McDuffie v. Hopper

Decision Date23 October 1997
Docket NumberNo. Civ. A. 96-A-1300-N.,Civ. A. 96-A-1300-N.
Citation982 F.Supp. 817
PartiesVISTA McDUFFIE, Plaintiff, v. Joseph HOPPER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

William Monroe Dawson, Jr., Gayle H. Gear, Dawson & Gear, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.

Bobby Neal Bright, C. Joseph Norton, McInnish, Bright & Long, PC, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

ALBRITTON, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 7, 1997, by defendants: Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS"), Dr. Gail Williams, Dr. William Sanders, and Dr. Charles Woodley.

Vista McDuffie ("McDuffie") filed this action on August 20, 1996. In his Complaint and amendment thereof McDuffie named six defendants: Joseph Hopper, individually and officially as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("DOC"); Merle Friesen, individually and officially as Director of Treatment of the DOC; CMS; Dr. Williams, individually and officially as CMS's Chief Psychiatrist and Mental Health Director; Dr. Woodley, individually and officially as CMS's Director of Psychological Services at Kilby Correctional Facility; and Dr. Sanders, individually and officially as a CMS psychiatrist at Kilby. Individual claims against Hopper were released by order of the court on March 25, 1997; claims against Friesen were dismissed on July 24, 1997.

McDuffie filed suit as the personal representative of his deceased father Billy Roberts, Sr., a prisoner who committed suicide while in the custody of the DOC, and under the care of CMS. In the Complaint, McDuffie asserted the following claims: cruel and unusual punishment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; wrongful death caused by negligence, indifference and/or recklessness, in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-410; and malpractice, in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-484. The court has jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim based on a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court also has jurisdiction over the state law claims based on supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Defendants CMS, Williams, Woodley, and Sanders ("Medical Defendants") have made four arguments in their renewed motion for summary judgment. Their previous motion was denied. The four arguments in the present motion are: (1) that Medical Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) that Plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference; (3) that Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata; and (4) that Plaintiffs state law claims abated at Plaintiffs death. For the reasons discussed herein, the present motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.

If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to the non-movant's case exists. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleading, but [his] response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.").

What is material is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of material fact "is `genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (1986). The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the non-movant must present "affirmative evidence" of material factual conflicts to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15. If the non-movant's response consists of nothing more than conclusory allegations, the court must enter summary judgment for the movant. See Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1989).

The evidence presented by the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there remains no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

With these rules and principles of law in mind, the court will determine whether summary judgment is appropriate or whether there exist genuine issues of material fact that should properly proceed to trial for resolution.

II. FACTS & CONTENTIONS

When viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, submissions before the court establish the following facts. Several contentions are also discussed. The court has not sought out evidence on all contentions of the parties because of the voluminous nature of the submissions, the limited nature of the present summary judgment motion, and the court's requirement that the parties specifically point out relevant evidence by page and line number. These contentions or allegations are noted as such.

McDuffie is an Alabama resident and the administrator of the estate of Billy Roberts, Sr. CMS is a Missouri corporation which contracts with the State of Alabama to provide mental care to the state's prisoners. CMS employs the three persons who are also movants here. Williams is the statewide mental health director for CMS, a position which the Plaintiff asserts is a policy-making position. Sanders is a psychiatrist employed by CMS; and Woodley is employed by CMS as a psychologist / director of acute mental health care at Kilby prison.

Roberts was an inmate in the custody of the Alabama DOC from 1978 until his death in 1995. Among the facilities housing Roberts was Kilby, a DOC prison. Records indicate that during the seventeen years of his imprisonment, Roberts suffered severe and recurrent psychiatric illness. On many occasions while at Kilby, Roberts informed medical staff that he was hallucinating, hearing voices, and thinking about suicide or other self injury. He sometimes requested medication and physical restraint because of his conditions, and was often put on suicide watch. At least four times, Roberts unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide. In particular, in December 1990 Roberts attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself in his P-I unit cell, a type of isolation cell. In December 1993, Roberts again attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of Thorazine while at Kilby.

During June of 1995, Roberts had been transferred to St. Clair Correctional Facility, but was eventually sent back to a P-I cell at Kilby. Roberts was housed in one of these cells until his death. Plaintiff presents evidence that the confinement in this type of cell, as opposed to a psychiatric hospital or a unit where more psychiatric care could be given, amounted to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff also presents evidence that CMS, through Williams, had a policy or practice of eliminating transfers to the state psychiatric hospital, and underusing psychiatric care units (so-called "MHU's" or mental health units).

During many of his years in prison and most of the month prior to his suicide, Roberts was receiving large doses of a psychotropic drug. As of September 5, 1995, Roberts was being medicated with 200 milligrams of Thorazine1 in the morning and 1,000 milligrams of Thorazine at bedtime. He was also taking 150 milligrams of To-franil at bedtime. These medications apparently did not greatly reduce Williams' suicidal thoughts. On September 14, 1995, Roberts requested that all personal items be removed from his cell because his hallucinations were intensifying. He also made statements to prison personnel about suicide or self-harm on September 7 and 18.

Despite these reports of suicidal thoughts by Roberts, a decision was made to discontinue his psychotropic medication. Williams allegedly gave the instructions, or at least made strong suggestions, to discontinue the medication. Plaintiffs allege that this was part of a policy of CMS that was instituted by Williams, a policy to get as many prisoners off of psychotropic drugs as possible in order to cut costs. On September 19, 1995, Sanders and Woodley went to Roberts' cell and informed him that they were ending his daily dosages of Thorazine. On the same day, Roberts told...

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3 cases
  • Raby v. Baptist Medical Center
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • September 9, 1998
    ...requirement of an official policy or custom in a claim of § 1983 liability brought against a private entity. See McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F.Supp. 817, 826 n. 8 (M.D.Ala.1997). Under the policy or custom standard, a plaintiff must identify an official act, policy or custom of the employer and......
  • Edwards v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • January 14, 2000
    ...but that they "cannot be held liable unless a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury"); McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F.Supp. 817, 825 (M.D.Ala.1997) (Albritton, J.) ("[T]hose who contract to engage in government services without supervision, and for profit in a competitive m......
  • Hinson v. Edmond
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • October 20, 1999
    ...courts in this circuit, see Nelson v. Prison Health Servs, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1452, 1462-63 (M.D. Fla. 1997); McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F. Supp. 817, 825 (M.D. Ala. 1997), but is also consistent with Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1998), where the Ninth Circuit concluded t......
1 books & journal articles
  • Managed health care in prisons as cruel and unusual punishment.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 90 No. 1, September 1999
    • September 22, 1999
    ...of federal and state courts, whose obligation it is to enforce the Constitution of the United States. (1) See McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F. Supp. 817, 821 (M.D. Ala. (2) See id. (3) See id. at 820-21. (4) See id. at 821. (5) See id. (6) See id. (7) See infra note 174 and accompanying text (dis......

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