State v. Rice
| Decision Date | 20 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-201-C.A.,2007-201-C.A. |
| Parties | STATE v. Kenneth S. RICE. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal from Providence County Superior Court; Chief Justice Frank J. Williams (Ret.).*
Christopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, for Plaintiff.
Mark B. Laroche, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.
The defendant, Kenneth S. Rice, appeals from a Superior Court order denying his motion to correct sentence with respect to his convictions on two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. Mr. Rice's motion to correct was based on a discrepancy between the wording of the judgment of conviction and the transcript of his sentencing hearing. The former sets forth sentences of fifty years for each count, whereas the latter provides that he shall serve five years for each count. For the following reasons, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
In 1998, a jury convicted defendant of three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, one count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, and two counts of solicitation with intent to commit a felony. The convictions were related to sexual crimes committed against two minor victims over a period of approximately twenty months. The defendant's convictions were affirmed by this Court in 2000. State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137 (R.I. 2000).
It is undisputed that defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on one of the three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault (count 1). Further, defendant received ten years on the second-degree child molestation sexual assault count (count 4), which was to run consecutively to the life sentence; five years on each of the two solicitation counts, to run concurrently (counts 5 and 6); and an additional ten years for being a habitual offender, to be served consecutively to the other sentences. The defendant alleges, however, that the judgment of conviction and commitment erroneously recites that he is to serve fifty years, to run concurrently to his life sentence, on each of the other two first-degree child molestation sexual assault counts (counts 2 and 3). Mr. Rice contends that the trial justice sentenced him orally to five years on each count. To support this contention, defendant points to the transcript of the trial justice's announcement of sentencing, which sets forth in pertinent part:
A judgment of conviction and commitment reflecting, inter alia, sentences of fifty years on counts 2 and 3 was entered on May 8, 1998, the date of the sentencing hearing. The judgment also stated that defendant would not be eligible for parole for thirty years. In 2000, defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and, on appeal, this Court vacated that portion of the judgment concerning his ineligibility for parole, holding that under the habitual-offender statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, "he could have been ordered to serve an additional consecutive term of no more than ten years in prison before becoming eligible for parole under that portion of his sentence." State v. Rice, 811 A.2d 1144, 1146 (R.I.2002). Upon remand, a new judgment of conviction and commitment was entered, again reciting fifty-year sentences on both counts 2 and 3.
The defendant filed a motion to correct his sentence, also under Super. R.Crim. P. 35, on February 22, 2007, nearly nine years after the original judgment of conviction and commitment had been entered.1 The trial justice denied defendant's motion in a written decision issued on April 10, 2007, and defendant appealed.
The defendant advances a number of arguments on appeal. All of defendant's arguments are barred, however, because he made statements through his attorney, on at least two occasions in 2000 in the context of his original Rule 35 motion, which amount to judicial admissions. "A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge[,]" which is "considered conclusive and binding as to the party making [it]." 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 783 at 48, 49 (2008); see also Black's Law Dictionary 54 (9th ed. 2009) ( that a judicial admission "relieves an opposing party from having to prove the admitted fact and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rice v. State
...of his sentencing hearing, which motion was denied. Rice unsuccessfully appealed that denial to this Court in State v. Rice, 986 A.2d 247 (R.I.2010) ( Rice III ). In November 2000, following the affirmance of his convictions by this Court in Rice I, Rice prepared and filed, pro se, a one-pa......
-
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Fay
...doctrine of judicial estoppel and precludes litigants from challenging statements they have previously made to a court. State v. Rice, 986 A.2d 247, 249 (R.I. 2010) (litigant was judicially estopped from taking a position contrary to one that had amounted to a judicial admission and was con......
-
Bank of America, N.A. v. Fay
... ... for the payment of money, the plaintiff is precluded from ... maintaining an action in another State upon the original ... cause of action." Id. at cmt. c. While a person ... who was not an original party is generally not bound by a ... judicial estoppel and precludes litigants from challenging ... statements they have previously made to a court. State v ... Rice , 986 A.2d 247, 249 (R.I. 2010) (litigant was ... judicially estopped from taking a position contrary to one ... that had amounted to a ... ...
-
Vogel v. Catala
...Vogel filed his amended complaint, Mr. Vogel's knowledge of the purpose of the loan was “conclusively established.” See State v. Rice, 986 A.2d 247, 249 (R.I.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, Mr. Vogel was “preclude[d] * * * from challenging [the judicially admitted ......