Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario

• Decision Date: 04 November 1992
• Docket Number: RIVERA-PUI,92-1397,D,P,Nos. 92-1239,GARCIA-ROSARI,s. 92-1239
• Parties: 20 Media L. Rep. 2242 Miguellaintiff, Appellee, v. Hon. Gabrielefendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 311

983 F.2d 311

20 Media L. Rep. 2242

Miguel RIVERA-PUIG, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Hon. Gabriel GARCIA-ROSARIO, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 92-1239, 92-1397.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Nov. 4, 1992.

Decided Dec. 18, 1992.

Anabelle Rodriguez, Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Guaynabo, PR, for appellant.

Juan R. Marchand-Quintero, San Juan, PR, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents important constitutional issues requiring us to strike a balance between state-created due process and privacy concerns, and freedom of the press rights protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because we find the latter paramount in this case, and in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ("Press Enterprise II "), we affirm the district court's decision ¹ declaring unconstitutional the closure provision of Rule 23(c) of the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 34, App. II R. 23(c) (1991). ²

To place this case in its legal context, we will first discuss the Supreme Court's ruling in Press-Enterprise II.

I. PRESS-ENTERPRISE II

Section 868 of the California Penal Code required preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless "exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Cal.Penal Code § 868 (West 1985). A defendant charged with 12 counts of murder and subject to the death penalty requested closure of his preliminary hearing. Defendant's unopposed motion was granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate denied Press Enterprise's request for the release of the transcript of the proceedings, and sealed the record. The state and Press-Enterprise lost their appeal to the superior court on the grounds that release of the transcript might prejudice defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.

After the defendant waived his right to a jury trial, the superior court released the transcript. Appeals to the higher courts in California nevertheless continued. These courts ruled that there was no general First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings, and that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by a jury uninfluenced by news accounts shifted the burden in favor of closure if defendant established a reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice.

Ultimately, the case arrived at the United States Supreme Court. The Court noted that maintaining a criminal trial process open to neutral observers is an important means of assuring a fair trial as well as maintaining the appearance of fairness. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2739. It then discussed what it called the "tests of experience and logic." If a proceeding passes these tests, a qualified First Amendment right to public access attaches. Id. at 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. These tests are comprised of two considerations: (1) whether a tradition of accessibility to the type of hearing in question exists; and (2) "whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question." Id. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740.

Applying these tests to California's preliminary hearing, the Court first found that state and federal courts have almost uniformly conducted preliminary hearings in open court. Id. at 10-11, 106 S.Ct. at 2742.

Under the second consideration of the tests, the Court found that public access to the California preliminary hearings would play a significant positive role in the actual functioning of the process. Id. at 11-12, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. The Court reasoned that it had already determined in prior cases that public access plays a significant role in criminal trials. Id. It then concluded that the "California preliminary hearings are sufficiently like trials to justify the same conclusion." Id. at 12, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. In both criminal trials and the California preliminary hearing, the accused has an absolute right to: (1) an elaborate preliminary hearing before a neutral magistrate; (2) personally appear at the hearing; (3) representation by counsel; (4) cross-examine hostile witnesses; (5) present exculpatory evidence; and (6) exclude illegally obtained evidence. Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. In addition, in the California preliminary hearing, if the magistrate finds probable cause, he binds the accused over for trial, which in most cases leads to a guilty plea. Consequently, "the preliminary hearing is often the final and most important step in the criminal proceeding," and "in many cases provides 'the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal justice system.' " Id. (quoting San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal.3d 498, 179 Cal.Rptr. 772, 780, 638 P.2d 655, 663 (1982)). The Court commented that the very absence of a jury in these proceedings makes access even more important as "an inestimable safeguard against corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[s] and ... compliant, biased, or eccentric judge[s]." Id.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that proceedings must remain open unless specific, on-the-record findings demonstrate that " 'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' " Id. at 13-14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-Enterprise I "), 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984)). Against this legal backdrop we consider the present case.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 4, 1991, Miguel Rivera-Puig ("Rivera-Puig"), a newspaper reporter for the San Juan, Puerto Rico daily El Vocero de Puerto Rico ("El Vocero "), sought access to a preliminary hearing before the Hon. Gabriel Garcia-Rosario, a district court judge of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Rivera-Puig filed a written request, as a newspaper reporter, seeking physical access to the proceedings, or a recording of the hearing. ³ Judge Garcia-Rosario denied this request. Rivera-Puig requested access to another preliminary hearing before the same judge on January 16, 1992. The judge also denied this request.

Appellant candidly admits that the exclusion of the press and public from preliminary hearings is the rule, rather than the exception, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 23(c). In the face of this barrier Rivera-Puig went in search of legal redress for his federal constitutional claim.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

On January 17, 1992, Rivera-Puig filed an action in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico seeking a declaratory judgment that the Rule 23 closure provision was unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement of the rule. Although the suit named Judge Garcia-Rosario as the defendant, the plaintiff also served the complaint on the Secretary of Justice of the Commonwealth and the Director of the Courts Administration of Puerto Rico. In a motion filed with the complaint, Rivera-Puig claimed that two preliminary hearings would soon take place involving charges against prominent public officials, ⁴ but that the identity of the presiding judges was unknown until the day of the hearings. Thus, it was difficult to challenge the closure of hearings beforehand. Because he wanted access to these hearings, Rivera-Puig sought an expedited hearing to decide the validity of the closure provisions of Rule 23.

The hearing was held on January 23, 1992. In addition to the facts previously stated, the district court heard the testimony of Manny Suarez, a reporter for the San Juan English language daily, The San Juan Star. Suarez testified that on January 22, 1992 he was denied access to a review of a preliminary hearing determination held in the San Juan part of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure. ⁵

The district court also learned of three local court actions involving the validity of Rule 23(c). In the first of these suits, El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Civil Appeal AC-90-191, (the "El Vocero appeal"), the superior court decided in favor of the rule's constitutionality on January 29, 1990. An appeal went to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico where it was pending resolution since February 1, 1991. Appellants twice moved in that court for expedited resolution and sought mandamus against the seven justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, moving for decision of the submitted appeal. The court rejected these efforts in a cryptic ruling dated January 22, 1992. ⁶

The second suit involving Rule 23(c) was Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Lara-Imbert, CE-91-235 (June 28, 1991), in which the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed a superior court ruling which, relying on Press-Enterprise II, refused closure of the preliminary hearing. That decision, however, was based on a perceived lack of a "case and controversy," not on the merits.

A third case, El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Hon. Carlos Caban-Garcia, 92 J.T.S. 1 at 9121 (1992), was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico for lack of jurisdiction.

In a comprehensive and well-founded opinion, the federal district court decided the present case on January 31, 1992. The district court ruled that: (1) the doctrine of "judicial immunity did not bar the issuance of prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in [his] judicial capacity," (quoting Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1981, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984)); (2) an Article III "case and controversy" existed between Rivera-Puig, who was denied access to the preliminary hearings, and Judge Garcia-Rosario who enforced the closure provisions of Rule 23; (3) abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), was inappropriate because plaintiff did not...