Walker v. Crigler
| Citation | 976 F.2d 900 |
| Decision Date | 05 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1542,91-1542 |
| Parties | Darlene WALKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Constance A. CRIGLER; Frank B. Whitesell, III, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
John Peter Relman, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Washington, D.C., argued (Hunter C. Harrison, Jr., Sandra L. Hughes, Harrison, Golden & Hughes, P.C., McLean, Va., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert Emmett Scully, Jr., Rees, Broome & Diaz, P.C., Vienna, Va., argued (Susan A. Richards, on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before WIDENER, PHILLIPS, and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges.
The present case arises as an appeal by appellant Darlene Walker from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Walker brought suit against Constance A. Crigler, a professional realtor, and against Frank B. Whitesell, the owner of the rental property in question. In her suit, Walker alleged sex discrimination in the rental of housing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1988), and sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Walker against Crigler and ordered the latter to pay $5,000 in compensatory damages, but indicated no punitive damages. Conversely, the jury found for Whitesell and cleared him of all charges and liabilities. Subsequently, appellant filed a motion for a new trial, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and submitted new pleadings in support of a request for declaratory and injunctive relief that had remained pending since the conclusion of trial.
On April 1, 1991, the district court denied all of appellant's motions, and refused to order the declaratory or injunctive relief. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's rulings on the issues of denial of judgment n.o.v. and denial of the requested declaratory relief.
Appellant is a single mother with one son. In 1986, she and her son moved to Falls Church, Virginia where appellant was and remains employed with the Central Intelligence Agency. Upon her arrival in Falls Church, appellant rented a pair of rooms in a four bedroom home for her and her son.
In late 1987, appellant's landlord reclaimed one of the two rooms, and she became interested in finding a new residence. Approximately two years later, in July of 1989, appellant contacted Town and Country Properties to inquire about rental properties in the area. Appellant spoke to Maurice Hill, an agent at Town and Country, who provided her with various property listings taken from the firm's Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") computer listings. Appellant viewed two of the properties accompanied by Hill's assistant John Moore ("Moore").
On the night of July 27, 1989, appellant and Moore visited a property located at 124 Falls Avenue in Falls Church. Whitesell owned the property, and Crigler provided services as the property manager. Crigler's responsibilities included finding financially-qualified tenants for 124 Falls Avenue and other properties owned by Whitesell, and keeping Whitesell constantly abreast of developments concerning the properties. 1 Crigler did not have the authority to sign leases with potential renters.
The listing in the MLS described the property as "a nice 2BR (two bedroom)" apartment "ideal for two men." The listing also indicated that the property had "3 guys" as tenants, and that the rent was $600 per month.
In January of 1989, Whitesell, in response to an awareness of housing discrimination suits against landlords, sent Crigler a memorandum which read:
In view of the recent legal action against rental property owners I have been advised by my attorney to submit the following statement:
No one who meets all other qualifications for tenancy on (sic) one of my properties is to be denied the right to rent such properties solely because of discrimination on the basis of race, creed or physical impairment ...
Obviously, this notice includes no provision against gender discrimination, but Crigler contended that the meaning of the letter, that all federally mandated anti-discrimination provisions should be met, was clear.
Appellant was unable to tour the 124 Falls Avenue apartment because there was no key available. But given its location so close both to school for her boy and to transportation to work for herself, she decided that she wanted the apartment, and filled out an application for it with Moore's assistance.
Later that night or early the next morning, Moore contacted Crigler to tell her that he had an application he wished to present on the Falls Avenue property. Both parties agree that Ms. Crigler inquired about the applicant, but that recollection is the end of their agreement.
Moore testified that he advised Crigler that the applicant was a single mother and that Crigler in no uncertain terms said that she would not rent to appellant because she was a woman. She expressed her policy of not renting to women in any circumstances. Crigler never reached the point of asking about appellant's financial qualifications, but Moore said that he told her that the applicant was financially qualified. Based on that conversation, Moore determined that it would be futile to deliver appellant's application to Crigler.
Appellant called Crigler after Moore relayed his conversation with the property manager. According to appellant, Crigler told her she would not rent the apartment to a single woman, and that she had experienced problems with the boyfriends of single women in the past. Crigler testified that she never told anyone that she would not rent to appellant because of her gender, but that her expressed rationale was that appellant did not meet the financial requirements set out for the unit. Appellant testified that she asked Crigler if she was speaking on behalf of the owner of the apartment, and Crigler replied that she was. Appellant then related the substance of her conversation to Hill at Town and Country.
Hill subsequently called Crigler and she repeated to him her policy of not renting to women. Between August 10 and October 19, appellant filed various administrative, local and state discrimination suits against the Town and Country officials and Crigler. She did not know who owned the 124 Falls Avenue unit at the time of those suits. On October 5, the unit was finally rented to two men who paid $580 monthly rent, twenty dollars less than appellant had been willing to pay.
On August 9, 1990, appellant filed the present action against Crigler and Whitesell alleging discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1988). Trial was held on March 5 and 6, 1991.
At trial, Crigler denied that she ever referred to appellant's gender as the reason for her refusal to rent to her. Whitesell made little effort to defend Crigler's actions and argued that he should not be held liable for her mistakes. At the conclusion of appellant's case, the court granted Whitesell's motion to strike appellant's punitive damages claim against him. Thus the only remaining claims were for punitive and compensatory damages against Crigler and compensatory damages against Whitesell.
The jury found for plaintiff in the suit against Crigler, but fully exonerated Whitesell of any responsibility for the discriminatory acts of his employee. The court had instructed the jury that they should find Whitesell liable for damages to appellant if they believed that Crigler, in practicing discrimination against appellant, was an agent of Whitesell, acting within the scope of her employment. The jury ordered compensatory damages of $5,000 to be paid by Crigler.
Following the trial, appellant filed a motion for judgment n.o.v., and for a new trial. In addition, appellant filed a memorandum in support of a request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, requesting that the court enter judgment against Whitesell, arguing that Crigler, as a matter of law, was an agent of Whitesell, and that she had clearly acted within the scope of her authority when she harmed appellant.
On April 1, 1991, the district court denied all of appellant's post-trial motions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On April 19, Crigler filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On August 9, 1991, appellant received a notice from the Bankruptcy Court indicating that Crigler's $5,000 debt to her had been discharged.
The denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v. "cannot be disturbed unless, without weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility, we conclude that reasonable people could have returned a verdict only [for the moving party]." Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.1987). The denial of a motion for a new trial should be reversed only when abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is shown in its determination that "[t]he jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence...." Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir.1984). 2
The jury ruled on the case against Whitesell in his favor, holding, apparently, that Crigler was not acting in the scope of her employment when she denied Walker's attempts to rent the 124 Falls Avenue premises because she was a woman. 3 The sole evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Whitesell was not liable for damages for the discrimination was the evidence indicating that Crigler was instructed not to refuse to rent on discriminatory grounds. In denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge concluded that the evidence of Whitesell's instruction was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We find, however, that the court's conclusion is based on an erroneous theory of law, and that reversal is required. Since there is no unsettled question of fact to be submitted for decision by the jury, it is...
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