Harold Washington Party v. Cook County, Illinois Democratic Party, 91-2712

• Citation: 984 F.2d 875
• Decision Date: 17 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-2712,91-2712
• Parties: The HAROLD WASHINGTON PARTY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 875

984 F.2d 875

24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1116

The HAROLD WASHINGTON PARTY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-2712.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 17, 1992.

Decided Jan. 29, 1993.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1993.

Roosevelt Thomas, Martin & Thomas, Robert E. Pincham, Jr., R. Eugene Pincham, Sr. (argued), Chicago, IL, for Harold Washington Party.

Brian L. Crowe, Henslee, Monek & Henslee, John F. Kennedy, Stamos & Trucco, Chicago, IL, for Cook County Illinois Democratic Party and Thomas Lyons.

David P. Schippers, Schippers & Gilbert, Chicago, IL, Martin J. McNally, Markham, IL, for Tom Carey and Michael Carey.

Michael C. Moses, Chicago, IL, for Michael F. Sheahan.

Joseph A. Spitalli (argued), Simon & Spitalli, Chicago, IL, for Ray Simmon.

John A. Dienner, III, George Murtaugh, Jr., Lydon & Griffin, Chicago, IL, for Bonnie McGuire.

George N. Leighton, Neal & Associates, Gregory A. Adamski, Karen Conti, Adamski & Conti, Chicago, IL, for Valerie A. Sutton, Patton L. Feichter, Ervin S. Picke, David Barrera and Dorothy Reed.

Before FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges, and CURRAN, District Judge. ^*

CURRAN, District Judge.

A. BACKGROUND

The Harold Washington Party (HWP), named after a deceased Chicago mayor, is a fledgling Chicago political party whose voters, members and supporters are predominantly African-Americans. The party was founded and incorporated in Illinois as a Chicago political party in 1989. As the November 6, 1990, general election approached, the party attempted to become a political presence in Cook County, Illinois, as well as in the City of Chicago, by slating candidates for the positions of Cook County Sheriff, State's Attorney, Assessor, Clerk, Treasurer, Board President, as well as other offices. ¹ Nominating petitions containing over 60,000 signatures were filed on behalf of these candidates.

The case before us arose out of the efforts of the Chicago Cook County Democratic Party (CCCDP) to remove the Harold Washington Party candidates from the Cook County November 6, 1990, general election ballot. The background of this dispute, as recounted by the Illinois Supreme Court in a related action, evolved as follows:

On August 6, 1990, Barbara J. Norman and others (the Party) filed petitions to place their names on the November 6, 1990, election ballot as candidates for office under the HAROLD WASHINGTON PARTY (Washington Party) name. The Washington Party candidates filed as a "new" political party in Cook County under article 10 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 10-1 et seq.), even though the Washington Party was already an established party in the City of Chicago. The Washington Party fielded candidates for all nonjudicial, countywide offices, and for county commissioners to be elected at-large within the City of Chicago (city commissioners), county commissioners to be elected at-large from outside the City of Chicago (suburban commissioners) and commissioners of the Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago.

Dorothy Reed and others (the objectors) filed objections to the Washington Party candidates' nomination pursuant to section 10-8 of the code, contending that the Washington Party petitions lacked the requisite number of signatures, and had failed to meet other requirements of section 10-2 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 10-2).

The Cook County officers electoral board (the board) examined the objections and held that the Washington Party candidates were entitled to appear on the November ballot, with the exception of the candidates for the water district and the suburban-district commissioners. The board found that the Washington Party had failed to gather the necessary number of petition signatures from within those districts in support of those candidates.

The objectors appealed the board's decision to the circuit court of Cook County. That court, in an order filed on September 20, 1990, affirmed the board's decision in part and reversed it in part. It held that the failure of the suburban commissioners' candidacy and the failure to present judicial candidates resulted in a failure by the Washington Party to submit a "complete slate" of candidates as required by section 10-2 of the Code, and that therefore all Washington Party candidates were ineligible for the ballot.

This court then reviewed the circuit court's decision pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (134 Ill.2d R. 302(b)), and issued an order filed on October 12, 1990, affirming the circuit court's decision on two separate grounds. First, this court held that the Washington Party candidates could not use the Washington Party party name because it was the name of an "established political party," in violation of section 10-5 of the Code. Second, this court held that the failure of the suburban commissioners' petitions resulted in the Washington Party's failure to file a complete slate of candidates and that, therefore, its nomination papers did not comply with section 10-2. As a result, this court found it unnecessary to address the remaining points raised on appeal, among them being whether the Washington Party's failure to slate judicial candidates was fatal to its candidates' petitions.

Reed v. Kusper, 154 Ill.2d 77, 180 Ill.Dec. 685, 686-87, 607 N.E.2d 1198, 1199-2000 (1992) (ruling after remand).

Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, stayed the order of the Illinois Supreme Court, and ordered that the Harold Washington Party candidates be listed on the November 6, 1992 ballot. On January 14, 1992, the Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding the decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board. See Norman v. Reed, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992).

Meanwhile, on October 1, 1990, the appellants ² filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the Cook County Democratic Party and eleven individuals ³ conspired to keep the Harold Washington Party candidates off the November 6 ballot. The Plaintiffs in the district court sought injunctive and monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Complaint also cites 18 U.S.C. § 231 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 & 1985(2) as avenues of relief. Four attorneys filed notices of appearances on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Lead attorney for the Plaintiffs was R. Eugene Pincham, who ran as the Harold Washington Party candidate for mayor during the pendency of this action.

On November 13, 1990, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (b)(6). At a December 3, 1990, status conference a briefing schedule was set whereby the Plaintiffs were to respond to the motion by January 2, 1991. The briefing schedule was memorialized by a minute order. On January 11, 1991, Attorney Robert E. Pincham, Jr. filed a motion seeking an extension of time in which to respond on the ground that his father, the lead counsel, was recovering from surgery. The court granted the motion and ordered the Plaintiffs to respond by February 1. This schedule was also memorialized as a minute order. On January 23, 1991, the Plaintiffs again moved for an extension of time due to the continuing illness of the lead attorney. Again, the motion was granted and the district judge ordered the Plaintiffs to respond by March 1. After that deadline passed with no response being filed, the Defendants moved for entry of an order granting their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim, and for failure to respond to the original motion to dismiss.

The court heard the Defendants' motion on April 5, 1991, at which time the Plaintiffs asked for another fourteen days in which to respond. This time the court denied the request and granted the motion to dismiss. A final judgment dismissing the action with prejudice was docketed on April 8, 1991.

On April 17, 1991, the Plaintiffs served a motion to vacate the April 5 order dismissing the complaint. This motion was heard on April 22, at which time the Plaintiffs finally responded to the motion to dismiss. In a July 12, 1991, memorandum opinion, the district court decided that this motion was untimely for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), ⁴ so it considered the motion under Rule 60(b) and found that the Plaintiffs had not established mistake, surprise, inadvertence, excusable neglect or any other exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the motion to vacate was denied.

On July 19, 1991, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the court's order of July 12. The principal issue before us is whether the district judge abused his discretion in denying the Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal under Rule 60(b). Because we conclude that he did not, we affirm.

B. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

As a threshold matter, the Plaintiffs point out that, because this case was filed as a Class action, the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice without addressing the issue of class certification or notifying the putative class. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1). This argument raises the question of whether there is a final judgment over which this court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If the district court has indicated that it contemplates additional proceedings to address the class issue, its judgment is not final for purposes of appeal.

In this case the district court never addressed the class certification issue and did not specifically reserve that question. Our cases hold that, absent a reservation of the class certification issue, the district...