Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd.

Decision Date25 January 1999
Docket NumberSAVE-A-LO,LTD
Citation989 S.W.2d 277
PartiesBernice ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v., a Supervalue Company, d/b/a Save-a-Lot Foods, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Erich M. Shultz, Memphis, for Plaintiff.

Jack A. Childers, Jr., Bateman, Gibson & Childers, Memphis, for Defendants.

OPINION

DROWOTA, J.

In this workers' compensation case, we consider for the first time whether an employee who has been sexually harassed by a supervisor in the course of employment may recover workers' compensation benefits from the employer. Finding that the plaintiff's alleged injury did not arise out of her employment, the Chancery Court of Shelby County granted summary judgment to the employer and its insurance carrier, the defendants. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5) (Supp.1998), reversed and remanded the case for a determination of factual issues. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendants.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Since this case is presented to us on summary judgment, we summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn.1993). The record demonstrates that the plaintiff, Bernice Anderson ("Anderson"), was employed by defendant Save-A-Lot Foods as a co-assistant manager of a grocery store in Memphis. Anderson testified in a deposition that she was repeatedly sexually harassed on a daily basis by her immediate supervisor, Kenneth Bush ("Bush"), during the course of her employment. Anderson's relationship with Bush began when Anderson worked for a Save-A-Lot store on Jackson Avenue. Bush, an assistant manager at the time, worked at the Jackson Avenue store for two or three months while he trained to be a manager. Anderson stated that although Bush did not make any sexually inappropriate remarks during this time period, he told Anderson that he did not like her and that he did not like the fact that he had to ask her to show him how to perform certain tasks.

After Bush was promoted to manager, he was eventually transferred to a Save-A-Lot store on Frayser Boulevard. Subsequently, Bush asked the manager of the Jackson Avenue store to transfer Anderson to the Frayser Boulevard store. Not realizing that Bush was the manager of the Frayser store, Anderson agreed to be transferred to the Frayser store, where she worked for approximately one year. When Anderson first started working in the Frayser store, Bush approached her, stating that he "knew how I got my job and what I had been doing with the other managers, [and] that he wanted the same thing." Anderson testified that Bush routinely followed her around the store, making lewd gestures and remarks to her. For instance, it is alleged that Bush repeatedly made graphic sexual comments about her body, requested that Anderson engage in sexual relations with him and accused her of having sex with co-workers. Bush would often grab Anderson's hand or bump up against her when he made these remarks. Anderson also alleged encounters in which Bush would "literally run up to me and get as close as he could to me and stare me up and down and then bust out laughing." In addition, on numerous occasions Bush, in the presence of Anderson, made inappropriate remarks about the body parts of the cashiers in the store.

Anderson explained that she feared notifying other Save-A-Lot supervisors of Bush's conduct, because Bush threatened to fire her and even stated that he knew where she lived and that he would kill her if she told anyone about the harassment. Wary of losing her job if she reported Bush's behavior, Anderson explained: "I tried to hold onto my job, keep my job, because I need my job." Ultimately, after Anderson reported the incidents to other management employees, an investigation was conducted, and Anderson was transferred to another store. Anderson alleges that as a result of Bush's harassing conduct, she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression and, consequently, has incurred medical expenses and has been unable to work. A psychiatrist who examined Anderson gave her a sixty (60%) percent permanent psychiatric impairment rating.

Anderson filed this Complaint for Workers' Compensation, seeking reimbursement for her medical expenses and lost earnings. In addition, Anderson filed a complaint in federal court alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After considering the deposition testimony proffered by the plaintiff, the trial court in the present case granted summary judgment to the defendants. It is unclear from the record whether the trial court found that a plaintiff may not recover workers' compensation benefits for sexual harassment injuries as a matter of law, or whether the trial court found that Anderson failed to demonstrate in this particular instance that she suffered an injury that arose out of her employment. In an opinion written by Judge Don Ash, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the decision of the trial court. Concluding that Anderson's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, the Panel found that Anderson would not have suffered an injury "but for" her employment.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movants, the defendants, demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. We must take the strongest view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, Anderson, allowing all reasonable inferences in favor of Anderson and discarding all countervailing evidence. Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn.1998) (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11). Since our review concerns only questions of law, the trial court's judgment is not presumed correct, and our review is de novo on the record before this Court. Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997).

B. Tennessee Law

Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Law, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 50-6-101 et seq. (1991 Repl. & Supp.1998), applies to covered employees who suffer from "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or death." Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a) (1991 Repl.); see also id. § 50-6-102(a)(5) (Supp.1998). Under this two-pronged test, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the injury arose out of her employment; and (2) the injury occurred during the course of her employment. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn.1997).

There is no dispute in this case that the alleged injury occurred in the course of Anderson's employment with Save-A-Lot. Viewing the "time, place and circumstances" surrounding the alleged harassment, it is clear that such incidents occurred while Anderson was on the premises of Save-A-Lot, performing duties on behalf of her employer. Id.; Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn.1993). The crucial inquiry in this case concerns whether the alleged injury arose out of Anderson's employment. For years this Court has avoided applying "artificial labels" by advocating a steadfast test to determine when an injury arises out of employment. Hall v. Mason Dixon Lines, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn.1987). This struggle that has confronted our courts was discussed in Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731 (Tenn.1980):

This Court and others over the years have attempted, with little success, to wring more certainty and specificity from the terse words "arising out of and in the course of employment." This has resulted in various judicial "tests" and "doctrines," such as, the "positional doctrine," the "peculiar hazard doctrine," the "foreseeability" test, the "street-risk doctrine," and others.

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to compose a formula which will clearly define the line between accidents and injuries which arise out of and in the course of employment to those which do not; hence, in determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, each case must be decided with respect to its own attendant circumstances and not by resort to some formula. See: 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 209 (1958).

In this endeavor, the relation of the employment to the injury is the essential point of inquiry....

Generally, an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment if it has a rational causal connection to the work and occurs while the employee is engaged in the duties of his employment; and, any reasonable doubt as to whether an injury "arose out of the employment" is to be resolved in favor of the employee. Great American Indemnity Company v. Friddell, 198 Tenn. 360, 280 S.W.2d 908 (1955); Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977 (1951).

The observation of this Court in Travelers Insurance Company v. Googe, 217 Tenn. 272, 279, 397 S.W.2d 368, 371 (1965), is pertinent here:

"The phrase, 'in the course of,' refers to time and place, and 'arising out of,' to cause or origin; and an injury by accident to an employee is 'in the course of' employment if it occurred while he was performing a duty he was employed to do; and it is an injury 'arising out of' employment if caused by a hazard incident to such employment."

We have said that an injury arises out of the employment "when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work [was] required to be performed and the resulting injury." T.J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235...

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