Garland v. Roy

• Decision Date: 06 August 2009
• Docket Number: Docket: Han-08-467.
• Citation: 2009 ME 86,976 A.2d 940
• Parties: Paul F. GARLAND et al. v. Peter R. ROY et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

976 A.2d 940

2009 ME 86

Paul F. GARLAND et al. v. Peter R. ROY et al.

Docket: Han-08-467.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 19, 2009.

Decided: August 6, 2009.

Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally), Julie D. Farr, Esq., Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, ME, for Angeline and Paul Garland.

James M. Bowie, Esq. (orally), Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, ME, for Peter R. Roy and Roy, Beardsley, Williams & Granger, LLC.

Panel: CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, and GORMAN, JJ.

CLIFFORD, J.

[¶ 1] Paul F. and Angeline A. Garland appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Hancock County, Cuddy, J.) following a jury verdict on their claim for professional negligence against attorney Peter R. Roy and the law firm of Roy, Beardsley, Williams & Granger, LLC (collectively, Roy). The Garlands contend, inter alia, that the court erred by entering a judgment as a matter of law against them on their claim for the value of their lost property. Roy cross-appeals, contending that there was insufficient evidence of any legal malpractice, and that emotional distress damages were improperly entered in favor of Paul Garland. We disagree with Roy that the evidence does not support a finding of legal malpractice. We agree with Roy, however, that emotional distress damages were improperly entered, and we vacate that part of the judgment awarding emotional distress damages to Paul. We agree with the Garlands that the court erred when it granted Roy's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Garlands' claim for the value of the lost property, and we vacate and remand to the Superior Court to reinstate the jury's award as to the value of the lost property in favor of both Paul and Angeline.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] This matter involves the legal representation of the Garlands by Roy in a land dispute between the Garlands and their abutter, Robert Millot, and the Garlands' subsequent action against Roy for legal malpractice in connection with that representation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Garlands, see Sullivan v. Porter, 2004 ME 134, ¶ 12, 861 A.2d 625, 631, a jury could have rationally found the following facts.

[¶ 3] In October of 1971, the Garlands purchased from Helen Vennen a shore front parcel of land on Green Lake in Ellsworth (the Vennen lot), which abutted land the Garlands already owned. Included within the Vennen lot is the land over which this dispute arose, a half-acre parcel with approximately 115 feet of shore frontage, upon which a small, red camp sits.

[¶ 4] Within weeks of purchasing the Vennen lot, Paul measured the boundary line of the land. During the summer of 1972, the Garlands began making ongoing improvements to the property, and Paul put a cable around the property's boundary with a sign that read "no trespassing" and "property of Paul Garland."

[¶ 5] The red camp was built in the late 1950s by George Anderson, who at the time owned another parcel of land abutting the Vennen lot. Anderson believed that he owned the land on which he built the camp. The City first taxed the camp as a building in 1958. The Garland children began using the camp in 1969, prior to the Garlands' purchase of the Vennen lot, and continued using the camp for several years thereafter. By the late 1960s, the Garlands no longer saw Anderson on the Vennen lot, and Anderson's personal possessions had been removed from the camp by the summer of 1972. Anderson sold his property to John Bridges in 1974.

[¶ 6] In 1975, the Garlands had a survey conducted, which confirmed that the red camp was on their land. At that time, Paul offered to help Bridges move the camp over to Bridges's property. Shortly thereafter, the Garlands no longer saw Bridges on his property. Paul wrote a letter to Bridges in 1978 about moving the camp, to which Bridges responded that he had sold the property. Assuming that the camp had been abandoned, Paul began making extensive improvements to the camp, including jacking it up, redoing the porch, putting in a window and stove, and reshingling the roof. Bridges sold the property to Millot in 1977.

[¶ 7] Millot filed a lawsuit against the Garlands in the District Court (Ellsworth, Romei, J.), seeking a declaratory judgment establishing the boundary between the parties' parcels of land. Roy was the attorney who represented the Garlands in that case. The court entered a judgment against the Garlands, determining that Millot was the owner of the disputed land. The basis for the court's decision, however, was unclear. The Garlands appealed the decision to the Superior Court (Hancock County.). The Superior Court (Marsano, J.) concluded that although the Garlands had the better record title, the District Court apparently granted Millot title based on a claim of adverse possession, which was never pleaded by Millot or advanced in detail at trial. The Superior Court affirmed the District Court judgment, but permitted the Garlands to request a retrial in order to fully litigate the issue of adverse possession, which the Garlands did. The Superior Court then remanded the case to the District Court.

