Martin v. Deiriggi
| Decision Date | 25 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-1210,92-1210 |
| Citation | 985 F.2d 129 |
| Parties | 124 Lab.Cas. P 35,758, 24 Fed.R.Serv.3d 785, 1 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 250 Lynn MARTIN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelo DEIRIGGI; Joseph Iaquinta, d/b/a Belmont Motor Inn, d/b/a Ceasar's Supper Club, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Franklin Dorrah Cleckley, Morgantown, WV, (Ron L. Tucker, Fairmont, WV, on brief), for defendants-appellants.
Lauriston Hardin Long, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, DC (Marshall J. Breger, Sol., Monica Gallagher, Associate Sol., William J. Stone, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, James B. Leonard, Associate Regional Sol., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before POWELL, Associate Justice (Retired), United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation, and PHILLIPS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Deiriggi and Iaquinta, d/b/a Belmont Motor Inn and Ceasar's Supper Club, challenge on five separate grounds the district court's decision finding them liable for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (). Appellants claim that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact for appellate review as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Appellants challenge three conclusions of the district court: (1) that the Belmont Motor Inn and Ceasar's Supper Club constituted a single enterprise within the meaning of § 203(r) of the FLSA; (2) that Appellants were liable for liquidated damages; and (3) that a three-year statute of limitations period applied because Appellants' violations of the FLSA were willful. Finally, Appellants allege that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence offered by Appellants to show hours and wages of Appellants' employees for 1987 and 1988. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Appellants Deiriggi and Iaquinta own and operate the Belmont Motor Inn and Ceasar's Supper Club, a combination motel, restaurant and lounge in Fairmont, West Virginia. The two businesses are located on the same premises, and patrons who stay at the motel frequently dine and recreate at Ceasar's. The tax and financial records of the two businesses are intermingled. As of June 30, 1987, Appellants carried as many as thirteen employees on their payroll records.
The Secretary of Labor (the Secretary) brought an action against Appellants alleging violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA. 1 The Secretary sought to enjoin Appellants' violations of the FLSA, and to restrain Appellants' withholding of back wages due as a result of their FLSA violations. Alleging that Appellants' violations of the FLSA were willful, the Secretary sought liquidated damages for three years of back wages allegedly owing to Appellants' employees.
On June 6, 7, and 11, 1991, a bench trial was held before Judge Kidd in the Northern District of West Virginia. The Secretary called thirteen witnesses, including the Wage-Hour Compliance Officer who conducted the investigation which gave rise to this case and the Compliance Officer who had conducted previous investigations of Appellants' businesses. The Secretary also called eleven of Appellants' current or former employees. Defendants called six witnesses, including both individual Defendants.
By order entered February 19, 1992, the district court found in favor of the Secretary. The district court enjoined the Appellants from future minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping violations of the FLSA. The court further restrained Appellants from withholding the payments of $43,209.10 in minimum wages and overtime compensation owed to their employees for the period of August 16, 1985 through March 30, 1989. The district court also determined that Appellants willfully violated provisions of the FLSA, and awarded liquidated damages equal to the amount of back wages that were found owing ($43,209.10). Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
We first address Appellants' contention that the record before us does not provide an adequate basis for appellate review because the district court did not make sufficiently detailed findings of fact. Specifically, Appellants maintain that it was error for the district court to conclude summarily that Appellants violated the overtime provisions of §§ 207 and 215(a)(2), the minimum wage provisions of §§ 206 and 215(a)(2), and the recordkeeping provisions of §§ 211(c) and 215(a)(5).
The findings of fact entered by a district court are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Even so, when a trial court provides:
only conclusory findings, illuminated by no subsidiary findings or reasoning on all the relevant facts ... there is not that detail and exactness on the material issues of fact necessary for an understanding by an appellate court of the factual basis for the trial court's findings and conclusions, and for a rational determination of whether the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous.
EEOC v. United Virginia Bank/Seaboard Nat'l, 555 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir.1977).
Appellants take issue with many of the factual findings of the district court, and the following is an example of the types of complaints Appellants raise. With reference to overtime pay violations, the district court stated that "none of defendants' employees was paid an overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty in any workweek for which such hours were worked." Appellants contend that this finding is insufficient because it does not inform this court which employees worked overtime and what time periods were involved. Appellants raise similar challenges to the district court's findings regarding minimum wage and recordkeeping violations.
Our review of the district court's opinion and the trial transcript does not confirm Appellants' allegations. In the findings of fact with respect to minimum wage, overtime pay, and recordkeeping violations, the district court in every instance cited to testimony at trial or evidence in the record to support the court's conclusions. For example, in concluding that Appellants violated the FLSA by failing to compensate their employees adequately for overtime work, the district court referred to: 1) the personal records kept by employees Richard Watson and Joyce Thorne; 2) the uncontradicted testimony of several cooks and waitresses that they regularly worked more than 40-hour weeks without receiving overtime pay; and 3) the testimony of employee Lucille Parker, as well as documentary evidence substantiating her testimony, that she worked overtime hours for which she did not receive appropriate compensation.
The inability of the court to provide more detailed findings resulted from the unavailability of accurate and complete employee wage and hour records. Where an employer fails to keep adequate and accurate records of employees' wages and hours as expressly required by the FLSA, the Secretary's burden of showing the extent of uncompensated work is reduced. Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 1192, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946). Here, the district court credited the testimony of Compliance Officer Tenney and others who testified that the Appellants destroyed records to prevent the Department of Labor from reviewing them. Under Mount Clemens, the Secretary need only produce evidence sufficient to show "as a just and reasonable inference" the amount and extent of work for which employees were not compensated adequately. Id. To support an award for back wages, the Secretary is not required to identify with specificity each and every employee who was undercompensated and for exactly what time period. Similarly, the district court cannot be required to state such specificity in the court's findings of fact. To impose such a requirement in a case where an employer destroyed employee records would be to reward the employer for his misdeeds.
While the district court did not identify which employees received inadequate compensation for exactly which time periods, the court did establish an apparent pattern of violations on the part of Appellants. The lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the district court, in conjunction with trial testimony and documentary evidence referenced therein, provide an adequate basis for this court to determine whether such findings are clearly erroneous pursuant to Rule 52(a).
Next we turn to Appellants' argument that the district court erred in concluding that the Belmont Motor Inn and Ceasar's Supper Club constituted a single enterprise operating in interstate commerce. The minimum wage and overtime protections of the FLSA extend to the employees of any "enterprise" with the requisite connection to interstate commerce. 2 Section 203(r) of the FLSA defines an enterprise as "the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). This definition of an enterprise has three elements: 1) related activities performed; 2) under unified operations or common control; and 3) for a common business purpose. Brock v. Hamad, 867 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir.1989). Appellants concede that the two businesses were operated through unified operation or common control.
The FLSA does not define the term "related activities" under § 203(r). The legislative history indicates that related activities are those which are "the same or similar." S.Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1961, p. 1620. "Related, even if somewhat different, business activities can frequently be part of the same enterprise." S.Rep. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1966...
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...2002) (employing and describing three-part test to determine whether companies constitute an "enterprise"); see also Martin v. Deiriggi, 985 F.2d 129, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding two businesses whose operations were directed towards making a profit and providing an array of complementar......
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Employment-related crimes.
...2002) (employing and describing three-part test to determine whether companies constitute an "enterprise"); see also Martin v. Deiriggi, 985 F.2d 129, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding two businesses whose operations were directed towards making a profit and providing an array of complementar......
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Employment-related crimes.
...2002) (employing and describing three-part test to determine whether companies constitute an "enterprise"); see also Martin v. Deiriggi, 985 F.2d 129, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding two businesses whose operations were directed towards making a profit and providing an array of complementar......
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Employment-related crimes.
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