State v. Schevers

Decision Date09 February 1999
Docket NumberNo. 24164,24164
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James SCHEVERS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Roy, Nielson & Barini-Garcia, Twin Falls County Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant. Lisa A. Barini-Garcia argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

LANSING, Judge.

In this appeal, we are asked to vacate James Allen Schevers' judgment of conviction for robbery because, it is asserted, the district court should have suppressed testimony regarding a witness's identification of Schevers as the robber. We affirm.

FACTS

Schevers was charged with committing a robbery at a liquor store. Prior to his trial, he filed a motion seeking to suppress a witness's in-court identification and her pretrial out-of-court identification of Schevers as the robber.

Evidence presented at the suppression hearing revealed the following facts. On the evening of November 25, 1996, Judy Buscher was working at a state liquor store in Twin Falls when the store was robbed by a man with a firearm. During the course of the robbery, which lasted about a minute and a half, Buscher attempted to comply with the robber's instruction not to look at him, but she got two quick glances at the man. Shortly after the robbery, the police arrived and Buscher gave a description of the robber. She also worked with a police officer in putting together a computer-generated sketch which she considered to be a satisfactory depiction of the robber.

On December 6, 1997, Buscher viewed a photo lineup containing driver's license photos of six men. Twin Falls Detective Dennis Rinehart read to Buscher from a form which essentially stated that she should not pick someone from the lineup unless she was sure. According to Detective Rinehart's testimony at the motion hearing, after looking at the photos Buscher initially stated something to the effect of, "I can't help you." Buscher, however, testified that she did not remember saying this. Detective Rinehart then told her to remember the suspect's eyes, as she had previously described the robber's eyes as memorable because they were discolored. Buscher then picked Schevers' photo as the "closest" to the man who robbed the store. Rinehart testified that he then showed Buscher a photocopy of a different photograph of Schevers and told her that he was the police's suspect. Buscher testified that she did not remember being shown the second photo.

Evidence at the suppression hearing also disclosed that, immediately before Schevers' preliminary hearing, while waiting in the courthouse hallway, Buscher saw Schevers being brought into the courtroom. He was wearing orange inmate coveralls and was shackled with two or more other similarly clad inmates. Upon seeing Schevers, Buscher said to Rinehart "That's him in the middle." She was pale and visibly shaken. Buscher apparently thereafter identified Schevers as the robber during the preliminary hearing.

Based upon the foregoing evidence, Schevers argued that the pretrial identification procedures were unduly suggestive and had so tainted Buscher's identification that testimony regarding the pretrial identification should be excluded and Buscher should not be allowed to identify Schevers at trial. The district court denied the motion.

After a jury trial Schevers was convicted of robbery, I.C. § 18-6501, -6502. On appeal, he challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress all evidence of Buscher's identification of him. He argues that the photo lineup procedure and the circumstances of Buscher's encounter of him in the courthouse hallway were so suggestive as to violate due process and that these out-of-court events tainted Buscher's identification of Schevers at trial.

ANALYSIS

Schevers' motion presented mixed questions of law and fact. Ordinarily, we In a due process analysis of an allegedly suggestive identification procedure, the central inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the procedure created a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Idaho courts have applied this test as a two-step process. See State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 162, 657 P.2d 17, 26 (1983); State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 796-97, 932 P.2d 907, 919-20 (Ct.App.1997), review denied, cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 81, 139 L.Ed.2d 39 (1997); State v. Alger, 115 Idaho 42, 45 n. 2, 764 P.2d 119, 122 n. 2 (Ct.App.1988). First, we consider whether the out-of-court identification procedure was suggestive based upon the totality of the circumstances. Gray, 129 Idaho at 796, 932 P.2d at 919; Alger, 115 Idaho at 44, 764 P.2d at 121. If the procedure was suggestive, we then consider whether other factors demonstrate that the identification was nonetheless reliable. Gray, supra. So long as the reliability of the identification outweighs the corrupting effect of suggestive procedures, the admission of the identification testimony will not violate due process. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116-17, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26.

                must defer to a district court's finding of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  State v. Medley, 127 Idaho 182, 185, 898 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1995); State v. Welker, 129 Idaho 805, 808, 932 P.2d 928, 931 (Ct.App.1997), review denied.   In this case, however, apart from stating a conclusion that the identification was not unduly suggestive, the district court did not make, and neither party requested, written or oral findings of fact.  In denying the motion, the district court stated that it "adopts the reasoning in the State's brief as being persuasive," but that brief was not made a part of the record on appeal.  We note, however, that even if the brief were available for our review, it would not contain findings of fact.  Thus, the district court's disposition does not express a factual basis for denying the motion that we can directly review.  However, our Supreme Court has held that where a trial court did not make express findings of fact in the disposition of a motion, an appellate court should examine the "implicit" findings that support the trial court's ruling.  State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 726 P.2d 735 (1986).  We therefore review the implied findings that would support the district court's determination that the identification procedures employed here were not unduly suggestive, and we will uphold those findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.  Id.; State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct.App.1994);  State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380, 757 P.2d 240, 243 (Ct.App.1988).  We then exercise free review over the trial court's determination of whether due process standards have been satisfied.  State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 452, 776 P.2d 458, 461 (1989);  State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 826, 839 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Ct.App.1992)
                

Schevers argues first that the photo lineup which Detective Rinehart showed to Buscher was impermissibly suggestive because none of the six men depicted in the lineup matched Buscher's description of the robber. The photo lineup was prepared by the State of Idaho Driver's License Bureau. It contained six photographs of clean-shaven men of about the same age, all wearing glasses. The pictures were all Idaho driver's license photos of the same size and type. We cannot discern anything in this photo array that emphasizes Schevers' photograph more than the other five. Nor are we persuaded by Schevers' argument that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive because...

To continue reading

Request your trial
736 cases
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • June 15, 2015
    ...is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).1. Extension of traffic stop Smith contends the traffic stop was unlawfully extended because the officers abandoned the......
  • State v. Williams
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • January 11, 2018
    ...is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina , 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995) ; State v. Schevers , 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).Williams first challenges the district court’s findings of fact. Williams argues the district court’s findings were......
  • State Of Idaho v. Hansen
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2010
    ...a residence for limited purposes. The district court was free to draw the reasonable factual inference, State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999), that Kirsch's use of the bathroom was a necessary part of the living arrangement, making the bathroom part of the......
  • State v. Cardenas
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 2006
    ...is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT