prohibited by the mandatory sentencing provisions.

Smith further argues that the legislative intent of the RITP legislation "entitle[s] [Smith] to an opportunity equal to that given to other successful participants in this unique [boot camp] program." Finally, if we do find a conflict between the two statutes, Smith urges us to rely on the principle that the more recent statute, i.e. the RITP act, controls. See Smith v. Zufelt, 880 P.2d 1178, 1184 n. 9 (Colo.1994); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Salida Gas Serv. Co., 793 P.2d 602, 604 (Colo.App.1989).

Our analysis of the RITP statute's plain language leads us to the conclusion that it extends an offender's right to have his or her sentence reconsidered; however, it does not affect the ultimate sentencing range. Thus, we find that it does not conflict with the sentencing requirements set out in section 18-1-105(9)(d) and that the sentencing court properly refused to impose a sentence outside the mandatory sentencing guidelines.

B.

Basic rules of statutory construction govern our analysis. Our primary task is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191, 194 (Colo.1996). To discern such intent, we first look to the statutory language, according terms their plain and ordinary meaning. See id. When the plain language is clear, we will not rely on interpretive rules of statutory construction. See Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo.1997).

With respect to relevant case law, we presume that the general assembly is cognizant of judicial precedent when it enacts legislation. See id. at 409. Specifically, the legislature "is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of statutory language when it intentionally incorporates the language of one statute into another statute." Stoorman v. Greenwood Trust Co., 908 P.2d 133, 135 (Colo.1995).

As the parties note, when interpreting more than one statute, we will favor a construction that avoids potential conflict between the relevant provisions. See Zufelt, 880 P.2d at 1183. If a conflict cannot be reconciled, the more specific provision should prevail over the general provision unless the more general provision was adopted later and there is manifest intent that the general provision prevail. See § 2-4-205, 1 C.R.S. (1998); Zufelt, 880 P.2d at 1183.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the relevant statutes. For her conviction of child abuse resulting in death, Smith was sentenced pursuant to section 18-1-105(9) which provides, in relevant part:

(d)(I) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 or the class 3 felony of child abuse under section 18-6-401(7)(a)(I) or (7)(a)(III), the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class felony.

(II) In no case shall any defendant sentenced pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d) be eligible for suspension of sentence or for probation or deferred prosecution.

§ 18-1-105(9)(d). It is undisputed that Smith's conviction triggered this mandatory sentencing provision, that sixteen years was the minimum sentence within the applicable range, and that the trial court sentenced her to the statutory minimum.

In addition, the parties stipulated that Smith was qualified for and successfully completed the regimented inmate training program. Section 17-27.7-104(2) of the RITP act provides, in relevant part:

(2)(a) If an offender successfully completes a regimented inmate training program, such offender, within sixty days of termination or completion of the program, shall automatically be referred to the sentencing court so that the offender may make a motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant to rule 35b of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure.

....

(b) ... The court may issue an order modifying the offender's sentence and placing the offender on probation or in a community corrections program.

§ 17-27.7-104(2). We must determine whether, in this case, the trial court's discretion to "modify" an offender's sentence includes discretion to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum for the crime of which the defendant has been convicted.

We begin with the plain language of the RITP statute. The language of RITP section 17-27.7-104(2)(a) incorporates our long-standing Crim. P. 35(b)...

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