CSX Transp. Inc. v. Marquar

• Decision Date: 13 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-5689,91-5689
• Citation: 980 F.2d 359
• Parties: 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2785, 61 USLW 2324, 123 Lab.Cas. P 10,452 CSX TRANSPORTATION INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neil J. MARQUAR, Mac A. Fleming, F.N. Simpson, and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 359

980 F.2d 359

141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2785, 61 USLW 2324,

123 Lab.Cas. P 10,452

CSX TRANSPORTATION INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Neil J. MARQUAR, Mac A. Fleming, F.N. Simpson, and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-5689.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 27, 1992.

Decided Nov. 13, 1992.

Freddie B. Westfall, Jr., Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, W.Va., Ronald M. Johnson (argued and briefed), Mark V. Holden, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Washington, D.C., Nicholas S. Yovanovic, James D. Tomola, CSX Transp. Inc., Law Dept., Jacksonville, Fla.,

Adrienne A. Berry, Segal, Isenburg, Sales, Stewart & Cutler, Christophe G. Stewart, Louisville, Ky., William A. Bon (argued and briefed), Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Southfield, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before: JONES, GUY, BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff CSX Transportation Inc. appeals the district court's decision granting a motion to dismiss for defendants, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (BMWE or "the union") and several union members, on the grounds that a railroad cannot obtain monetary damages under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188, for an illegal strike by the union. The majority affirms the district court and holds that monetary damages are never awardable under the RLA for a strike over a minor dispute. I, however, dissent from this holding.

I.

In September of 1990, CSX Transportation Inc. assigned part of a "stationary" track gang headquartered in Cynthiana, Ky., to perform track repairs away from its headquarters. CSX provided a truck driver to take lunch orders from gang members and bring their lunches to the job site. On September 19, 1990, defendant F.N. Simpson complained to CSX that CSX was violating the collective bargaining agreement by having these union members eat lunch on the job site instead of at the motel where the union members had been meeting each day. The union members contended that this was a "major dispute" under the RLA and that CSX was violating the RLA's status quo obligations under the RLA by changing a term of employment. CSX countered that this was a minor dispute. ¹ When CSX continued to insist that it believed this to be a minor dispute, the General Chairman of BMWE, defendant Neil J. Marquar, threatened that the union would strike.

On September 20, 1990, CSX brought suit against the BMWE and union members Mac Fleming, Neil J. Marquar and F.N. Simpson for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief. On September 22, 1990, the union approved a strike over the lunch dispute. On September 24, 1990, at 5 a.m., the union began a nine-state strike against CSX. That same day, at 10:35 a.m., CSX obtained a temporary restraining order, enjoining the strike. The parties then agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration as required by the RLA, and the arbitration panel upheld CSX's view that this was a minor dispute. The dispute was resolved through this arbitration process.

CSX, however, continued this action for compensatory relief. In its amended complaint filed February 11, 1991, CSX claimed that despite the swift injunctive relief, the strike had disrupted its business and delayed its trains, and also had stalled shipments to the Persian Gulf War. On May 3, 1991, the district court granted BMWE's motion to dismiss, finding that no court had allowed damages in this situation and that Congress had failed to "affirmatively approve such remedies." On appeal, plaintiff-appellant CSX contends that damages should be available under the RLA because the Supreme Court already has implied a right of action in this situation and a damages remedy is appropriate. Defendants-appellees argue that the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949, 78 S.Ct. 913, 2 L.Ed.2d 843 (1958), and in Burlington Northern Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance Way Employees, 961 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.1992), which denied damages for an unlawful strike, are controlling and that a damages remedy would disturb the balance of power between labor and management.

II.

In reviewing defendant's motion to dismiss, the standard of review that we must apply is that, "to be granted, there must be no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Matters outside the pleadings are not to be considered, and all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true." Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 577-78 (6th Cir.1992).

As the arbitration panel found and the district court recognized, this lunch controversy constitutes a minor dispute, and therefore defendants violated the RLA by striking over a minor dispute. ² We must determine, then, whether under the RLA a railroad may obtain money damages in this situation.

The question of whether monetary damages are available under the RLA for an illegal strike is one of first impression for this Circuit, and only one other circuit has addressed this issue. See Burlington Northern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 961 F.2d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir.1992) (damages not available); Louisville & N. Ry. v. Brown, 252 F.2d 149, 155 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 949, 78 S.Ct. 913, 2 L.Ed.2d 843 (1958). We find that the recent Supreme Court opinion in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), provides the framework that must govern our approach in deciding this question. Although Franklin does not change the existing law of implied rights and the remedies available under a statute providing those rights, it does clarify the route courts are to take in determining whether particular remedies are available under a federal statute. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1032-38. ³

In Franklin, the Court addressed whether an implied right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, supports a claim for money damages. The Court held that money damages are available under Title IX, and it indicated that once a right has been implied under a statute, courts need only decide what remedies are available under that statute. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1032. The Court then held:

As we have often stated, the question of what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of action is 'analytically distinct' from the issue of whether such a right exists in the first place. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2274 (1979). Thus, although we examine the text and history of a statute to determine whether Congress intended to create a right of action, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2489 (1979), we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. Davis, supra 442 U.S., at 246-47, 99 S.Ct. at 2277-2278. This principle has deep roots in our jurisprudence.

Id. The Franklin Court relied on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), in which the Supreme Court held that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Id. The Franklin Court then proceeded to discuss the historical basis, dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), for the "longstanding rule" that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy." Franklin, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1033 (citing Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway & S.S Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569, 50 S.Ct. 427, 433, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930); Texas & P. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 229, 21 S.Ct. 762, 765, 45 L.Ed. 1074 (1901); and Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838)). This presumption of the availability of all appropriate remedies has not dissipated in recent Supreme Court cases, the Franklin Court noted. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 1252 n. 9, 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984) (retroactive relief available to plaintiffs); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 n. 26, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2278 n. 26, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (federal court may order any appropriate relief); Cary v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1048, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (damages under § 1983); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239, 90 S.Ct. 400, 405, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) (statutory right "implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies"); and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 1560-61, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) (courts have power to grant "all necessary remedial relief"). The Franklin Court then stated, in sweeping terms clearly applicable to any federal statute, that "[t]he general rule, therefore, is that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute." Id. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1035.

A.

Applying the Franklin framework to this case, ⁴ we first note that the RLA does not provide explicitly for a right of action when a union strikes over a minor dispute, and in fact it does not explicitly provide for any causes of action. ⁵ However, the Supreme Court has implied a right of action under the RLA for a union's illegal strike. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30, 42, 77 S.Ct. 635, 641, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957) [hereinafter Chicago River], the Court implied a cause of action under the RLA and held that an injunction was appropriate to prevent an illegal strike. In that case, the union struck against the railroad over a...