Young v. State

Decision Date02 June 1999
Citation983 P.2d 1044,161 Or. App. 32
PartiesDavid YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Oregon, Respondent.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

John Hoag, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Mary H. Williams, Assistant Solicitor General.

Before De MUNIZ, Presiding Judge, and LANDAU and HASELTON, Judges.

De MUNIZ, P.J.

In this declaratory judgment case, plaintiff challenges the trial court's determination that the overtime pay provisions of ORS 279.340(1) (1995)1 did not apply to state managerial and executive employees.

At all relevant times, the state2 employed plaintiff in a salaried position. In 1995, the legislature amended ORS 279.340(1) to include the state in the overtime compensation law; before 1995, that statute referred only to nonstate public employers. See ORS 279.340 (1993) ("Labor directly employed by a county, municipality, municipal corporation, school district or subdivision shall be allowed overtime as follows[.]"). After the amendment, ORS 279.340(1) provided:

"Labor directly employed by a public employer as defined in ORS 243.6503 shall be compensated, if budgeted funds for such purpose are available, for overtime worked in excess of 40 hours in any one week, at not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of such employment. If budgeted funds are not available for the payment of overtime, such overtime shall be allowed in compensatory time off at not less than time and a half for employment in excess of 40 hours in any one week."

Under the authority of the amended law, plaintiff applied for overtime pay or compensatory time. The state denied plaintiff's request on the ground that, as a professional, salaried employee, plaintiff was exempt from the overtime provisions. At that time, the exemptions from overtime compensation were contained in ORS 279.342, which provided:

"(5) Employees exempted from overtime:
"(a) By a county, municipality, municipal corporation, school district or subdivision because of the executive, administrative, supervisory or professional nature of their employment[.]"

Because that statute did not expressly exempt state salaried employees from the overtime law, plaintiff filed this action in which he sought a declaratory judgment that he, and other similar state "white collar" employees, were within the overtime pay provisions of ORS 279.340(1). The state moved for summary judgment, urging that the 1995 legislature's inclusion of the state in the overtime pay provisions and the legislature's corresponding failure to exempt state "white collar" workers from those requirements was an inadvertent mistake rather than a definitive expression of legislative intent to include those workers in the overtime law. The trial court granted the state's summary judgment motion. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

The sole issue in this case is a legal one that requires us to construe ORS 279.340(1) and ORS 279.342(5)(a) to determine whether the "white collar" exemption applies to state workers. In making that determination, we are constrained to apply the methodology established by the Oregon Supreme Court in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993).

Under that methodology, we first examine the text and context of a statute because a statute's wording "is the best evidence of the legislature's intent." Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. Related to that principle is a rule of textual construction that governs the scope of our first-level inquiry. That rule limits our role in construing a statute "simply to ascertain[ing] and declar[ing] what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted[.]" ORS 174.010 (emphasis added); PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143.

The context of a statute relevant at the first level of analysis may include other provisions of the same statute and related statutes, id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143, prior enactments and prior judicial interpretations of those and related statutes, Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430, 435, 918 P.2d 808 (1996), and the historical context of the relevant enactments. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or. 406, 415, 908 P.2d 300 (1995), on recons. 325 Or. 46, 932 P.2d 1141 (1997).

If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the first level of analysis may legislative history be considered. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. If that inquiry fails to yield an unambiguous result, then consideration may be given to pertinent maxims of construction. Id. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143.

Here, ORS 279.340(1) provided that "[l]abor directly employed by a public employer as defined in ORS 243.650 shall" receive overtime compensation. Because the qualifying phrase "as defined in ORS 243.650" directly follows the term "public employer" and is not set off by commas, it must, under the last antecedent rule, modify only that term. State v. Webb, 324 Or. 380, 386-87, 927 P.2d 79 (1996). In turn, ORS 243.650(20) defines "public employer" to include the state. Furthermore, because the term "labor" is not modified, is not defined anywhere in the statute or related statutes, and is a word of common usage, we must ascribe to it, its plain, natural and ordinary meaning. PGE, 317 Or. at 611,859 P.2d 1143. In that light, "labor" properly is construed to mean all employees of a subject employer. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1259 (unabridged ed 1993) (as relevant here, defines labor as "workers employed in an establishment[.]"). Thus, by its plain terms, ORS 279.340(1) entitles all state employees to overtime compensation.

As noted, ORS 279.342 contained the only exceptions to that law. Subsection (5)(a) is the "white collar" exception at issue here, and, as the text plainly shows, the state is not among the entities included therein. See ORS 279.342(5)(a) (exception applies only to workers employed by "a county, municipality, municipal corporation, school district or subdivision"). Thus, because ORS 279.340(1) unambiguously entitles all state employees to overtime compensation, and because ORS 279.342(5)(a) does not expressly exempt state "white collar" workers from that entitlement, a natural reading of the plain words of those statutes yields a single and unambiguous meaning: State "white collar" workers are entitled to overtime compensation.

The state concedes that point. Nevertheless, the state seeks to obscure that clear meaning with a contextual analysis premised, not on the identification of a contextually based alternative, and clearer, expression of legislative intent, but, rather, on a conclusion that a literal reading of the statutes' plain text, in the light of the statutes' context, "would yield an absurd or unreasonable result." From that conclusion, the state argues that, essentially, because the legislature could not have intended an absurd result, "the `white collar' exemption in ORS 279.342(5)(a) also should apply to state employees[.]" Implicit in the state's argument is the contention that we may use an "absurd result" analysis at the first level of the methodology prescribed by PGE.4

In support of its argument, the state relies on Supreme Court cases that predate the publication of PGE and on Owens, which came after PGE. With respect to the earlier opinions, the state correctly identifies in those cases a method of statutory construction in which the court relied on the absurd-result maxim to "look beyond the [literal import of] the words of the act." Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 703-04, 530 P.2d 53 (1974). See also McKean-Coffman v. Employment Div., 312 Or. 543, 549, 824 P.2d 410 (1992)

("In construing a statute, courts must refuse to give literal application to language when to do so would produce an absurd or unreasonable result."); Pacific P. & L. v. Tax Com., 249 Or. 103, 109-10, 437 P.2d 473 (1968); Holman Trf. Co. v. Portland, 196 Or. 551, 564-65, 249 P.2d 175, 250 P.2d 929 (1952); Fox v. Galloway, 174 Or. 339, 347, 148 P.2d 922 (1944). However, as we discuss below, PGE created a different methodology that is inconsistent with the approach used in those earlier cases.

PGE, like the cases before it, is based on the principle that the court's role is to discern legislative intent. However, what separates PGE from its predecessors is its step-by-step methodology, which proceeds from what the legislature has written, to what the legislature has considered, and finally, as a last resort, to what the court determines makes sense. Significantly, unlike the earlier case law, PGE requires ambiguity before the court may leave one analytical level and proceed to the next. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611,

859 P.2d 1143 ("If, but only if, the intent is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level[.]"). See also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or. 370, 376-77, 938 P.2d 756 (1997) ("If text and context yield an unambiguous meaning, we proceed no further.").

Additionally, PGE demarcated a clear boundary line between the powers of the legislature and those of the court and, in doing so, circumscribed the court's authority to construe a statute. In State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or. 275, 282-83, 917 P.2d 494 (1996), the court explained the reason for that line as it related to the absurd-result maxim:

"Because we have already determined that the legislative intent is clear from an inquiry into text and context, we do not apply the statutory maxim that we should avoid a literal application of the statutory text if it will produce an absurd result. PGE, 317 Or. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143. That maxim is best suited for helping the court to determine which of two or more plausible meanings the legislature intended. In such a case,
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