Mims v. Reid
| Decision Date | 27 November 1957 |
| Citation | 98 So.2d 498 |
| Parties | Valentine W. MIMS, for the use and benefit of Emmco Insurance Company, a corporation, Appellant, v. Howard REID, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jack A. Nants, Orlando, for appellant.
Sanders, McEwan & Berson, Orlando, for appellee.
V. W. Mims sued Howard Reid for personal injuries and damage to his automobile arising out of an automobile accident. At the pre-trial conference, Mims, with the consent of Reid, dismissed his claim for property damages; whereupon, the case was settled and a judgment was rendered, promptly paid and satisfied.
Prior to the entry of the consent judgment but during the pendency of the action, Mims, for the use and benefit of Emmco Insurance Company, instituted a separate action based on the same collision to recover damages to the motor vehicle. Reid answered and defended on the ground of the prior action and the consequent judgment and satisfaction thereof; and further that the suit was barred because it was in violation of the rule against splitting a cause of action and was res judicata. In reply to the answer, Mims alleged that Emmco Insurance Company had reimbursed him for damages to his car under the rovisions of his insurance policy and he had delivered to Emmco Insurance Company a loan receipt. The reply alleged that by virtue of the loan receipt Emmco Insurance Company had a separate cause of action in itself and could maintain the same despite the previous action of the plaintiff and the consequent judgment and satisfaction.
The matter was terminated in the trial court by the entry of a summary judgment holding, inter alia, that the consent judgment and satisfaction thereof in the case involving personal injuries prevented maintenance of the separate action for damages to the automobile. This appeal is from the summary final judgment.
The sole point, therefore, involved in this appeal is correctly stated by appellee as follows:
'May a person who suffers property damages and personal injury in an automobile collision and accepts reimbursement from an insurance carrier for the property damages giving to the insurance carrier a loan receipt sue the adverse party for personal injury, securing judgment and payment thereof and thereafter maintain a separate suit for the use and benefit of the insurance carrier to recover the property damage?'
There is a great divergence of views on this subject by the various courts of the land. What is said to be the majority rule holds that only one cause of action arises. The courts holding to this view reason that if the defendant's wrongful act is single, the cause of action must be single and that the different injuries occasioned by it are merely items of damage proceeding from the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, the rule is that two causes of action result from the negligent act which inflicts injury on a person and his property at the same time. This is said to be the minority rule. 1 Am.Jur. Actions, para. 114; 1 Fla.Juris. Actions, para. 42 and 43. Midway between these two extreme views some courts recognize the general principle that but one cause of action arises out of a single act or omission resulting in injuries to both person and property, nevertheless they permit recovery by insured for personal injury, under some circumstances at least, irrespective of the prior institution of a suit by an insurer who is subrogated, as in this case, to the rights of insured with respect to property damage. Or, on the other hand, they permit an action by the insurer on its subrogated claim for property damages to be maintained despite the prior institution of an action by the insured for personal injury. See the collocation of cases in 140 A.L.R. 1242, 166 A.L.R. 870.
Appellee contends that this Court has heretofore committed itself to the view that but one cause of action exists for which but one suit may be maintained. In the case of Gaynon v. Statum, ...
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Weekes v. Atlantic National Ins. Co., 20245.
...Restatement, Judgments, § 62. 12 Levitt v. Simco Sales Service of Pa., 1957, Del.Super.Ct., 11 Terry 552, 135 A. 2d 910; Mims v. Reid, 1957, Fla., 98 So. 2d 498; Sibson v. Robert's Express, Inc., 1962, 104 N.H. 192, 182 A.2d 449; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Arlt, 1953, N.D., 61 N. W.2d 429; Aubil......
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...a cause of action means that a plaintiff has used the same cause of action to seek damages in different lawsuits. In Mims v. Reid, 98 So.2d 498 (Fla.1957), the supreme court adopted the majority view that prohibits splitting causes of The law does not permit the owner of a single or entire ......
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