Blancq v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 96-229.
• Citation: 986 F.Supp. 376
• Parties: Ronald BLANCQ v. HAPAG-LLOYD A.G. and Hapag-Lloyd (America), Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

986 F.Supp. 376

Ronald BLANCQ v. HAPAG-LLOYD A.G. and Hapag-Lloyd (America), Inc.

Civil Action No. 96-229.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

November 24, 1997.

Perrin C. Butler, Butler & Stern, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiff.

Doyle Paul Spell, Jr., Darren M. Guillot, Spell & Associates, New Orleans, LA, Robert Seth Reich, Mark S. Senter, Reich, Meeks & Treadaway, Metairie, LA, for Defendants.

VANCE, District Judge.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are two motions filed by the defendants: (1) a motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of plaintiff Ronald Blancq; and (2) a motion to strike plaintiff's demand for a trial by jury. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Captain Ronald Blancq was employed as a Mississippi River pilot and hired by the M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS to perform services on or about January 3, 1995. Pet. ¶ III. The M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS was owned/operated by defendants Hapag-Lloyd A.G. and Hapag-Lloyd (America), Inc. (collectively referred to hereinafter as "Hapag-Lloyd"). Pet. ¶ IV. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he attempted to leave the vessel by way of the ship's Jacob ladder. Pet. ¶ V. Plaintiff contends that the defendants were negligent in the following ways:

(a) Failing to properly maintain the Jacob's ladder aboard the M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS.

(b) Failing to properly anchor or secure the Jacob's ladder aboard the M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS.

(c) Failing to provide proper handholds or stanchions in the vicinity of the Jacob's ladder.

(d) Failing to warn petitioner of the defective condition of the M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS and its appurtenances.

(e) Failing to properly warn of the slack in the Jacob's ladder aboard the M/V NEUREMBERG EXPRESS, as well as the lack of handholds or stanchions.

Pet. ¶ VI.

This action was originally filed in the 34th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Bernard, State of Louisiana, on January 3, 1996. Defendants timely removed the action from the state court to the Eastern District of Louisiana on January 18, 1996. This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.¹ Hapag-Lloyd now moves this Court for summary judgment and further requests that plaintiff's demand for trial by jury be stricken.

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-moving party only if there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). The court must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact that preclude judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A. Plaintiff's Legal Status

In maritime law, the standard of care owed by the vessel owner to the plaintiff depends upon the plaintiff's legal status. Hapag-Lloyd argues that plaintiff is covered under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, and is owed only a limited duty of care from the vessel owner under § 905(b). Plaintiff asserts that he falls under neither the Jones Act, nor the LHWCA and that the defendants owed him a warranty of seaworthiness under the doctrine articulated in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946) (hereinafter the "Sieracki doctrine").²

It is generally recognized that "[t]here is some confusion ... over the status of a pilot who suffers personal injury." 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 13-1 at 238 (2d ed.1994). See generally Guy C. Stephenson, A Pilot is a Pilot: Compulsory Pilots—Vessel Owner's Responsibilities for Intervention and Personal Injury, 70 Tul. L.Rev. 633, 638-46 (1995) (reviewing pilot's coverage under Jones Act, LHWCA, and warranty of seaworthiness); Jack L. Allbritton, Seaman Status in Wilander's Wake, 68 Tul. L.Rev. 373, 377-85 (1994) (same); David W. Robertson, Continuing Issues in the Rights of Injured Maritime Workers in the Wilander-Gizoni Era, 24 Rutgers L.J. 443, 451-59 (1993) (same). Thus, the first question this Court must resolve is the legal status of a river pilot.

Under Louisiana law, river port pilots have the exclusive right to pilot vessels on the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Pilottown, Louisiana, and within certain other geographical limits. La. R.S. 34:996. A river port pilot must be certified by the Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners for the Port of New Orleans and appointed by the governor. La. R.S. 34:992. River port pilots are intensively regulated under state law—for example, the fees charged to the vessels for the pilotage services is set by statute. La. R.S. 34:997. Although a pilot works on each vessel for only a short period of time, he is exposed to the typical hazards of the sea, and his duties are clearly related to the navigation of the vessel.

1. Jones Act Coverage

The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence for "any seamen" injured "in the course of his employment." 46 U.S.C. § 688(a). In two recent opinions, the United States Supreme Court clarified the definition of "seamen" under the Jones Act. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). The Supreme Court concluded that there are two requirements for seaman status: First, "an employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission." Chandris, Inc., 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2190 (internal quotations omitted). Second, "a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature." Id.

Prior to these Supreme Court opinions, the Fifth Circuit, in Bach v. Trident Steamship Co., Inc., 920 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1991), held that a compulsory river pilot was not a "seaman" under the Jones Act because he was not permanently assigned to any particular vessel or fleet of vessels. The test used by the Fifth Circuit was substantially similar to the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Wilander and Chandris, Inc. See id. at 324 ("An injured worker attains seaman status by proving: (I) permanent attachment to or substantial work on a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels; and (ii) contribution to the function or mission of the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels." (citing Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1072-74 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc))). Upon remand from the Supreme Court following the Wilander decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that Wilander had no effect on its earlier conclusion, and the court reinstated its previous judgment. 947 F.2d 1290, 1291 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931, 112 S.Ct. 1996, 118 L.Ed.2d 592 (1992).

Although the definition of "seaman" as set forth in Chandris, Inc. does not require a maritime worker to have a "permanent" connection with the vessel, the Supreme Court made clear that it believed the seaman's connection to a vessel must be substantial in both nature and duration and that the worker must have a relationship with the vessel or employer in question. Chandris, Inc., 515 U.S. at 364-68, 370-71, 115 S.Ct. at 2188-89, 2191; id. at 368, 115 S.Ct. at 2189 (summarizing lower courts' standards and stating that "the relationship creating seaman status must be substantial in point of time and work, and not merely sporadic" (internal quotations omitted)).

Thus, this Court concludes that the holding of Bach—that a pilot is not a seaman under the Jones Act because he lacks the requisite connection to a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels—is consistent with the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements. Therefore, Captain Blancq is not entitled to the legal benefits of the Jones Act.³

2. LHWCA Coverage

The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, was originally enacted in 1927 to protect longshoremen and other harbor workers doing loading and repair work, who were excluded from state-law workers' compensation coverage and did not fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction. See generally Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 256-60, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 2353-55, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). Generally, the Act requires employers to provide compensation to their employees for injury arising out of the course of employment, and, in return, the Act grants the employer immunity from tort liability. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904-905.

Prior to the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, all employees injured upon navigable waters in the course of their employment were covered by the LHWCA. Eligibility for coverage depended solely upon a "situs" test. As the Supreme Court explained:

[T]he consistent interpretation given to LHWCA before 1972 by the Director, the deputy commissioners, the courts, and the commentators was that (except for those workers specifically excepted in the statute), any worker injured upon navigable waters in the course of employment was "covered ... without any inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be doing) at the time of his injury."

Director v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 311, 103 S.Ct. 634, 644, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983) (quoting G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 429-30 (2d ed.1975)). The statute explicitly excluded from coverage any person who was a "master or member of a crew of any vessel." Id. at 306, 103 S.Ct. at 641 (citing 44 Stat. 1424). Significantly, in 1927 the United States Employees' Compensation Commission, the body in charge...