986 P.2d 914 (Ariz.App. Div. 2 1999), 2 CA-CR 98-0560, State v. Tamplin
|Docket Nº:||2 CA-CR 98-0560.|
|Citation:||986 P.2d 914, 195 Ariz. 246|
|Party Name:||The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Greg David TAMPLIN, Appellant.|
|Case Date:||August 27, 1999|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Arizona|
Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General By Paul J. McMurdie and Jack Roberts, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.
Susan A. Kettlewell, Pima County Public Defender By John F. Palumbo, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellant.
PELANDER, Presiding Judge.
¶ 1 Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of theft by control. He was sentenced to mitigated, concurrent prison terms of seven years for the armed robbery and kidnapping convictions, five years for the aggravated assaults, and .75 years for the theft conviction. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jurors concerning appellant's knowledge of whether his conduct was wrong. We affirm.
¶ 2 We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts. State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 832 P.2d 593 (1992). On November 29, 1997, appellant and his cousin robbed a Tucson restaurant, where the cousin worked, as it was closing for the day. After pointing a gun at two of
[195 Ariz. 247] the employees, appellant had one of them place the restaurant's money into bags. He fled with the money but was apprehended almost immediately. Appellant was interrogated at the police station. He admitted to the officers that discarded items, including a .22 caliber handgun, a blue knit cap with holes cut for eyes, a blue sweater, and a glove, all used in the commission of the offenses, were his. He initially denied committing the robbery but, during the interview, admitted that he and his cousin had planned the robbery weeks in advance, explained how he had planned to perpetrate the offenses, admitted pointing the gun at the two employees, and admitted taking the money. After the interview, appellant also showed the officers where he had left the bags containing the cash that was taken in the robbery.
¶ 3 Appellant's defense was insanity. A police detective testified that, during the interrogation, appellant had stated that although he knew his conduct was illegal, he had been hearing voices. A psychiatrist testified that appellant exhibited numerous mental disorders at the time of the offenses and that his commission of the crimes was in response to auditory hallucinations that commanded him to act. On cross-examination, the psychiatrist testified that appellant was not necessarily precluded by his mental disorders from discerning the wrongfulness of his conduct. The state's psychiatrist testified that appellant understood at the time of the offenses "that what he was doing was wrong."
¶ 4 The trial court instructed the jurors:
Knowledge that an act was wrong, as the phrase is used in these instructions, means knowledge that the act was wrong according to generally accepted moral standards of the community and not the defendant's own individual moral standards. Knowledge that an act was forbidden by law will permit the inference of knowledge that the act was...
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