Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.
| Citation | 988 F.2d 414 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | COCA-COLA,No. 91-3497,91-3497 |
| Parties | BOTTLING COMPANY OF SHREVEPORT, INC.; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Elizabethtown, Inc.; Owensboro Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.; Texarkana Coca-Cola Bottling Company; Coca-Cola Bottling Company (San Angelo); Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Company; The Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Tucson, Inc.; Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Company; Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Company; Permian Coca-Cola Bottling Company; Marshall Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Liquidating Trust Company; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Tulsa, Inc.; Dixie Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Incorporated; New Bern Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.; Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.; The Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Fort Smith); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Jamestown; Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co.; Plymouth Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.; Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.; Natchez Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.; Central Coca-Cola Bottling Co.; Decatur Coca-Cola Bottling Co.; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Williston (North Dakota); Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Mt. Pleasant; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Muskegon; Mary Louise Goodrich; Mary Louise Kay Robinson, individually and as trustee of the Kendall family inter vivos trust; Ann Kay Hobson Haack, individually and as trustee of the Kendall family inter vivos trust; John K. Hobson; Margaret Dodge Hobson, individually and as trustee of the Kendall family inter vivos trust (Subst. for Natchez Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.) Oliver C. Hutaff, Jr., as Trustee under Shareholders' Lawsuit Trust Agreement (Subst. for Wilmington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. and Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc.) v. TheCOMPANY, Arkansas-Georgia Company, Inc.; Central Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc.; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Dickinson; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Elizabethtown, Inc.; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Jamestown; Coca-Cola Bottling Company of LaCrosse, Inc.; Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Company; Love Coca-Cola Bottling Company; |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Jesse A. Finkelstein, Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, DE, Emmet J. Bondurant, II and Jane E. Fahey (argued), Jeffrey D. Horst, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Atlanta, GA for appellants.
Richard D. Allen, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Wilmington, DE, Michael C. Russ (argued), George S. Branch, William F. Lummus, Jr., King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for The Coca-Cola Co.
Before: HUTCHINSON, ALITO and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
This is a companion to the case that is the subject of our opinion of even date disposing of the two consolidated appeals at our Docket Nos. 91-3496 and 91-3498, 988 F.2d 386. We will refer to that case as the "Coke case" and our opinion disposing of it as Coke VIII. We will refer to this case as the "diet Coke case" and to this opinion as diet Coke VIII. In diet Coke VIII, twenty bottlers appeal from the district court's final judgment denying them relief on all of their claims. 1
We have appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final order in this case. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp.1992). The district court had diversity jurisdiction over the bottlers' action in the diet Coke case. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1) (West Supp.1992).
The diet Coke case, like the Coke case that is the subject of Coke VIII, arises out of a dispute between The Coca-Cola Company (the "Company") and some of its bottlers over the scope of the bottlers' pre-existing contracts with the Company. The twenty bottlers who are parties appellant here in the diet Coke case, like the thirty who are parties appellant in the Coke case, refused to amend their contracts with the Company. The amendment proposed to them would have given them the right to bottle diet Coke in exchange for certain concessions. Thus, the question to be resolved is whether the bottlers' original contracts and the 1921 Consent Decrees (Consent Decrees) entered into between the Company and the parent bottlers in settlement of the same 1920 lawsuit we considered in Coke VIII include the right to bottle diet Coke. The district court ultimately held that diet Coke was not within the scope of these agreements. 2 In Coke VIII, we addressed the claims of a somewhat overlapping set of bottlers 3 concerning the Company's use of alternative natural sweeteners, namely high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), to produce Coca-Cola Bottlers' Syrup. In Coke VIII, we affirmed the district court's holding that the contracts of that set of bottlers entitled them only to Coca-Cola bottling syrup sweetened with sucrose refined from cane or beet sugar and not HFCS. The district court interpreted the bottlers' contracts on the basis of findings concerning what the parties intended the ambiguous terms "sugar" and "syrup" to mean in the Consent Decrees settling the 1920 dispute over the price and quality of syrup. The 1920 litigation involved the Company and their so-called parent bottlers. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D.Del.1920) (Coke 1920 ). The bottlers who are parties to this case, like those who are parties to Coke VIII, rely on the rights of their parent bottlers in bringing suit. In Coke VIII, we held that the district court's findings on the meaning of "sugar" and Coca-Cola bottling "syrup" were not clearly erroneous. We further affirmed the district court's determination that the syrup the bottlers are entitled to under the Consent Decrees contains 5.32 pounds of cane or beet sugar per gallon of syrup. The same analysis applies to this case, and we are similarly unable to hold that the district court's findings in diet Coke VII were clearly erroneous. Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of the district court denying relief to the bottlers seeking a supply of diet Coke syrup.
