Hollingsworth v. State
| Citation | 989 N.E.2d 384 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 26A04–1210–CR–498.,26A04–1210–CR–498. |
| Parties | Stephen R. HOLLINGSWORTH, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Interlocutory Appeal from the Gibson Superior Court; The Honorable Donald G. Hendrickson, Senior Judge and Special Judge; Cause No. 26D01–1102–FC–2.
Christine L. St. John, Rhine–Ernest Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
In this discretionary interlocutory appeal, Stephen R. Hollingsworth appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) and the United States and Indiana Constitutions because his trial occurred more than one year after he was charged and arrested. Concluding that Hollingsworth was tried within one year after accounting for the delays attributable to him, we affirm the trial court.
On February 1, 2011, the State arrested and charged Hollingsworth with Class C felony child molesting arising out of an incident that allegedly occurred at Bethel Memorial Church in Princeton, Indiana. Appellant's App. p. 12. The trial court scheduled a preliminary hearing for February 9, 2011. Defense counsel moved for a continuance because she would be out of town on February 9. The court continued the preliminary hearing until the next day, February 10.
The preliminary hearing was held on February 10, at which time the trial court scheduled a progress hearing for March 23. But on March 17, defense counsel moved to continue the progress hearing, and the trial court rescheduled it for April 13, which was 21 days after the original March 23 date.
The progress hearing was held on April 13, at which time Hollingsworth entered a not guilty plea, trial was set for July 25, the omnibus date and a pretrial conference was set for July 13, and a progress hearing was set for June 1. At the June 1 progress hearing, the trial court noted that the trial and pretrial dates remained the same but that according to counsel, discovery was still “ongoing.” Id. at 4.
At the July 13 pretrial conference, defense counsel told the trial court that Hollingsworth was not willing to accept the State's offer and he would be filing a motion to suppress. Accordingly, the court told defense counsel to file the motion before July 18, vacated the July 25 trial date, and scheduled another pretrial conference for August 25. Hollingsworth did not object.
Defense counsel, however, filed the motion to suppress over a month later on August 24, the day before the pretrial conference. At the August 25 pretrial conference, the trial court set a hearing on Hollingsworth's motion to suppress for September 29.
At the September 29 hearing on Hollingsworth's motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion and set a progress hearing for October 27.
At the October 27 progress hearing, the trial court scheduled a jury trial for approximately four months later, February 22, 2012, with a pretrial conference on February 8. Notably, Hollingsworth did not object although he later argued at the hearing on his motion to suppress that the February 2012 trial date was “three weeks beyond the one-year trial date.” Tr. p. 25. At the February 8 pretrial conference, defense counsel informed the trial court that no agreement had been reached and Hollingsworth wished to proceed to trial. The court set the final pretrial conference for February 13.
The parties appeared before the trial court on February 13 and said that there may be a resolution to the case. Accordingly, the court set another hearing for two days later. The CCS entry for February 15 provides:
Parties appear. Court is advised the Defendant waives his right to trial by jury and there is an agreement between the State and the Defendant but sentencing will be left open to the Court. Defendant pleads guilty to the [new] charge of Battery with Bodily Injury with a Person under the Age of 14, as a Class D felony.1 Court schedules sentencing hearing for February 22, 2012 at 11:00 a .m. Defendant ordered to appear. Probation Department is ordered to prepare a Pre–Sentence Investigation Report. Court notes the Class C felony will be dismissed at sentencing so long as a factual basis can be established and the Court accepts the agreement on the D felony.
The parties appeared before the trial court on February 22, at which time Hollingsworth was informed of the new charge, battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years old. Defense counsel requested a continuance; the trial court granted the continuance and set a progress hearing for April 2. The CCS entry for April 2 provides:
Court is informed of a charge bargain whereby the Defendant will plead guilty to Battery on a Child and sentencing will be left to the Court.
Defendant, after being advised of all constitutional rights and other matters as required by law, voluntarily and knowingly waives those rights and pleads guilty to Battery on a Child, a Class D felony (Count II).
The Court finds a factual basis for said plea and takes the Defendant's plea of guilty under advisement. Court schedules sentencing hearing on May 7, 2012 at 1:00 p.m. and orders the Defendant to appear. The Defendant reserves the right to have conviction entered as a misdemeanor and the State reserves the right to object.... Court orders the Probation Department to amend the Pre–Sentence Report to reflect the Class D Felony Count.
At the May 7 sentencing hearing, the State asked that the plea be set aside and the case proceed on the original charge of Class C felony child molesting. 2 The trial court dismissed the new charge and ordered that Hollingsworth's previous admission to the new charge be “held for naught.” Id. at 7. The court then granted Hollingsworth's oral motion for a special prosecutor and set a progress hearing for June 11. On May 9, Hollingsworth filed a written motion for appointment of a special prosecutor, and the State filed a petition for appointment of a special prosecutor. The basis of the State's petition was that the prosecutor attended Bethel Memorial Church, which is where the crime allegedly occurred. The court granted the State's petition and appointed Michael J. Perry of Vanderburgh County as the special prosecutor in this case.
On May 15, defense counsel was granted a continuance of the June 11 progress hearing to June 14. Then, on June 11, the State was granted a continuance of the June 14 progress hearing to June 20. Id. at 8, 9. The parties appeared on June 20, at which time the special prosecutor said that he felt “further discussions would be appropriate.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, the trial court continued the progress hearing until July 19.
In the meantime, on July 2, Hollingsworth filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) and the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The State filed a response. The trial court said the motion would be argued at the already-scheduled July 19 hearing. At this hearing, however, the trial judge recused himself. The Honorable Donald G. Hendrickson was appointed special judge on July 25.
Hollingsworth's motion for discharge was argued on August 3. The trial court denied the motion on August 13:
The Court does not find the Defendant has requested a[s]peedy trial nor objected to any progress dates or trial dates assigned by the Court with the concurrence of the attorneys of record. The Court finds approximately 458 days have elapsed from February 1, 2011, the day of the arrest and bond of the defendant, to the day the motion for discharge was filed by the defendant on July 2, 2012.[ 3] The Court further finds the progress of this case has moved forward 196 days and has been delayed 262 days. Those 262 delayed days are attributed to the defendant or by the concurrence of the defendant and the State.[ 4] The congestion of the Court calendar, the availability of attorney, has decreased the available timing of progress dates and hearings. Neither party has recorded an objection of any assigned date provided by the Court.
The Court finds the rights of the defendant to a speedy trial have not been prejudiced. The Defendant['s] motion for discharge is hereby denied.
This discretionary interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B) now ensues.
Hollingsworth contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge because his trial occurred more than one year after he was charged and arrested. Hollingsworth makes his argument under both Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) and the United States and Indiana Constitutions.
A defendant's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Bostic v. State, 980 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Indiana Criminal Rule 4 implements this speedy-trial right. West v. State, 976 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), reh'g denied, trans. denied. In relevant part, Criminal Rule 4 provides:
(C) Defendant Discharged. No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule. Provided further, that a trial court...
To continue reading
Request your trial