Card v. Singletary

• Citation: 981 F.2d 481
• Decision Date: 28 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 88-3729,88-3729
• Parties: James Armando CARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 481

981 F.2d 481

James Armando CARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of

Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 88-3729.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 28, 1992.

Billy H. Nolas and Julie D. Naylor, Tallahassee, FL, for petitioner-appellant.

Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs and Richard B. Martell, Tallahassee, FL, for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.

Before KRAVITCH, HATCHETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION OF REHEARING EN BANC

Card's petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en banc are DENIED. No judge on active service has requested

                that the court be polled on rehearing en banc.   Fed.R.App.P. 35;  11th Cir.R. 35-5.   We have modified certain language from our previous opinion in this case, Card v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir.1992).   The earlier opinion is vacated and withdrawn, and the revised opinion below is substituted therefor
                

REVISED OPINION

This habeas corpus case comes before us for the second time. In Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir.1990), we remanded this case to the district court for the limited purpose of allowing the court to set forth its reasons for denying petitioner Card an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his competency to stand trial. Having reviewed the district court's order on remand, Card v. Dugger, Case No. TCA 87-40243-MMP (N.D.Fla. February 14, 1991) ("February 14 Order"), we affirm the court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue.

I. BACKGROUND

Our initial opinion remanding petitioner Card's competency claim to the district court but affirming denial of habeas relief on all other claims sets out in detail the facts of this case. The following summary provides additional context.

Appellant was convicted of robbery, kidnapping and first degree murder in connection with the death of Janice Franklin, clerk of a Western Union office in Panama City, Florida, and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the convictions and sentence. Card v. State, 453 So.2d 17 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 989, 105 S.Ct. 396, 83 L.Ed.2d 330 (1984). After having been denied collateral relief in state court, Card v. State, 497 So.2d 1169 (Fla.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987); Card v. Dugger, 512 So.2d 829 (Fla.1987), Card filed a habeas petition in the Northern District of Florida, asserting eight claims, including the claim that he was denied the right not to undergo criminal proceedings while incompetent. The district court denied petitioner relief on all claims and Card appealed to this court.

With respect to the claim that he was denied the right not to undergo criminal proceedings while incompetent, petitioner argued that (1) his constitutional rights were abridged by the state trial court's failure to afford him a pre-trial competency hearing, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), and that (2) he was in fact incompetent to stand trial and the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Card's actual competence. ¹

Regarding petitioner's Pate v. Robinson claim, we concluded that "the 'objective facts known to the trial court were [not] sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency'," Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 1519 (quoting Fallada v. Dugger, 819 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir.1987)), and that therefore the district court was correct in determining that the state trial court did not err by failing to conduct a competency hearing.

We reached this conclusion in spite of our determination that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing petitioner's Pate claim:

In its order, the district court did not set out the legal standard as enunciated by this court in Zapata ² and Fallada. Instead, it set out the standard that a federal court is to use in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when a substantive claim of incompetency is raised in a request for post-conviction relief.

Card, 911 F.2d at 1518 (emphasis in original) (footnote added). ³ This latter standard, enunciated by this court in Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S.Ct. 834, 88 L.Ed.2d 805 (1986), requires a defendant to present "clear and convincing evidence to create a 'real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to [his] mental capacity ... to meaningfully participate and cooperate with counsel....' " Adams, 764 F.2d at 1360 (quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d 1031, 1043 (5th Cir.1973)). Accord Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). Notwithstanding the district court's application of the wrong legal standard to Card's Pate claim, we found, upon review of the district court's findings and the record, that the facts available to the state trial court did not raise a bona fide doubt as to Card's competency. In so ruling, we relied on the psychiatric reports available to the state court at the time of the January 1982 trial, each of which deemed the appellant competent to stand trial, and the evidence that Card actively and competently participated in his own defense. Card, 911 F.2d at 1518-19.

With regard to the second issue--Card's claim that he was actually incompetent to stand trial and that the district court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this claim--we agreed that the standard enunciated in Bundy and Adams did apply, and that the appellant had "to present facts sufficient to 'unequivocally and clearly' generate a substantial doubt as to mental capacity." Card, 911 F.2d at 1519.

Although recognizing that "the district court concluded, in the context of Card's Pate claim, that Card did not meet the Bundy standard of raising a legitimate doubt as to his competency," we expressed concern that "the district court erroneously limited itself to the evidence of competency before the trial court." Id. Thus, we remanded the case back to the district court to let it review the post-trial evidence presented by Card in support of his claim of incompetency, and to state the grounds, if any, for its denial of an evidentiary hearing on Card's competency to stand trial.

On remand, Card argued to the district court that the mental health experts who evaluated him before trial failed to conduct an adequate evaluation of his competency to stand trial. In support of his position, Card pointed to two psychiatric reports prepared subsequent to his state court trial, in which other psychiatrists identified the deficiencies in the pre-trial competency evaluations: in one such report, the psychiatrist concluded that Card was in fact incompetent to stand trial. Card also pointed to a letter prepared by one of the pre-trial attending psychiatrists, in which the doctor identified errors in his own pre-trial competency evaluation. Finally, Card focused on his history of emotional disturbances in support of his claim of incompetency. This evidence, contended Card, unequivocally and clearly generated a substantial doubt as to his mental capacity, and thus warranted an evidentiary hearing before the district court on the competency issue.

The district court, however, concluded that Card did not meet his burden of positively, unequivocally and clearly raising a legitimate doubt as to his competency to stand trial, and accordingly denied Card an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Petitioner appeals the district court's order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We must affirm the district court's finding that Card did not generate a real substantial and legitimate doubt as to his capacity to stand trial unless that finding was clearly erroneous. Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d at 1360.

III. PETITIONER'S ENTITLEMENT TO A COMPETENCY HEARING

The issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial raises due process concerns. See Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d at 1036; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903-04, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court defined the contours of this due process right, holding that the test for determining competence to stand trial is "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402, 80 S.Ct. at 789.

As noted supra, this court's decisions in Bundy and Adams announce the legal standard by which a habeas petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing as to competency should be measured. ⁴ A defendant must present "clear and convincing evidence to create a 'real, substantial and legitimate doubt as to [his] mental capacity ... to meaningfully participate and cooperate with counsel....' " Adams, 764 F.2d at 1360 (quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F.2d at 1043); Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d at 566; Card, 911 F.2d at 1518. As the Adams court noted, "[t]he standard of proof is high. The facts must 'positively, unequivocally and clearly generate' the legitimate doubt." Adams, 764 F.2d at 1360. ⁵ For purposes of assessing whether such a legitimate doubt is created, we must accept as true petitioner's alleged facts. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992); Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337, 1338 (11th Cir.1987). ⁶ Further, we note that this inquiry does not involve a weighing of (1) the evidence in support of a hearing, against (2) the evidence in support of competency; rather, we must examine whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner...