Matthew J. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., Civ.A. 94-30172-MAP.

Citation989 F.Supp. 380
Decision Date05 January 1998
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 94-30172-MAP.,Civ.A. 94-30172-MAP.
PartiesMATTHEW J., et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Stewart T. Graham, Jr., Hampden, MA, for plaintiffs.

Rosemary Tarantino, Asst. Atty. General, Office of Attorney General, Springfield, MA, Cynthia J. Gagne, Attorney General's Office, Springfield, MA, for Massachusetts Department of Education, defendant.

Peter L. Smith, Paroshinsky Law Offices, Springfield, MA, for School Committee of the Town of Granville, Massachusetts.

MEMORANDUM REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

PONSOR, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a decision of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") of the defendant Massachusetts Department of Education ("Department" or "DOE"). The BSEA decision concluded that plaintiff, Matthew J., and his parents were entitled to reimbursement for certain special educational costs, due to the failure of the defendant School Committee of the Town of Granville, Massachusetts ("Granville") to offer Matthew a proper special education program for the years 1988 through 1992.

The BSEA hearing officer declined, however, to find that the plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement of tuition costs paid by them after they placed Matthew in a private school. The hearing officer concluded that the school offered no special education programs and did not conform either to the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., or to state regulations. The BSEA's decision also stated that both the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 46, § 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution (the "Anti-aid Amendment") forbade reimbursement of tuition expenses for attendance at the private school because it offered a sectarian Christian education. The plaintiff brought this action to obtain review of the BSEA decision. After some preliminaries, both sides filed what the court has construed as motions for summary judgment. See, note 1.

The court referred the parties' motions to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman, and on March 10, 1997 he issued his Report and Recommendation to the effect that the BSEA decision should be upheld, in part. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that the BSEA officer was correct in concluding that tuition reimbursement would be inappropriate for the last three of the four years of Matthew's secondary education, because Matthew's placement in the private school was not proper under the IDEA, and because such reimbursement would violate the First Amendment and Article 46, § 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution.

With regard to the first year of Matthew's secondary education (1988-89), however, the Magistrate Judge found that Granville's utter failure to provide any educational services for Matthew, or even to draft an Individual Education Plan ("IEP") for him, justified the court's exercise of its equitable power to require the defendants to reimburse plaintiffs for their tuition payments for that year.

Plaintiffs have objected to the Report and Recommendation, contending that a fair review of the record requires the defendants to reimburse plaintiffs for all four of Matthew's secondary years. Defendants also have objected, contending that the Magistrate Judge should not have ordered them to pay for even one year. They argue that this equitable award constituted an improper imposition of punitive damages.

For the reasons set forth in detail below, the court will decline to adopt the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation and will order that defendants reimburse the plaintiffs for all four years of tuition at the private school. In summary, the record clearly reveals that (1) the school system's abdication of its responsibilities under the IDEA left Matthew's parents with no practical alternative to the private school, (2) the private school (though not formally a "special education" facility) provided Matthew with an environment and a program that effectively addressed his special needs, and (3) the school system itself designated the private school as Matthew's educational provider even while refusing to reimburse the tuition costs or propose any practical alternative. Finally, decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court establish that the private school's sectarian identification does not bar tuition reimbursement to the parents under these circumstances.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts set forth below are primarily drawn from Magistrate Judge Neiman's statement of the facts, occasionally supplemented from the voluminous underlying record.

Matthew attended the Granville Public Schools from kindergarten through eighth grade, the 1987-88 school year, with the exception of his fourth grade when he attended a private school called the Master's School. Granville provided him with special education services during the fifth through eighth grades pursuant to an Individual Educational Plan ("IEP") using a prototype placement promulgated under 603 C.M.R. § 28.502.2 & .502.3.2 These two regulations govern special education programs with no more than 25% and 60% of time outside regular educational programming, respectively.

Matthew's principal diagnosis was "Schizotypical Personality Disorder." This illness manifested itself as excessive social anxiety, magical thinking, poor internal controls and inappropriate affect. These problems, in turn, led to difficulties in school and Matthew's consequent need for special education services.

During the seventh grade, Matthew's "TEAM" reconvened to discuss Matthew's placement. Under Massachusetts law, the "TEAM" refers to a group of professionals who develop, review and revise the provisions of an IEP, including placement options. See 603 C.M.R. § 28.322.0. A similar group is required under federal law. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.343 et seq. By March 1987, the TEAM concluded that Matthew required an out of district program, that Granville's school program was not appropriate for him, and that Granville would temporarily service him until an out of district placement was obtained.

In February 1988, Matthew's parents exercised their right to obtain an independent evaluation by an approved facility, pursuant to Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 71B, § 3; 603 C.M.R. § 28.328.0. This evaluation by Newington Children's Hospital ("Newington"), referred to as the "PEDAL" evaluation, concluded, among other things, that Matthew's educational placement required appropriate peers who were not overly aggressive, since Matthew was at risk of being victimized or otherwise traumatized.3

Because Matthew had had a positive peer experience at the Master's School, his parents began considering whether this would be an appropriate placement. Master's is a college preparatory school for grades one through twelve, offering high school students a 12:1 student/teacher ratio, and providing individual attention and a supportive environment. The school is a Christian school; it integrates Christian philosophy and doctrine throughout the school day.

Although Master's does not explicitly offer special education services, the services it does provide were responsive to Matthew's needs. Specifically, the 12:1 student/teacher ratio provided the structured and supportive environment and the "appropriate peers" the PEDAL evaluation recommended. Further, the services Master's provided, though not special education, had presumably responded to Matthew's special needs adequately during the fourth grade.

In February 1987, the Granville Special Needs Coordinator notified the parents that the Master's School was not a possible placement due to its non-Chapter 766 status.4 The school did not explain what it meant by "non-Chapter 766 status." Granville may have assumed that because Master's was a parochial school it could not get the Department's approval to enter into an agreement pursuant to Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 71B, § 4. There is no evidence indicating that the school committee ever made a request for approval of Master's as a placement for Matthew at this time.

During the 1987-88 eighth grade year, the parents and Granville attempted to determine an appropriate out of district special education placement for Matthew. Granville first proposed a "behavior based" program for September 1987.5 The parents initially accepted this IEP, but, after Matthew's attendance the first day, they became disenchanted and rejected it. It is unclear from the record why the parents made this decision. However, the BSEA hearing officer found that the parents felt the change in the teacher and the students rendered it inappropriate.6

In December 1987, Granville developed an interim IEP with a 502.3 prototype placement and, shortly thereafter, requested a BSEA hearing to resolve the dispute regarding the placement. In April 1988, the parties entered into mediation, eventually resolving their dispute by a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the parties agreed (1) that Matthew would remain in the public school's special education program with mainstreaming, (2) that an individual aide, resource room services, psychological counseling and psychological consulting would be provided, and (3) that Granville would seek a 502.5 "Day school program," prototype placement, out of the district, for the 1988-1989 school year.7

Granville failed to implement the mediation agreement. It did not carry out the terms of the IEP as modified by the agreement, and failed to seek a section 502.5 out of district prototype placement. In fact, no TEAM meeting was ever convened to develop the section 502.5 prototype for the 1988-89 school year. Granville did, however, make attempts to pursue some private school possibilities and, in June 1988, suggested several out-of-district alternatives. The town urged the parents to let Granville know if they wer...

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