Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-75687.,96-75687. |
| Citation | 984 F.Supp. 1075 |
| Parties | Keith STUBL, Plaintiff, v. T.A. SYSTEMS, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Ken Frey, and Ken Batur, Jointly and Severally, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
George W. Burnard, Troy, MI, for Plaintiff.
Kenneth A. Flaska, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment arising out of Plaintiff Keith Stubl's Complaint alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (hereinafter "the Act" or "FMLA"). In Count I of his Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants T.A. Systems, Inc., as well as Ken Batur and Ken Frey, President and Vice President of the company respectively. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the Act when, upon his return from leave, they deducted money from his paycheck for medical insurance premiums Defendant T.A. Systems, Inc. ("T.A.") paid during his leave and terminated Stubl for exercising his right to take a leave of absence under the Act. In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges T.A. breached his employment contract when they refused to pay commissions on certain pre-termination and post-termination orders. In Count III, Plaintiff seeks damages under M.C.L. 600.2961 for allegedly overdue commissions.
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not give adequate notice to T.A., or provide the medical evidence required by T.A.'s employee manual, to be covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Defendants also claim that Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show that the reasons given for his termination were pretextual. With respect to Counts II and III, Defendants argue they have paid Mr. Stubl the commissions he is entitled to.
Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for the first claim in Count I, in which Plaintiff argues Defendants violated the Act by charging him for his medical insurance upon his return, in violation of the FMLA.
Plaintiff Keith Stubl worked for T.A. as an in-house salesman from 1991 through late July 1996. T.A. is a custom machine shop with approximately 85 employees.
In June 1995, Mr. Stubl's 15 year-old son Keith Jr. committed suicide. Stubl took a week off from work for the funeral, but continued working thereafter. On July 5, 1995, Stubl sent a letter to Ken Frey and Ken Batur stating he was taking some time off work to get through problems he was encountering as a result of his son's death.1 The letter read as follows:
July 5, 1995
To: Ken Batur
Ken Frey
Irene LeFevre
From: Keith A. Stubl
RE: Personal Leave of Absence
Based on the personal tragedy I have recently encountered I have thought things through and believe I necessitate some personal time off work. I have attempted to work on a day to day basis for T.A. Systems, but my loss is taking it's toll on me.
Please see below some things that I believe should be understood between both parties regarding my leave of absence:
1.)It is understood that I am taking this leave of absence based on my personal loss caused by the death of Keith Jr. with regards to my personal health.
2.)It is understood that my leave of absence will begin July 17, 1995 and end September 18, 1995.
3.)It is understood that at the end of the 60 day leave of absence, I will return to T.A. Systems, Inc.
4.)It is understood that no salary will be paid during the 60 day leave of absence.
5.)It is understood that all commissions due will continue to be paid each Thursday during my leave of absence.
6.)It is understood that no expenses will be paid during the 60 day leave of absence.
7.)It is understood that my health insurance through Blue Cross and my dental insurance through Guardian, as well as any life insurance through T.A. Systems, Inc. will remain in effect during the leave of absence and if any monies are due by me they will be paid after September 15, 1995.
Regretfully
Keith A. Stubl
(Defendant's Exhibit B).
Attached to Stubl's memo was a copy of T.A.'s policy on taking a leave of absence. The policy states:
Leave of Absence—A leave of absence may be granted for medical or compelling personal reasons. Leave of absence for sickness is granted when sufficient medical evidence is submitted. Employees should apply by letter for a leave of absence through his supervisor, stating the reason and expected length of leave.
(Defendants' Exhibit B). Stubl's letter did not reference the Family and Medical Leave Act, as he was not aware of the Act. Notice of the Act was not posted in the work place as required by law, and nobody at T.A. attempted to inform Stubl of the Act. (Joint Final Pretrial Order, p. 10).
On July 17, 1995, Stubl began his leave of absence. Around the same time, T.A. employee Irene Le Fevre directed Stubl to see the company doctor to determine whether Stubl had a medical excuse for taking the time off, and whether he was eligible for disability payments.2 (Peppler Deposition, p. 6). On July 21, 1995, Stubl went to see Doctor Craig Peppler, D.O.3 Dr. Peppler diagnosed Mr. Stubl as having "prolonged grief reaction." (Peppler Deposition, p. 14).
