Andrews v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 23 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-3917,95-3917 |
| Parties | Kristi D. ANDREWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy Alan FOWLER, individually and in his capacity as an officer with the City of North Sioux City, South Dakota, Defendant, Scott Price, individually and in his capacity as former Chief of Police of the City of North Sioux City, South Dakota Police Department; William C. Merrill, individually and in his capacity as Mayor of the City of North Sioux City, South Dakota; City of North Sioux City, South Dakota, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael F. Marlow, Yankton, SD, argued, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Gary P. Thimsen, Sioux Falls, SD, argued (Tim R. Shattuck, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before HANSEN, ROSS, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
Kristi Andrews brought this civil rights action, alleging causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and state law, arising out of a sexual assault by Randy Fowler, a former police officer for the North Sioux City Police Department. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of former Chief of Police Scott Price, Mayor William Merrill, and North Sioux City, South Dakota. In this appeal, Andrews contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, because (1) genuine issues of material fact exist on her § 1983 claim that these defendants failed to properly hire, train, and supervise Fowler and failed to act on or investigate complaints; (2) genuine issues of material fact exist on her § 1985(3) conspiracy claim; and (3) the district court erred in denying her request to take additional depositions. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Andrews, supports the following set of facts. In the early morning hours of June 8, 1991, Andrews was raped by Randy Fowler, who was then a police officer for the North Sioux City Police Department. At the time, Andrews was a 17-year-old and had been drinking. She had recently graduated from high school and was preparing to enter basic training for the military.
Earlier the same evening, during a going-away party for Andrews at her home, police were called to the scene because of underage drinking and reports of several arguments at the party. Fowler took an interest in Andrews, which Chief of Police Scott Price noticed. After the police left the scene, Price called all three of his officers back to the police department where he warned them not to fraternize while on duty, especially not with minor females. Price was aware that the department had had trouble in the past with some officers fraternizing with and possibly even having sexual relations with minor females. Those officers had been discharged before Price became chief of police and before any of Price's officers had been hired. Price had, however, received numerous complaints that one of his officers had been stopping females for minor traffic violations or no violation at all, asking them out on dates, and offering not to issue citations if they would agree to go on a date with or to provide their telephone number to the officer. Therefore, Price warned his officers to avoid such conduct.
Later on June 8, 1991, while Fowler was still on duty, he returned to Andrews' home on another call reporting a disturbance at the address. He invited Andrews into his police car. They drove away from Andrews' home and parked the police car in a spot where the two talked for some time. Fowler offered to take Andrews home when his shift was over. At that time, Fowler exchanged his police car for his personal vehicle, but instead of taking Andrews home, Fowler took her to an isolated area. There, he forced her to have sexual intercourse with him under threats that he would charge her with underage drinking and prevent her from being allowed into the military if she did not cooperate with his advances. Andrews told no one of the assault.
During the next few weeks, while Andrews was away at basic training, her mother, Dixie Anderson, began to hear rumors that Randy Fowler was bragging about having had sexual relations with Andrews and that he knew she had no tan lines. When her mother reported this to Andrews in a brief telephone conversation, Andrews replied, (Appellant's App. at 39.) Dixie Anderson then went to Chief of Police Price, who had already heard the rumor of Fowler's boasts from another officer. Anderson informed Price that if there had been sexual relations between her daughter and Fowler, it was not consensual and she wanted to press charges. Price confronted Fowler with the accusation, and he denied having had any sexual relations with Andrews. Price did not investigate the incident further, and Anderson did not pursue the matter.
In early July, Fowler sexually assaulted another woman, Bonnie Bell, threatening to charge her with a crime if she did not acquiesce to his sexual demands. Ms. Bell told Officer Greg Hanson about the incident but did not make a formal complaint. Officer Hanson told Chief Price about the incident, but Price did not investigate. Ultimately, on August 3, 1991, Price wrote up an evaluation of Fowler to present to the city council when he requested Fowler's termination. The evaluation included some reference to the Andrews incident, to reports that Fowler had been stopping young females and asking them out on dates instead of issuing citations, and to Fowler's dates with another 17-year-old girl against Price's orders. The evaluation also noted Fowler's lack of reliability, often failing to respond to radio requests for back-up help. Price presented a copy of the evaluation to the mayor and met with the mayor and the city council on August 5, 1991, to discuss terminating Fowler's employment. The city council immediately requested Fowler's resignation, and he complied.
Andrews' mother, Dixie Anderson, testified that she decided not to pursue the criminal prosecution of Fowler because she had heard of his discharge and assumed that there was nothing more she could do. Three years later, at the instigation of then Chief of Police Skip Ensley who investigated these matters, Fowler was prosecuted for raping Kristi Andrews. The Supreme Court of South Dakota recently affirmed Fowler's conviction of second-degree rape. State v. Fowler, 552 N.W.2d 92 (S.D.1996). In another criminal case, Fowler was convicted of attempted second-degree rape, simple assault, and sexual contact all arising from his assault of Bonnie Bell, which occurred approximately one month after he raped Andrews. State v. Fowler, 552 N.W.2d 391 (S.D.1996).
Andrews brought this civil rights suit against Fowler, Chief of Police Price, Mayor Merrill, and the city based on the incident. Andrews asserted a § 1983 cause of action based on Fowler's conduct and the other defendants' failure to properly hire, supervise, or train Fowler, as well as their failure to investigate complaints against him. Andrews asserted a § 1985(3) cause of action, claiming that the defendants conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights by covering up Fowler's misconduct. Andrews also asserted South Dakota state law claims of assault and battery, intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, and negligence.
The district court granted summary judgment to Price, Merrill, and the city, concluding that there is no genuine issue of material fact on the § 1983 claims or on the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. As to the state law claims, the district court concluded that they are not available because Andrews did not comply with the statutory notice requirement. See S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 3-21-2 (1994). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Fowler, dismissing the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim and the state law assault and battery claim against him. Trial against Fowler on the remaining claims is stayed pending final disposition of this appeal, in which Andrews challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of Price, Merrill, and the city.
"We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court and examining the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 258 (8th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Disesa v. St. Louis Community College, 79 F.3d 92, 94 (8th Cir.1996). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is also appropriate when the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of her case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Andrews first contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Price, Merrill, and the city on her § 1983 claim. On appeal, she contends that she has raised a material dispute of fact concerning whether these defendants failed to properly hire, train, and supervise Fowler or to investigate complaints against him.
We begin with Andrews' arguments challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment to the city.
"[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents" on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The city may be subject to § 1983 liability for failing to act on complaints of sexual misconduct by police department employees only if it had a "policy or custom" of failing to act upon prior similar complaints of unconstitutional conduct, which caused the constitutional injury at issue. Id. There must...
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