U.S. v. Williams

Decision Date03 November 1992
Docket NumberNos. 91-5167,91-5427,s. 91-5167
Citation977 F.2d 866
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Buck WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles J. McNEAL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Nelson Rufus Bickley, Jr., Charleston, W.Va., argued for defendant-appellant McNeal.

Thomas W. Smith, Thomas W. Smith Law Offices, Charleston, W.Va., argued, for defendant-appellant Williams.

John Kirk Brandfass, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.Va., argued (Thomas W. Carey, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before SPROUSE and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and LEGG, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

OPINION

LEGG, District Judge:

Buck Williams and Charles McNeal appeal their respective convictions and sentences for distribution of and possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 (1988). Appellants present two issues: (i) whether the district court erroneously denied appellants' motions to suppress the fruits of an allegedly improper search warrant; and (ii) whether the district court erroneously attributed 67 grams of cocaine base to appellants as "relevant conduct" in determining their guideline sentencing range. Additionally, Williams contends that the district court's refusal to compel the government to disclose prior to trial the quantity of cocaine it intended to attribute to him in the event he was convicted and sentenced denied him effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. We conclude that the district court did not err in any of the above concerns and accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Facts

At approximately 7:05 p.m. on January 29, 1991, Williams and McNeal were arrested in, or just outside of, an apartment in the Orchard Manor public housing project in Charleston, West Virginia. Participating in the arrest were approximately twelve members of the Charleston Metropolitan Drug Enforcement Task Force ("MDENT") and Agent Stan Kennedy, a federal officer who had accompanied the MDENT officers as part of his training. Immediately prior to their arrest, McNeal and Williams sold crack cocaine to an MDENT informant and part-time dealer named William Sayles.

Because the apartment's leaseholder was not present at the time that McNeal and Williams were arrested, the officers waited to search the apartment until Detective Steve Neddo obtained a search warrant from a Kanawha County Magistrate. Based upon information provided by Sayles, the warrant was issued to Detective Neddo at approximately 8:20 p.m. that evening. Shortly thereafter, Neddo radioed the officers waiting at the apartment and told them that he had received the warrant. 1 The officers then searched the apartment and found cocaine on a table in the living room and cocaine base in the refrigerator.

Prior to Detective Neddo's arrival at the apartment, Williams and McNeal were taken to the Charleston Police Department Patrol Division Office ("PDO"), where they underwent standard processing. After the cocaine base was discovered, one of the arresting officers, Detective Mick, also returned to the PDO. Upon arrival, Mick telephoned Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") J. Kirk Brandfass to ask whether the United States would be prosecuting the case. Detective Mick briefly informed the AUSA that two out-of-state defendants had been arrested for selling cocaine base and that an additional quantity of the drug had been found in the Orchard Manor apartment. Upon hearing these facts, AUSA Brandfass replied that the United States would prosecute.

The government asserts that Detective Mick telephoned the AUSA before the appellants were booked federally; appellants, however, maintain that the call was made afterward. The booking ticket reflects that appellants were booked at 8:42 p.m. as federal prisoners. 2

Williams and McNeal were initially tried together. On May 13, 1991, the district court, after hearing testimony from six law enforcement officers and informant Sayles, denied appellants' pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of the search. Appellants contended that the search warrant was invalid under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a) because it had been issued by a county magistrate, rather than a federal magistrate or a state court of record. Under appellants' argument, the police intended to have them prosecuted federally from the beginning, and the county magistrate was not a proper source for a federal warrant. The court rejected appellants' contention, finding that: (i) the decision to proceed federally was made after the search warrant was obtained and executed, (ii) there was no violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a), and (iii) historically, not all MDENT cocaine base cases were prosecuted federally; twenty-six such cases had been prosecuted by the state authorities.

Later, McNeal retained new counsel and received a severance. Williams' trial began on May 14, 1991 and Williams was found guilty on both counts. Before McNeal's trial began, McNeal again sought suppression of the search results under Rule 41(a). The district court denied McNeal's motion to suppress after hearing testimony from four officers. 3 McNeal was subsequently found guilty on both counts of his indictment.

On August 23, 1991, the first portion of a contested sentencing proceeding was held for the purpose of determining the amount of cocaine base attributable to each appellant as relevant conduct. Detective Mick testified that he had interviewed Sayles, who claimed to have seen a golf-ball sized piece of cocaine in appellants' possession on January 28, 1991, the day preceding appellants' arrest. Sayles also testified that he saw the cocaine on January 28. Dr. Robert Myers, a chemistry professor at West Virginia Tech., testified that the weight of a similarly-sized piece of cocaine base would be approximately 67.5 grams. 4

The second and final sentencing hearing was held on September 19, 1991. The court found that: (i) appellants were in possession of a golf-ball sized piece of cocaine base on January 28, 1991, (ii) the weight of the cocaine base was 67 grams, and (iii) appellants possessed the cocaine base as part of a common drug distribution scheme that also included the offenses of conviction. The court then raised appellants' guideline ranges from 30-37 months to 135-168 months.

II. Standard of Review

We review legal conclusions arrived at by the district court on a de novo basis, but we review the factual findings underlying legal conclusions under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d 1149, 1155 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030, 101 S.Ct. 1739, 68 L.Ed.2d 225 (1981). Determinations regarding the quantity of cocaine base to be considered as relevant conduct for purposes of calculating a base offense level are factual in nature and subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir.1991); see also United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.1989).

III. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a)

Appellants argue that the underlying search warrant violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(a), which requires that a federal search warrant be issued by a federal magistrate or a state court of record. 5 Appellants contend that the search warrant obtained by Detective Neddo was invalid because the MDENT officers had initially intended to prosecute appellants federally and the county magistrate was an improper source for a federal warrant. The government replies that its decision to prosecute federally was not made until the warrant had issued and the search had been completed.

In a recent case, we decided that the test to be applied in determining whether a warrant must be obtained in compliance with Rule 41(a) is whether the warrant application was made "at the direction or urging of a federal officer." United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d 565, 569 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 999, 112 L.Ed.2d 1082, (1991). See also United States v. MacConnell, 868 F.2d 281 (8th Cir.1989) (significant prior involvement by federal officers required before search characterized as federal); accord United States v. Bookout, 810 F.2d 965, 967 (10th Cir.1987). The record here reveals no evidence suggesting that the warrant obtained by Detective Neddo was issued in response to a directive or urging from Agent Kennedy, the only federal agent who accompanied the MDENT officers during their arrest of appellants and search of the apartment. 6 Nor has there been any showing that the MDENT officers initially intended to prosecute the case federally. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding that the officers were not required to comply with Rule 41(a) in obtaining the warrant.

IV. Relevant Conduct

A defendant's possession or distribution of types and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction is to be considered for sentencing purposes to determine a base offense level if it is part of the same course of conduct, common scheme, or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2); see also United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 32-33 (4th Cir.1990). The government must establish such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court's determination that other acts of drug distribution are part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction is a factual determination subject to review by this court under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir.1989).

In evaluating "same course of conduct" issues, the sentencing court should consider "such factors as the nature of the defendant's act[s], his role, and the number and frequency of repetitions of those acts, in determining whether they indicate a behavior...

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