Hannon v. Beard

• Decision Date: 27 September 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06–10700–NMG.
• Citation: 979 F.Supp.2d 136
• Parties: Francis HANNON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey BEARD, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

979 F.Supp.2d 136

Francis HANNON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jeffrey BEARD, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 06–10700–NMG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Sept. 27, 2013.

Francis Hannon, Trenton, NJ, pro se.

Raymond Cook, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Sean Milliken, Bridgewater, MA, pro se.

Wayne Crosby, Norfolk, MA, pro se.

John Stote, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Lawrence McArthur, Gardner, MA, pro se.

Steven Balsavich, Trenton, NJ, pro se.

Miguel Moure, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Marlon Holmes, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Michael Vincent, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Edward Keith, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Myles R. Miranda, South Walpole, MA, pro se.

Victor Sandiford, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Kenji Drayton, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Michael Mauney, Shirley, MA, pro se.

David Myland, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Justin Gaouette, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Louis Luiz, Shirley, MA, pro se.

George Awad, Shirley, MA, pro se.

William Barnowski, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Anthony Barry, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Daniel Holland, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Carlo Montefusco, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Kevin Beauchamp, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Steven Plavetsky, Shirley, MA, pro se.

Glen Bovat, Norfolk, MA, pro se.

Robert G. LeBlanc, Shirley, MA, pro se.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

Twenty-seven pro se prisoners have filed suit against the Massachusetts Department of Correction (“Massachusetts DOC”) and some of its current and former officials, UMass Correctional Health (“UMCH”) and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney (“Romney”). They seek monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a variety of perceived constitutional violations. Pending before the Court are the defendants' motions to dismiss, a related motion for clarification and plaintiffs' motions for service of process and extension of time. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for clarification will be allowed and the plaintiffs' motions for service of process and extension of time will be denied.

I. Background

In April, 2006, 40 prisoners housed at the Souza Baranowski Correctional Center (“SBCC”) in Shirley, Massachusetts filed a single pro se suit challenging the conditions of their confinement. The original complaint named 63 defendants. Pursuant to a Court order, plaintiffs individually filed amended pro se complaints in June, 2007. All of the amended complaints alleged that SBCC was “environmentally unsafe” because the conditions presented an unreasonable risk to prisoners' health and that officials repeatedly denied their attempts to file grievances. Certain plaintiffs also alleged that defendants had ordered retaliatory prison transfers, illegally confiscated inmate property, falsely accused one inmate of rape, denied inmates access to the law library and the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates, denied access to training programs and suspended visitation rights without first providing a disciplinary board hearing. See Docket No. 277.

The procedural history of the case since 2006 is protracted and convoluted, and is described in detail in earlier orders (e.g., Docket Nos. 250, 277, 300). Since 2006, the parties have been reduced in number to 27 plaintiffs and 29 defendants and the issues limited to constitutional claims brought under § 1983. The current operative complaint is the comprehensive amended complaint dated November 23, 2007.

The remaining counts allege that defendants violated plaintiffs' 1) Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by exposing them to harmful environmental conditions at the SBCC, 2) First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for filing grievances and law suits, 3) fundamental right of access to the courts and 4) Due Process and Equal Protection rights.

In early 2013, 13 defendants moved to dismiss the complaints against them for failure to state a claim (Docket Nos. 308, 321 and 337).¹ For the reasons that follow, those motions will be allowed.

II. Legal AnalysisA. Standard of Review

To overcome a motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). This statement “needs only enough detail to provide a defendant with ‘fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). At a minimum, the complaint must “set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when [and] where.” Educadores Puertorriqueños en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.2004).

A district court assesses “the sufficiency of the complaint's factual allegations in two steps.” Manning v. Boston Medical Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.2013).

First, conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant legal standard are disregarded, as they are not entitled to the presumption of truth. Second, we accept the remaining factual allegations as true and decide if, drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, they are sufficient to show an entitlement to relief.

Id. A pleading must set out “a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Rather than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In weighing possibility against plausibility, the court

appropriately draw[s] on [its] judicial experience and common sense [but] may not disregard factual allegations even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.

Manning, 725 F.3d at 43 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937;Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. Massachusetts Department of Correction Motion to Dismiss

As an initial matter, plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Massachusetts DOC are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The First Circuit has previously held that the Massachusetts DOC is entitled to sovereign immunity as an agency of the Commonwealth. Poirier v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 & n. 6 (1st Cir.2009). Plaintiffs' claims for money damages against state officials acting in their official capacities are similarly barred. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). As a result, the Court's inquiry is limited to plaintiffs' claims against individual defendants in their personal capacities.

The Court finds that even if it draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, the amended complaints fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

1. Eighth Amendment Claims

In order to prevail on their claim that SBCC's environment was unsafe such that it violated their Eighth Amendment rights, the prisoners must show that 1) the alleged deprivation is objectively serious and denies prisoners the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” and 2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.1991).

Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard. Their conclusory allegations that they were exposed to unsafe levels of toxins are not enough to show that the alleged deprivation was objectively serious. In order to avoid dismissal, plaintiffs are required to allege specific facts that would support a finding that environmental toxins were actually present, inmates were actually exposed to those substances and the exposure caused injury.

Even if plaintiffs could make such a showing, they have not pled sufficient facts to support a finding of deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs' conclusory allegations that they complained to all of the remaining individual defendants about prison conditions are insufficient. Plaintiffs are required to allege additional facts as to whom they complained and when they put each defendant on notice. See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Accion, 367 F.3d at 68 (explaining that at a minimum the complaint must “set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom”). Further, plaintiffs' attempt to rely on supervisory liability is unavailing. Even if prison conditions were objectively unacceptable and guards were deliberately indifferent to that fact, plaintiffs have not alleged that any of the defendants supervised guards who were deliberately indifferent or had any authority to alleviate those conditions. See Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581–82 (1st Cir.1994).

2. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

In order to succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a party must show that 1) her conduct was constitutionally protected and 2) the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor driving the allegedly retaliatory decision. Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 35–36 (1st Cir.2011). Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy this standard. First, plaintiffs do not specifically allege which, if any, of the defendants was aware of their grievances. Without such awareness, plaintiffs' retaliation claims fall short of being plausible. Second, plaintiffs do not provide any dates or times that would allow the Court to infer that protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants' allegedly retaliatory conduct.

3. Fundamental Right of Access to Courts

In order to prove that defendants violated their constitutionally protected right of access to the courts, plaintiffs are required to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate that defendants actually impeded or frustrated a non-frivolous claim relating to either the inmate's criminal conviction or his conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,...