Mercado v. Ahmed, 91-1530

Citation974 F.2d 863
Decision Date04 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1530,91-1530
Parties36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 814 Lucy MERCADO, Individually and as Next Friend of Brian Mercado, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Salim AHMED and Checker Taxi Company, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

James T. Crotty, Zacarias R. Chacon, Timothy F. Kelly (argued), Crotty & Chacon, Chicago, Ill., Karl K. Vanzo, Munster, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard G. French (argued), Michael J. Ortyl, John P. Prusik, French, Kezelis & Kominiarek, Chicago, Ill., Howard Goffen, Jesmer & Harris, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., * and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and CURRAN, ** District Judge.

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity suit, plaintiff Lucy Mercado ("Mercado"), individually and as next friend of her minor son, Brian, filed a complaint in the district court against defendants Salim Ahmed ("Ahmed") and his former employer, the Checker Taxi Company, Inc. ("Checker"), alleging that due to Ahmed's negligence his taxi struck and injured Brian. The plaintiff further alleged that Checker was negligent in employing Ahmed because he was not qualified to operate the taxi. Mercado sought damages for Brian's personal injuries, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and medical expenses, and for her own mental anguish. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $50,000 for Brian's pain and suffering and $29,000 for his medical expenses. The district court judge denied Mercado's motion for a new trial and motion to amend the judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the jury's verdict was inconsistent and that the judge made several evidentiary errors, and requests a new trial on the issue of damages only. In the alternative, plaintiff asks that we amend the judgment and add to the damages award $2,995,933 for Brian's future medical care and $1,116,836 for Brian's future lost wages. We affirm the verdict of the jury.

I.

On October 13, 1985, Lucy Mercado traveled to Chicago, Illinois, from her home in Hammond, Indiana, with her four sons--including six-year-old Brian--to visit the Museum of Science and Industry. While walking in the museum parking lot, Brian slipped away from his mother, stepped out onto a crosswalk between two aisles of parked cars, and was struck on the crosswalk by a taxi driven by defendant Ahmed. The impact of the blow threw Brian four or five feet into the air and a distance of about one and one half car lengths.

Brian was taken by ambulance to the University of Chicago, Wyler's Children's Hospital. The boy was examined for an extended period of time, about three to four hours, by a team of doctors and other hospital personnel and then released that same day. According to the information in the hospital records testified to at trial, Brian never lost consciousness, reported no feeling of any pain, and was alert, stable and able to answer the emergency room doctors' questions. An examination of Brian's skull, eyes and ears revealed no signs of head injury. The boy's reflexes, blood pressure, heart rate, and pulse were all normal.

Trial testimony established that Brian, 11 years old, suffered from a wide range of problems prior to the accident. His ability to process visual and auditory information is substantially impaired, making reading, writing, and arithmetic very difficult for him. The boy has been diagnosed as suffering from severe emotional problems and as suicidal. He is unable to perform such rudimentary tasks as dressing properly or managing his personal hygiene. Both the plaintiff's and defendants' witnesses testified that Brian will require some form of institutionalization or structured environment for the remainder of his life. At the time of trial, Brian was a patient in the children's unit of Hartgrove Hospital. His employment prospects are limited to those positions which require the performance of only the most menial tasks.

Mercado argued at trial that Brian's many problems were caused by a closed head injury he suffered when he was struck by the taxi in the museum parking lot, an injury which she claims went undetected the day of the accident. The defendants countered that Brian's myriad problems stem from a condition which predated the taxi accident and are not related to the injuries he suffered when he was struck by Ahmed's taxi. The jury found against both Ahmed and Checker on the plaintiff's complaint, and awarded $29,000 for medical expenses and $50,000 for pain and suffering. The jury awarded no damages for disability from the injury, or for future medical expenses, much less anything for future lost earnings.

II.