Dr. Peppler dictated a letter to Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company stating his diagnosis and summarizing the reasons why Stubl needed to take a leave of absence. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). Dr. Peppler testified that he suggested Stubl seek psychiatric counseling, but Stubl was not receptive to the idea. Dr. Peppler did not prescribe any medication, as he thought this would just prolong Stubl's grief.
Stubl did not send the letter by Dr. Peppler to T.A. regarding his medical condition nor did T.A. request such a letter. (Joint Final Pretrial Order, p. 10). T.A. claims they did not know Stubl was taking a medical leave, or they would have asked for medical evidence.
Stubl returned to Dr. Peppler's office on August 24, 1995 for a thirty minute visit. Dr. Peppler testified that he has trouble recalling the purpose of the second visit, but his records indicate he held discussion with Stubl, probably assessing if he could return to work.
During his leave of absence, T.A. paid Stubl $11,168.18 in commissions. (Joint Final Pretrial Order, p. 9). Out of these commissions, T.A. deducted $749.76 to cover the cost of health insurance premiums incurred by T.A. during Stubl's leave. (Id.)
Stubl returned to work in late August of 1995, and received a raise in January of 1996. (Joint Final Pretrial Order, p. 10). T.A. terminated Stubl on July 31, 1996.(Id.). Stubl claims he was fired because Mr. Frey was angered by Stubl's decision to take leave, over Frey's objection. Stubl claims Frey had mentioned it several times during the months leading up to his termination.
However, Defendants note that Stubl previously testified in his divorce action that he believed he was being terminated because he did not get along with his fellow employees and because T.A. was being sold.4 During his divorce hearing Stubl never mentioned his personal leave as a potential basis for his dismissal from T.A.5 Defense counsel addressed the apparent contradiction during Mr. Stubl's deposition in the instant case:
Q. Okay. Now I think your complaint, you state that Ken Frey terminated you because you took a leave of absence under the Family Leave Act?
A. That's correct.
Q. You've previously testified earlier where, that you thought you were terminated because the company was being sold; isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Well why did you testify in your divorce proceedings that you thought you were terminated because the company was being sold and—is that because you believed that at that point in time or were you committing perjury then?
A. I answered a question by—my attorney asked me why I felt I was being terminated and I explained to him was one of the reasons was because the company was being sold. Ken Frey told me personally that the new owners, as well as Rick May felt I was making too much money. And there were several other reasons that were not asked of me at that time.
Q. Well, wasn't the question—the question was why were you terminated?
A. One question. I didn't get a chance to elaborate on the other reasons.
Q. So there's more than one reason?
A. Yes.
Q. One of the reasons you were terminated is because the company is being sold?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. But at the time you were terminated they told you they were terminating you because they could? You were an at-will employee, right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. And prior to your termination there had been discussions about your alleged inability to get along with fellow employees?
A. That's correct.
(Stubl Deposition, pp. 56, 57, 78).
The parties also dispute the facts surrounding the payment of commissions to Mr. Stubl. Stubl's compensation included $60,000 salary plus expenses, benefits and commissions. The commissions were defined in a September 9, 1991 letter drafted by T.A., which read:
Commission Schedule
— 2% of first $2,000,000.00 in Sales
— 1% thereafter
— Commission to be paid on Machine Sales only. Not on service orders or parts orders. Territory is exclusive to Michigan, non-exclusive to other states. See listing of House Accounts below.
Michigan House Accounts
ASAA FOCUS GOLF LECTRON
ALLIED HOLLEY LESCOA
BRANSON ITT HANCOCK STAR GASKET
CROTTY CORP. L & M GEAR WENDT
We are looking forward to a lengthy term of employment that is mutually beneficial.
(Defendant's Exhibit A) (emphasis added). On January 16, 1996, Mr. Stubl received a similar letter, updating his...
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