[¶ 8] Roy wrote a letter to the Garlands informing them that the Superior Court judge told him that "based upon the evidence on the record, . . . Millot had excellent evidence on [a]dverse [p]ossession." After the case was remanded to the District Court, Roy, without the Garlands' input or approval, waived a hearing on retrial, and agreed to allow the District Court to reconsider its judgment based on the record from the original proceeding. The District Court found that Millot "owned all of the land in the disputed area by adverse possession." The Garlands appealed the District Court's decision to this Court, and we upheld the judgment in Millot's favor. Millot v. Garland, Mem-02-33 (Mar. 11, 2002).

[¶ 9] The Garlands then filed this case against Roy in the Superior Court, alleging that Roy committed professional malpractice in his representation of the Garlands in the land dispute case brought against them by Millot. The Garlands alleged that as a result of the malpractice, they lost the value of the property that was in dispute, and suffered emotional distress. At the malpractice trial, the Garlands' expert, Attorney Frank Chowdry, testified that Roy committed malpractice in the land dispute case by not insisting upon a retrial on remand, and by not having the Garlands' children, whom Paul had identified to Roy as people with knowledge of the Garlands' use of the disputed property, testify in order to contradict Millot's adverse possession claim. Chowdry testified that in his opinion, sufficient evidence was available that, had it been presented at a retrial, would have defeated each element of Millot's adverse possession claim, and that Roy had knowledge of such evidence based on his conversations with Paul¹ and the dates from the various deeds. Roy admitted that dates are critical for an adverse possession claim, and agreed that it is important to get your client "focused on dates" in such cases. Roy testified, however, that although he knew prior to the original trial that Paul was mistaken about two critical dates, he did not bring these mistakes to Paul's attention.

[¶ 10] The Garlands and their children testified that the loss of the land was emotional for both Paul and Angeline, and "devastated" Paul. Paul described the loss as "one of the greatest losses that we've ever experienced."

[¶ 11] Over Roy's objection, Angeline testified that she thought the value of the lost property was $200,000. The Garlands paid less than $10,000 for the entire Vennen lot in 1971, and never marketed the land or looked into its value. Paul had no opinion as to the value of the lost property, and no other evidence as to the value was admitted at trial.²

[¶ 12] At the close of the Garlands' case, see M.R. Civ. P. 50(a), and again at the close of all of the evidence, see M.R. Civ. P. 50(b), Roy moved for a judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he breached the standard of care of an attorney, or that the Garlands could have defeated Millot's adverse possession claim. Roy also moved for a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the value of the land, arguing that Angeline's testimony as to the land's value lacked a sufficient foundation. The court reserved its decision on both motions.

[¶ 13] Roy's defense was based in part on his contention that, at the malpractice trial, the Garlands presented new evidence of their use of the property during the early to mid 1970s, evidence Roy asserted he did not know about at the time the Garlands were being sued by Millot. Roy presented evidence of Paul's testimony at the original trial, and in Paul's deposition from that trial, that the Garlands first occupied the disputed property in 1978; that Paul first announced that he owned the camp at least twenty years after it was built; and that Paul told Roy that the camp was being used regularly by Anderson and then by Bridges until 1977.³ Roy contended that no one in the Garland family informed him that the Garlands had occupied the property, including the camp, prior to 1978, and that the Garlands did not correct Roy's understanding, as stated in a letter to Paul, that Bridges and Anderson utilized the property in an open and notorious fashion from 1958 through 1978. Roy testified that in his professional judgment, based on his knowledge at the time, the Garlands were more likely to succeed after the case was remanded to the District Court by arguing on the existing record that Millot did not meet his burden of proving adverse possession, which Roy believed Millot could easily have proved if there was a full retrial on remand and Millot presented additional evidence.

[¶ 14] At the close of the Garlands' case, the court granted a motion for a judgment as a matter of law on Angeline's claim for emotional distress, but allowed Paul's emotional distress claim to go...