In re Parent–Child Relationship v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.

• Decision Date: 05 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 15S01–1306–JT–402.,15S01–1306–JT–402.
• Citation: 989 N.E.2d 1225
• Parties: In re the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of K.T.K., K.C. and K.R.K. (Minor Children), and R.C. (Mother), Appellants (Respondents below), v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, DEARBORN COUNTY OFFICE, Appellee (Petitioner below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

989 N.E.2d 1225

In re the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent–Child Relationship of K.T.K., K.C. and K.R.K. (Minor Children),andR.C. (Mother), Appellants (Respondents below),

v.INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, DEARBORN COUNTY OFFICE, Appellee (Petitioner below).

No. 15S01–1306–JT–402.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 5, 2013.

Jeffrey E. Stratman, Aurora, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Robert J. Henke, DCS Central Administration, Indianapolis, IN, Matthew K. Hagenbush, DCS, Dearborn County Local Office, Lawrenceburg, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 15A01–1201–JT–14

RUCKER, Justice.

Indiana Department of Child Services successfully petitioned to terminate Motherand Father's parental rights regarding their three children, K.T.K., K.R.K., and K.C. The trial court concluded that the Department of Child Services provided clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in the children's continued placement outside of the home would not be remedied and that termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Concluding that the record supports the trial court's findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

R.C. (“Mother”) and T.K. (“Father”) are the biological parents of three children: K.T.K. born October 21, 2000; K.R.K. born December 5, 2003; and K.C. born April 13, 2009 (collectively the “Children”). The Dearborn County Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with Mother and her Children in August 2009 when Mother tested positive for Oxycodone yet failed to provide a recent prescription for the drug. On September 30, 2009, DCS received a report alleging Mother had passed out in a car with her infant son and required assistance getting in and out of the vehicle two days earlier. When DCS investigated the allegations, Mother denied having any recollection of the event but she admitted to having snorted hydrocodone and xanax that day. On October 2, DCS successfully petitioned to declare all three Children in need of services and removed the Children from Mother's home due to Mother's admitted substance abuse problems and her inability to properly care for the Children. The Children were placed with their biological paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) because Father was incarcerated and thus also lacked the ability to provide or care for his Children.

Mother continued to use drugs and failed to cooperate with the recommended services offered by DCS after the Children were removed from her care. Beginning January 2010, Mother was incarcerated pending charges for theft and receipt of stolen property until mid-July of that year. Two weeks after her release from prison, Mother was arrested again for public intoxication and remained incarcerated until November 4, 2010. By the time mother was released from her second term in prison, the Children had already been under DCS' care for 13 months.

On November 12, 2010, DCS changed the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption. And on January 5, 2011 DCS filed a petition with the trial court for involuntary termination of parental rights. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on DCS' petition for termination, which lasted three days—June 1, August 9, and September 19, 2011. Throughout this time the Children remained under DCS' care and had been placed in five different living arrangements: (1) October 2, 2009: Children were placed with Grandmother; (2) November 23, 2009: Children were placed with maternal grandfather (“Grandfather”); (3) September 7, 2010: K.C. was removed from Grandfather and returned to Grandmother and K.T.K. and K.R.K. were placed in a foster home with temporary foster family B.E. and K.E.; (4) December 12, 2010: K.C. was also placed with B.E. and K.E.; and (5) February 11, 2011: all three Children were placed with B.S. and D.S. (“Foster Parents”) where they have remained since. DCS did not have the option of placing Children with Father because he remained incarcerated throughout the termination hearing.

On October 13, 2011, the trial court issued its Order on Final Termination Hearing(“Order”).¹ The order provided in pertinent part:

1. The Children have been placed outside of the home for fifteen (15) of the last twenty-two (22) months.

2. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for placement outside of the home will not be remedied in that:

a. Mother has a severe substance abuse addiction that will always present a risk of relapse, particularly in times of stress.

b. Mother's choices have created the circumstances that resulted in the Children's removal from the home and the court found these choices far more compelling than the late remedial efforts made by Mother.

c. Mother's lack of commitment in the CHINS process until October 2010 demonstrates her lack of commitment to her children and shows a reasonable probability that she will fail them again.

d. Mother has a history of consistent disobedience of the law.

3. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Children's best interests because the Children's need for permanency is paramount.

4. DCS has a plan for the Children's continued care and treatment, namely to have the Children adopted by their current Foster Parents.

See Amended Order, at 6–7.

On November 4, 2011, Mother filed a timely appeal of the trial court's Order. On February 13, 2012, Father filed an appeal of the Amended Order but Mother did not. In a memorandum decision the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights. See In re K.T.K., No. 15A01–1201–JT–14, 2012 WL 3206076 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 8.2012). Due to some procedural missteps by Mother, a divided motions panel dismissed Mother's appeal with prejudice. In re K.T.K., No. 15A01–1201–JT–14, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (Ind.Ct.App. May 11, 2012). Both Mother and Father petitioned for transfer. We grant Mother's petition and thereby set aside the Court of Appeals order dismissing Mother's appeal. SeeInd. Appellate Rule 58(A). In a separate order issued today, we deny Father's petition to transfer. Additional facts are set forth below as necessary.

Standard of Review

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind.2010). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind.2009), and give “due regard” to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id.;Tr. R. 52(A). In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminateparental rights is clearly erroneous, “we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132. “Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child's emotional and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent's custody.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind.2005) (quotations omitted).

Discussion

I.

“The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. at 147 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). The parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132 (quoting Neal v. Dekalb Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind.2003)). And a parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th [e] [c]ourt[s].” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). We also recognize, however, that parental interests are not absolute. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259. “[C]hildren have an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind.2011) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982)). Consequently, a parent's interests must be subordinated to the child's interests when considering a State's petition to terminate parental rights. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259. Accordingly, “[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities” by failing to provide for the child's immediate and long-term needs. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132 (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied ).

Indiana Code section 31–35–2–4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate parental rights for a child in need of services must allege that:

(A) one (1) of the following exists:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;

(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the court's finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made; or

(iii) the child has been removed from the...