Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.
| Decision Date | 02 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 87,964,87,964 |
| Citation | 976 P.2d 545 |
| Parties | CITIES SERVICE COMPANY, now OXY USA, Inc., Appellee, v. GULF OIL CORPORATION, now Chevron USA, Inc., and GOC Acquisition Corporation, Defendants, D. Richard Funk and John T. Schmidt, Appellants. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Tulsa County; Honorable Deborah C. Shallcross, District Judge.
¶0 During the trial's progress the judge imposed sanctions against the appellants which circumscribed what they could do in the representation of their clients (the defendants) in her courtroom. The appellants were not personally fined, held in contempt or otherwise sanctioned. Both lawyers appeal the imposed sanctions.
APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
W. DeVier Pierson, Knox Bemis, and Peter J. Levin of Pierson Semmes and Bemis, Washington, D.C., and Sam P. Daniel, Jr., and Dallas E. Ferguson of Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellee.
Randolph L. Jones, Jr., Peter B. Bradford and Bruce W. Freeman of Conner & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for appellants.
¶1 The threshold and determinative issue in this cause is whether under the facts and circumstances, particular to this case, the appellants have standing to challenge a trial judge's bench rulings which [by way of sanction] limited their participation in proceedings then pending before her court. For reasons delineated below, we determine that Richard Funk and John T. Schmidt [lawyers or appellants] do lack standing and dismiss their appeal with prejudice to renewal.
¶2 Appellants represent Gulf Oil Corporation, now Chevron USA, Inc. [Gulf
Oil], a defendant below, in a case whose central issue was whether an acquisition agreement between its client and Cities Service Company, now OXY USA, Inc. [Cities Service] had been breached. After perceiving violations of the trial court's orders in limine the trial judge imposed first on Funk and then on Schmidt sanctions which restricted the manner in which they could represent their client during the trial. 1 Although the trial judge characterized the lawyers' courtroom behavior as "contemptuous", she never formally held them in contempt nor did she impose monetary fines on either of them, i.e., her rulings bore no criminal connotations and were in all events non-monetary. Appellants seek review of the imposed sanctions, asserting that the judge's orders--which [along with her comments] were reported by the local media--caused harm to their professional reputations. 2 Cities Service posits that the appellants' interests were not injured which raises the issue of their standing to bring this appeal. 3
THE STANDING ISSUE
¶3 At a minimum standing is composed of three elements. These components are: (1) a legally protected interest which must have been injured in fact--i.e., an injury which is actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the injury and the complained of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 4
¶4 Aggrieved status is limited to those persons (a) whose pecuniary interest in a protected right is directly and injuriously affected or (b) whose rights in property are either "established or divested" by the trial court's rulings. 5 The complained of harm must be substantial and immediate as opposed to contingent. 6
¶5 Finally, assessment of standing is not a decision on the case's merits. Rather it is a determination whether the plaintiff is the proper party to seek adjudication of the asserted issue. 7
¶6 Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence recognizes that a party's legal counsel has standing, separate from his client, to appeal an order which imposes a monetary sanction ¶7 Funk and Schmidt assert that because (1) they possess legally protected property interests in their professional reputations and (2) the trial judge's bench rulings impaired those interests, they have standing. 9 They also contend that the harm which they have suffered is pecuniary in nature because their representation of Gulf Oil was limited by the sanction orders. Lastly, they allege that the injury to their reputations will hurt their ability to attract business in the future. It is not contended by either lawyer that their licenses were at any time in jeopardy of divestiture or revocation. The appellants have submitted no authority which holds that they have a protected property right to represent a particular client. 10
against him/her personally. 8 The question whether a lawyer--whose sanction is non-monetary and consists solely of limitations on his participation in a trial which has now concluded--has standing, independent from his client, to seek review of a sanction order has not been addressed before by this Court.
¶8 We are mindful that it is incumbent upon a trial judge to manage the proceedings in his or her court in order to assure orderly process to all parties. 11 In this regard district courts are indeed entitled to discretion in monitoring their own processes. Sanctions exist to ensure the proper functioning of the legal system and there can be no doubt that they primarily deter and punish. Unquestionably, the trial court's interests are not synonymous with the trial lawyers' interests in every instance and there is potential for conflict and injury--be it justified or unjustified--to the legal practitioner's reputation. Nonetheless, it is not necessary today to, and hence we do not, reach the issue whether Funk and Schmidt's interests in their professional reputations are legally protectible because there is no reasonable likelihood that the alleged harm would be redressed by a favorable opinion. Hence, the third component of standing is missing.
¶9 Assuming for the purpose of analysis that Funk and Schmidt do have a legally protected interest in their professional reputation which was harmed in some way by the imposed non-monetary sanctions, their injuries are not remediable under the circumstances of this case. The imposed sanctions consist primarily of limitations on the two lawyers' right to participate in certain oral presentations before the jury. 12 Both counsel remained at counsel's table--assisting their client--throughout the trial. The trial is now concluded.
¶10 Assaying standing against the facts disclosed by the record, the lawyers' appeal is in a form which is not capable of judicial resolution. Standing's third component requires there be a reasonable likelihood that the complained of injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 13 The Court can provide no remedy--other than a meaningless declaration--to the lawyers in this appeal. If the sanction orders constitute reversible error, the only possible remedy would be to order a new trial. This relief, if appropriate under the facts disclosed by the record, would be a remedy available to Gulf Oil Company in its own right and not to the appellants who are non-parties in the litigation below. As a personal right Gulf's lawyers are not entitled to a new trial solely to vindicate perceived damage to their professional reputations.
¶11 Appellants argue that publication of the trial judge's comments and the fact of the sanctions in a local newspaper has affected negatively their ability to attract business. Even if they received a favorable decision, it is beyond the Court's power to order its opinion published by local media. It is a speculative contingency that our holding would be deemed newsworthy by the local press, published and read by those who earlier read the so-called negative press coverage. The Court does not see the requisite likelihood that a favorable decision would remedy the alleged harm to the lawyers' ability to attract new business. Hence, the appellants lack standing.
¶12 If the appellants feel that the trial judge's conduct was oppressive, their complaints properly lie with the Court on the Judiciary and not here. The latter tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear causes of that character. 14
¶13 Without reaching the issue whether the appellants' interests in their professional reputations are susceptible to protection from the harm, if any, occasioned by Judge Shallcross' non-monetary sanctions, the appeal is dismissed because the lawyers lack standing to pursue the matter. The Court cannot give them the effectual relief which they seek, i.e.., public remediation of a perceived harm to their professional reputations. Hence, the third component of the Toxic Waste standing test cannot be satisfied.
¶14 THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
¶18 HODGES, J., not voting.
¶1 The court holds today that lawyers have no standing to seek review of non-monetary sanctions. By making unreviewable that courtroom discipline which visits no pecuniary loss, the court gives the trial bench a carte blanche for boundless mid-trial restrictions on a lawyer's right of audience. 1 I cannot accede to a doctrine which puts a premium on loss of money but utterly discounts the grave harm that is inflicted by means of non-pecuniary fetters on a legal practitioner's courtroom liberty to advocate a client's cause.
¶2 Funk and Schmidt, attorneys for the defendant in an action, were subjected to mid-trial conduct restrictions after the trial judge had perceived their behavior as violative of certain in limine orders. Funk was precluded from questioning witnesses and participating in closing arguments; Schmidt was initially silenced during his closing argument and then barred from involvement in
post-trial proceedings. Denied to the two lawyers was not only their right of audience, but also the opportunity to charge the...
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