Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos
Decision Date | 30 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-56165,91-56165 |
Citation | 989 F.2d 362 |
Parties | PALOMAR MOBILEHOME PARK ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN MARCOS, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Robert J. Jagiello, Law Offices of Jagiello & Pech, Lake Arrowhead, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.
Donald R. Lincoln, Endeman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater, San Diego, CA, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before: D.W. NELSON, WIGGINS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Palomar Mobilehome Park Association ("Palomar") filed suit in federal court, challenging the City of San Marcos's ("City") mobilehome park rent control ordinance. The district court dismissed the case because it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a) and 1343(3). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
On September 14, 1989, Palomar filed a complaint in the San Diego Superior Court, challenging the City's rent control ordinance. The City filed a general demurrer to the complaint. The superior court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. Palomar appealed the dismissal to the California Court of Appeals, and the dismissal was affirmed. The appellate court dealt with Palomar's federal claims at length and found that no taking had occurred.
Palomar then filed suit on essentially the same facts in the federal district court. The district court dismissed the federal action under the doctrine of res judicata. The district court specifically found that the federal constitutional issues were fully litigated in the state court proceedings. Palomar appeals.
We review a district court's dismissal of an action based on res judicata de novo. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1992); Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1992).
The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires that we "give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give." Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 771, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986); see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) ( ); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (); Southeast Resource Recovery Facility Authority v. Montenay Intern. Corp., 973 F.2d 711, 714 (9th Cir.1992). Accordingly, we apply California's res judicata law to determine if Palomar's action was properly dismissed. See Southeast Resource, 973 F.2d at 712-14.
In California, a judgment entered after the sustaining of a general demurrer is a judgment on the merits, and, to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not establish a cause of action, it will bar a second action on the same facts. See, e.g., Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co., 44 Cal.2d 321, 282 P.2d 33, 34 (1955) ( ). Moreover, California, as most states, recognizes that the doctrine of res judicata will bar not only claims actually litigated in a prior proceeding, but also claims that could have been litigated. See Busick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 7 Cal.3d 967, 104 Cal.Rptr. 42, 500 P.2d 1386, 1392 (1972) ( )(quoting Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 99 P.2d 652, 655 (1940)); see also Jama Const. v. City of Los Angeles, 938 F.2d 1045, 1047 n. 1 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1293, 117 L.Ed.2d 516 (1992).
Palomar challenges the district court's reliance on the doctrine of res judicata on three fronts. First, Palomar argues that the doctrine cannot bar its federal claim because the claim did not exist, or at least was not ripe, until the state court proceedings were terminated against Palomar. Second, Palomar argues that its claim cannot be barred because it did not raise its federal claims in the state court. Third, Palomar argues that its claim cannot be barred because it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate its federal claims.
Palomar's first argument, that its takings claim cannot be barred because it was not ripe until the state court ruled on its claims, lacks merit. Palomar correctly interprets Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), to require that a plaintiff take its takings claim to state court before the case will be ripe for federal adjudication. However, this requirement does not prevent the doctrine of res judicata from barring subsequent federal action. The Supreme Court has stated:
There is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he would rather not have engaged at all.
McCurry, 449 U.S. at 104, 101 S.Ct. at 420. In addition, other circuits have squarely rejected Palomar's argument. For example, the court in Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 729 (3rd Cir.1989), stated:
Appellants have exhausted their state claims, which, under Williamson, is a necessary predicate to their federal cause of action; but in doing so, they received a full and fair adjudication of their constitutional claims against the City in state court. Due process guarantees them no less, but entitles them to no more.
See also Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 953 F.2d 1299, 1309 (11th Cir.1992). We are compelled to conclude that res judicata bars Palomar's claims in federal court, despite the requirements of Williamson.
Palomar's second argument against application of res judicata also fails. It is well settled that res judicata bars subsequent actions on all grounds for recovery that could have been asserted, whether they were or not. Clark, 966 F.2d at 1320; see also Busick, 500 P.2d at 1392; Fields, 953 F.2d at 1309 (). A litigant cannot avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata by failing explicitly to plead federal constitutional violations in a prior state action. While every litigant deserves his or her day in court, few deserve two. Thus, Palomar's failure specifically to plead federal constitutional violations in the state court complaint does not affect the application of res judicata to this case.
Finally, we reject Palomar's third argument, that it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate its federal claims. The record reflects that the state courts fully considered Palomar's rights under the Constitution. The California Court of Appeal and the superior court 1 expressly addressed Palomar's federal constitutional claims as well as the state claims. Moreover,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Santa Fe Village Venture v. City of Albuquerque
...insufficient to preclude the application of claim preclusion in a subsequent federal court action. Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 364-65 (9th Cir.1993); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 728-29 (3rd Cir.1989). See also Fields v. Sarasota Man......
-
Drawsand v. F.F. Props., L.L.P.
...66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, federal courts look to state law. Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n, 989 F.2d at 364. “California, as most states, recognizes that the doctrine of res judicata will bar not only those claims actually litigated ......
-
Dlx, Inc. v. Kentucky
...federal claim, or, if so, what must be done to reserve such a claim, because at no time did plaintiffs attempt to do so." Id. at 1324-25. In Palomar v. Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir.1993), again, the plaintiff had asserted its federal claims in stat......
-
Dodd v. Hood River County
...court. Indeed, such a requirement would not ripen the claim, rather it would extinguish the claim. See Palomar Mobilehome Park v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.1993). Declining to hear a case on ripeness grounds is appropriate in situations where there is a reasonable prospect t......
-
The taking issue in the Ninth Circuit after Lucas.
...Hollister, 989 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1052 (1994). (80.) Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1993). (81.) Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994). (82.) However......