Newcomb v. United States, 8698.

• Citation: 98 F.2d 25
• Decision Date: 09 July 1938
• Docket Number: No. 8698.,8698.
• Parties: NEWCOMB v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

98 F.2d 25 (1938)

NEWCOMB v. UNITED STATES.

No. 8698.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

July 9, 1938.

P. E. Keeler and James W. Bell, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Ben Harrison, U. S. Atty., and Francis C. Whelan, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal.

Before WILBUR, DENMAN, and MATHEWS, Circuit Judges.

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.

In the District Court for Southern California, appellee, the United States, filed a bill of complaint and obtained a final decree against appellant, Sarah Anne Newcomb, who thereupon appealed to this court. Appellee now moves this court to reverse the decree and to remand the case to the District Court, with directions to dismiss the bill without prejudice, on the ground that the case has become moot. Appellant resists the motion and seeks a decision on the merits.

The bill alleged that appellee had made a contract with Standard Dredging Company, a corporation (hereafter called the contractor), whereby the contractor had agreed to dredge the land lying under, and covered by, the waters of Newport Bay in the State of California; that Newport Bay was a navigable area of the Pacific Ocean; that the waters thereof were navigable waters of the United States; that the dredging of the land under said waters was in the interest of navigation and commerce; that the contractor was performing said contract and, in so doing, was acting for, on behalf of, and under the authority of, the United States; that appellant had brought an action in a State court of California for the purpose of quieting her title to a part of said land, and had in the State court action obtained an order requiring the contractor to show cause why it should not be enjoined and restrained from dredging the part claimed by appellant; and that, if the dredging of said land was prevented or delayed, appellee would suffer great and irreparable injury.

The bill prayed that appellant be temporarily and permanently restrained and enjoined "from further prosecuting said order to show cause," and "from the further prosecuting of the contractor in the performance of the work under said contract, by causing, or attempting to cause, the issuance of any restraining order or injunction enjoining or restraining the contractor from performing said contract, or in any other manner." No other relief was sought by appellee.

The District Court granted a temporary restraining order and, thereafter, a temporary injunction, as prayed in the bill. No injunction bond was or could have been required of appellee, and none was given.

Answering, appellant admitted that she had brought the State court action above referred to and had therein sought to enjoin the contractor from dredging the land claimed by her; denied all other allegations of the bill; and prayed "that the bill be dismissed, that the restraining order be denied and that appellant be dismissed with her costs." There was no counterclaim or prayer for affirmative relief. No damages were claimed by either party.

The contractor was not a party to this suit. Nevertheless, on motion of appellant, the court made an order restraining the contractor, pendente lite,...