976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992), 92-3212, Lombardo v. Parker
|Citation:||976 F.2d 733|
|Party Name:||James V. LOMBARDO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Phillip PARKER, Respondent-Appellee.|
|Case Date:||September 24, 1992|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit|
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
N.D. Ohio, No. 90-02209; Dowd, D.J.
Before KEITH, DAVID A. NELSON and RYAN, Circuit Judges.
James V. Lombardo, Jr., pro se, appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus which he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of probable cause on February 27, 1992. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a). The respondent has declined to file a brief.
In 1988, Lombardo was indicted for the offenses of felonious assault of his son, attempted murder of his son and the murder of his wife. Each of the counts had a firearm specification. After Lombardo agreed to plead guilty to the felonious assault charge, and after the prosecution agreed that Lombardo did not purposely cause the death of his wife under the facts and circumstances, the murder count was amended to a count of involuntary manslaughter and the attempted murder count was dismissed. Thereafter, Lombardo entered a plea of guilty to felonious assault and involuntary manslaughter with a firearm specification on each count. He was sentenced to one three-year term of actual incarceration on both specifications, to be served consecutively with a 3-15 year prison sentence for felonious assault and a 5-25 year sentence for the involuntary manslaughter conviction.
In support of his petition for habeas relief, Lombardo alleges the following five grounds: 1) his conviction was obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant; 2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel by counsel's failure to investigate the defense, by his prejudicial statements, by not informing him of discovery or discussing important decisions with him, by not informing him of the elements of the offense...
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