Nevertheless, differences in the parties' arguments, the facts and the evidence, including the inferences that can be drawn from a preclusion order entered in diet Coke IV against the Company for failure to obey a discovery order and the effect of certain specific admissions the Company made that apply to the diet Coke litigation, require some separate exposition and analysis. Those differences and their effect on our legal analysis are the subject of this opinion. Otherwise, the evolution of the relationship between the Company and its bottlers is as set forth more fully in our opinion in Coke VIII, typescript at 10-23. We will not repeat those facts in any detail but will recite here only the undisputed facts specifically and additionally relevant to diet Coke. 4
During the 1980's, the Company's product line proliferated. The Company intended one innovation, diet Coke, to counter the "narrow market appeal" of its existing diet product, Tab. diet Coke I, 563 F.Supp. at 1127. Because the diet soft drink market promised to expand by nearly one-hundred percent within the decade, and a ten percent gain in market share was estimated to translate into additional retail revenues of five billion dollars, "[o]n July 8, 1982, diet Coke was introduced with great fanfare." Id. With this introduction of diet Coke came a dispute over whether it was covered by the current bottling contracts.
The bottlers felt that the Company was obligated to provide diet Coke under the terms of their existing contracts. The Company, however, asserted that diet Coke was not within the scope of the existing contracts and proposed developing a new flexible pricing contract to cover it. diet Coke V, 696 F.Supp. at 103.
On October 7, 1982, the Company proposed a Temporary Amendment to the bottlers' contracts which would govern the price of diet Coke pending final agreement on a permanent contract. Id. The Temporary Amendment was intended to be an interim measure. Most of the bottlers have accepted it. About 191 have signed the Temporary Amendment and another 181 bottlers, who have not actually signed, have agreed to its terms. Id. These 372 bottlers are receiving diet Coke syrup and are marketing diet Coke within their territories. The bottlers in this case have refused either to sign or accept the terms of the Temporary Amendment. They object to its Paragraph Nine which states that "[i]t is further agreed, however, that during the period this Temporary Amendment is in effect, the price of Coca-Cola syrup and beverage base for diet Coca-Cola as between the parties hereto shall be determined solely under this Temporary Amendment." Id. (). Consequently, the Company has refused to provide diet Coke syrup or beverage base to these bottlers. Id.
Shortly after its introduction of diet Coke, the Company embarked on a new project:
[I]n April, 1985, the Company announced that it would stop producing Coca-Cola under the existing formula ("old Coke") and immediately start producing "new" Coke, which, the Company proclaims, tastes even better than old Coke.... The secret ingredient in new Coke, called "7X-100," is different than the secret ingredient in old Coke, but it is still only known to a handful of individuals and is kept locked in a bank vault in Georgia.
... [I]n response to consumer demand, [the Company] announced in July, 1985, that it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
US v. Eleven Vehicles
...to those legal conclusions which are merely dicta and are not part of the judgment in a case, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 428-30 (3d Cir. 1993). Even if the Court were to accept the claimants' argument that the discussion that they refer to......
-
United States ex rel. Dickson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practice & Prods. Liab. Litig. (NO. II))
...only applies "to issues that the court actually decided, whether expressly or by implication." Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co. , 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, Defendants contend that this Court's dismissal of federal FCA claims based on false certifications o......
-
United Artists v. Township of Warrington
...court in a prior appeal decided, either expressly or by implication; it does not apply to dicta. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir.1993). The law of the case doctrine does not restrict a court's power, but rather governs its exercise of d......
-
United States ex rel. Dickson v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. (In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II)), MDL No. 13–2418 (FLW).
...only applies "to issues that the court actually decided, whether expressly or by implication." Coca–Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca–Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir.1993).Here, two of Defendants' arguments were previously argued and expressly decided by the transferor court in th......