Rodrigues v. State

• Decision Date: 18 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2007-345-Appeal.,2007-345-Appeal.
• Citation: 985 A.2d 311
• Parties: Nilsa RODRIGUES (a/k/a Juana Rodriguez)<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. STATE of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

985 A.2d 311

Nilsa RODRIGUES (a/k/a Juana Rodriguez)¹ v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 2007-345-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

December 18, 2009.

Angel Tavares, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Jane M. McSolely, Department of Attorney General, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

The applicant, Juana "Nilsa" Rodrigues (applicant or Rodrigues) appeals from the denial of her application for postconviction relief in the Superior Court. For the reasons that follow, we reject the applicant's assertions of legal error and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

On November 6, 1993, a mere twelve days after arriving in Rhode Island from Puerto Rico, Rodrigues was arrested by Middletown police while delivering fourteen grams of heroin and seven grams of cocaine to an undercover detective. She subsequently was charged by criminal information with delivery of both heroin and cocaine, as well as two counts of conspiracy to violate the Uniformed Controlled Substances Act, G.L.1956 chapter 28 of title 21, by delivering heroin and cocaine. On March 14, 1994, she was provided with court-appointed counsel from the Office of the Public Defender.

Rodrigues originally attempted to enter a plea of nolo contendere to the charges, with an agreed-upon disposition. However, during the plea colloquy, on April 7, 1994, the trial justice refused to accept a plea of nolo contendere and indicated that he would accept only a guilty plea. The applicant agreed and did plead guilty. In accordance with the agreement, Rodrigues was sentenced to ten years in prison, with one year to serve and nine years suspended, with probation. She served nine months of her prison sentence at the Adult Correctional Institutions and the remaining three months in home confinement.

Almost thirteen years later, under G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1,² Rodrigues filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel and that her plea was neither knowing, voluntary, nor intelligent. On July 3, 2007, the hearing justice issued a written decision denying relief on all grounds. A timely notice of appeal to this Court followed.

Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

Analysis

Before this Court, applicant argues that the hearing justice erred in denying her application for postconviction relief and asserts several grounds for appeal. However, we shall only address the two arguments we deem relevant.³ The applicant alleges that her conviction should be vacated because the plea colloquy failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus was not a knowing, voluntary, or intelligent waiver of her rights. Additionally, Rodrigues argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney did not adequately investigate her case or review potentially exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, applicant contends that counsel failed to inform her about potential immigration consequences resulting from the plea.⁴ We deem applicant's arguments without merit and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

A. Standard of Review

"Post-conviction relief is available to any person in this state pursuant to G.L.1956 chapter 9.1 of title 10, who after having been convicted of a crime, claims, `inter alia, that the conviction violated [his or her] constitutional rights * * *.'" Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 513-14 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Mastracchio v. Moran, 698 A.2d 706, 710 (R.I.1997)); see also Pelletier v. State, 966 A.2d 1237, 1240 (R.I.2009). When this Court reviews a ruling on an application for postconviction relief, we afford great deference to the hearing justice's findings of fact. Moniz v. State, 933 A.2d 691, 694 (R.I.2007). We will uphold a postconviction relief decision absent clear error or a determination that the hearing justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence. Id.; Hassett v. State, 899 A.2d 430, 433 (R.I.2006). This Court, however, will review de novo any determination pertaining to an issue concerning a defendant's constitutional rights. Hassett, 899 A.2d at 433; Powers, 734 A.2d at 514.

B. Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent Nature of the Plea

Rodrigues argues that her conviction should be vacated because the plea colloquy was so riddled with errors that her guilty plea was neither knowing, voluntary, nor intelligent. Rule 11 codifies the manner in which a trial justice must conduct a plea proceeding in order to ensure constitutional compliance. Rule 11 provides:

"A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea."

See Moniz, 933 A.2d at 695 (recognizing Superior Court must conduct an "`on the record'" examination to determine defendant's voluntariness and knowledge); State v. Frazar, 822 A.2d 931, 935 (R.I.2003). It is well settled in this state that "[g]uilty pleas are valid only if voluntarily and intelligently entered, and the record must so affirmatively disclose" facts pertaining to those requirements. State v. Figueroa, 639 A.2d 495, 498 (R.I.1994).

Having reviewed the record, including the transcript of the plea, it is our opinion that the trial justice's colloquy was thorough and established that applicant's guilty plea was voluntary and made with knowledge and understanding of the charges against her. See Tavarez v. State, 826 A.2d 941, 943 (R.I.2003) (acknowledging proper colloquy when trial justice clearly explained the defendant's rights and inquired about the defendant's understanding of the plea form); Frazar, 822 A.2d at 936 (recognizing that plea colloquy demonstrated that the defendant understood his rights and voluntarily relinquished them). The justice who presided over the postconviction relief hearing reviewed the plea colloquy and determined that Rodrigues knew that she was pleading guilty. To support his conclusion, the hearing justice noted that Rodrigues had counsel and a Spanish language interpreter by her side and that she "expressly acknowledged that she understood that the court was accepting her plea as a plea of guilty and nothing else."

The transcript from the plea proceeding is instructive. The trial justice had Rodrigues summarize the Spanish language plea form, which she had signed. Rodrigues indicated that she understood that she was waiving her rights to a trial, that she would serve one year in prison, with nine years suspended, with probation, and that she would go back to jail if she violated the terms and conditions of her term of probation. After this discussion, the prosecutor summarized the facts that the state was prepared to prove. Although there may have been some confusion at this point in the colloquy, this seasoned trial justice, with assistance from defense counsel, obviated Rodrigues' confusion and continued with the proceeding. Throughout the remainder of the colloquy, Rodrigues admitted no fewer than four times that she was guilty of the crimes set forth in the criminal information.⁵ When Rodrigues again appeared confused, the trial justice stopped his line of questioning to make sure that applicant understood the question being asked.

"THE DEFENDANT: I did deliver it. I know I did it.

"THE COURT: In other words, you knew that what you were involved in was heroin and cocaine, is that so?

"THE DEFENDANT: That if I knew? I have to say yes.

"THE COURT: Well you don't have to [say yes] if it's not so.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I knew what I was passing out." (Emphasis added.)

Additionally, the trial justice specifically declared that Rodrigues voluntarily submitted to the plea and waived her rights.

"THE COURT: Now, Ms. Rodrigues, I'm going to make a determination that you are waiving your right to a trial and also the other rights that you have such as presumption of innocence, privilege against self-incrimination, knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly, and I base that finding on your responses to me, the representation that you read and discussed with the interpreter the Spanish version of the request to enter your guilty plea, and the confirmation by the interpreter taht [sic] she read that form to you. Do you understand what I just said?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you have any fault with any findings?

"THE DEFENDANT: No, sir." (Emphasis added.)

This Court "shall not vacate a plea unless the record viewed in its totality discloses no facts that could have satisfied the trial justice that a factual basis existed for a defendant's plea." Frazar, 822 A.2d at 935-36 (quoting State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1269 (R.I.1980)). In the case at bar, the trial justice conducted an appropriate plea colloquy in accordance with Rule 11, and there is no basis for us to vacate applicant's guilty plea based on allegations of constitutional error.

Additionally, it makes no difference that applicant's plea was changed to a plea of guilty based on the trial justice's refusal to accept a plea of nolo contendere. Defense counsel testified at the postconviction relief hearing that she discussed with Rodrigues that a plea of nolo contendere and a guilty plea were essentially the same thing. It is well settled in this state that, "[a] plea of nolo contendere is the substantive equivalent of a guilty plea * * *." LaChappelle v. State, 686 A.2d 924, 927 (R.I.1996) (quotin...