Initially, we address the plaintiff's argument that the district court should have ordered a new trial on damages because the jury verdict was fatally inconsistent. Although this is a diversity case, our review of the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial is governed by federal law. M.T. Bonk Co. v. Milton Bradley Company, 945 F.2d 1404, 1407 (7th Cir.1991). We will reverse the district court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial only "upon exceptional circumstances showing a clear abuse of discretion." Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 835 (7th Cir.1989). "[W]e will not set aside a jury verdict if a reasonable basis exists in the record to support that verdict." M.T. Bonk, 945 F.2d at 1407. "We review damages evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict," Roggow v. Mineral Processing Corp., Needmore Processing Div., 894 F.2d 246, 249 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), and will "let the verdict stand unless there [is] no rational connection between the evidence on damages and the verdict," Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 716 (7th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). We adopt this posture because of our recognition that the "district court, having seen the presentation of evidence and observed the course of the trial, is in a unique position to rule on a new trial motion." Valbert v. Pass, 866 F.2d 237, 239 (7th Cir.1989).

With this highly deferential standard of review in mind, we turn to the plaintiff's argument that the jury's verdict was irreconcilably inconsistent. As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must apply state law--in this case the law of Illinois--to resolve the substantive questions. M.T. Bonk, 945 F.2d at 1407. The plaintiff correctly points out that, under Illinois law, 1 verdicts returned in the same action which are legally inconsistent should be set aside and a new trial granted. Wottowa Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Bock, 104 Ill.2d 311, 84 Ill.Dec. 451, 453, 472 N.E.2d 411, 413 (1984). 2 In support of her position that the instant verdict was inconsistent, the plaintiff cites four Illinois cases in which jury verdicts were overturned on appeal on grounds of inconsistency. In three of these cases, Healy v. Bearco Management, Inc. and Bear & Sons, Inc., 216 Ill.App.3d 945, 160 Ill.Dec. 241, 249, 576 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (1991), Kumorek v. Moyers, 203 Ill.App.3d 908, 148 Ill.Dec. 906, 909, 561 N.E.2d 212, 215 (1990), and Hinnen v. Burnett, 144 Ill.App.3d 1038, 99 Ill.Dec. 76, 82, 495 N.E.2d 141, 147 (1986), the verdicts were reversed as being inconsistent because the juries awarded the plaintiffs compensation for the medical costs related to the treatment of pain, and refused to award damages for past pain and suffering. In the fourth case, Schranz v. Halley, 128 Ill.App.3d 125, 83 Ill.Dec. 243, 244, 469 N.E.2d 1389, 1390 (1984), the verdict was set aside because the jury awarded damages for medical expenses but not for the past pain and suffering which necessarily accompanied the injury for which the defendant was held liable. In each of these cases, the appellate court concluded that the verdicts were inconsistent because it was unable to understand why the juries failed to award damages for past pain and suffering.

The plaintiff attempts to depict the verdict in the instant case as afflicted with this same inconsistency. Her argument runs as follows: The jury's finding of liability on the part of the defendants and its award of $29,000 in medical costs to the plaintiff represented an award of damages equal in amount to all of Brian's medical expenses up to the time of trial, including treatment for his ongoing mental, emotional, and behavioral problems. To grant this award the jury must have necessarily found that the taxi accident caused the problems for which Brian sought treatment. Having made this finding, it was inconsistent for the jury not to award damages for Brian's future medical expenses, future loss of wages, and future disabilities, since these expenses would arise from the same malady which caused the plaintiff's pretrial medical expenses. In short, Mercado contended that if the jury found the defendants liable for Brian's pre-trial medical expenses as a result of the accident, then it was required to find them liable for all future damages.

The plaintiff's argument that the jury's verdict was inconsistent is not entirely implausible. However, we agree with the district court that there are other interpretations of the jury's verdict just as persuasive as the plaintiff's. As the district court stated in rejecting the plaintiff's inconsistency argument, the jury's verdict was based on its finding that Brian Mercado was injured by the taxi as a result of the defendant driver's negligence, which negligence was chargeable to the taxi company. After making this finding, the jury was required to determine "to what extent was Brian injured by the taxicab and what sequelae followed from that injury." The court explained that the plaintiff presented substantial evidence that Brian was mentally and emotionally in "sound condition" before the accident and in "very poor condition mentally and emotionally after the accident." However, the district court pointed out that the defense countered with equally competent evidence...

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