Dupont v. Dubois

• Decision Date: 06 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-1459,96-1459
• Citation: 99 F.3d 1128
• Parties: NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases. Michael Kevin DUPONT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Larry E. DUBOIS, Commissioner of Corrections, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1128

99 F.3d 1128

NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases.

Michael Kevin DUPONT, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Larry E. DUBOIS, Commissioner of Corrections, et al Defendants, Appellees.

No. 96-1459.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Nov. 6, 1996.

Michael Kevin Dupont on brief pro se.

Nancy Ankers White, Special Assistant Attorney General, and David J. Rentsch, Counsel, Department of Correction, on brief for appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, SELYA and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Kevin DuPont appeals from the district court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief. ¹ We affirm, without prejudice to his right to seek certain relief anew in the district court, as is explained below.

A. Background

DuPont is incarcerated at MCI-Cedar Junction in Massachusetts. In 1992, he filed a pro se civil rights action against various Department of Corrections personnel and others, seeking damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among other things, he alleged that defendants had violated his rights by using excessive force against him, seizing his legal materials, denying him medical care, and threatening to confine him in a disciplinary unit. At the time he filed his complaint, DuPont was in the Departmental Segregation Unit (DSU), but he was later placed in the Departmental Disciplinary Unit (DDU), where he remains.

In this appeal, DuPont challenges the district court's denial of his request for an injunction ordering compliance with certain stipulations, agreements, or orders in the following cases: Cepulonis v. Fair, D. Mass., No. 78-3233-Z; Stone v. Boone, D. Mass., No. 73-1083-T; Alston v. Fair, D. Mass., No. 77-3519-G; Hoffer v. Fair, S.J.C. No. 85-71; and DuPont v. Hall, Norfolk Super. Ct. No. 87-1399. He also objects to the court's denial of his requests for injunctions forbidding the use of chemical agents or excessive force against him, forbidding his placement in a strip cell, directing the return of postage stamps taken from his incoming mail and the return of certain legal materials, and directing his release from the DDU.

B. Discussion

If the district court has made no clear error of law or fact in its ruling on a preliminary injunction motion, we will not disturb its conclusion absent manifest abuse of discretion. See Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 902 (1st Cir.1993). For the reasons outlined below, we find that the district court did not overstep its bounds in denying the requested relief.

Consent Decree Violations. In part, DuPont seeks orders enforcing federal or state court consent decrees, but such relief is unavailable in an individual action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Martel v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 n. 4 (1st Cir.1993). ²

State Law Violations. DuPont also asserts various state law violations, e.g., that defendants have not properly promulgated certain DDU rules, did not medically screen him before placing him in the DDU, and have not provided certain law library access, all in violation of state statutes or regulations. But he does not explain how defendants thereby violated federal law, and this court does not have the power to direct state officials to comply with state law. See Quintero de Quintero v. Aponte-Roque, 974 F.2d 226, 230 (1st Cir.1992) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)).

Court Access. DuPont complains that defendants violated his right to court access by restricting his ability to conduct legal research ³ and by seizing legal materials from his cell. DuPont has clearly been able to challenge his criminal conviction and sentence by filing a direct appeal and post-conviction motions in state court and by filing two habeas petitions (and appeals from the dismissal thereof) in federal court. He has also been able to file and prosecute this action challenging the conditions of his confinement. Nothing in the record indicates that DuPont's access to the courts has not been adequate or meaningful. Consequently, he has not suffered the "actual injury" required to show a violation of his right to meaningful court access. See Lewis v. Casey, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180-82 (1996).

Liberty Interests. DuPont asserts that defendants have violated his due process liberty interest in law library access and in not being confined in the DDU by their failure to comply with obligations imposed in the cases cited in the beginning of this opinion. Contrary to DuPont's claim, however, the Alston case did not require defendants to prepare and evaluate a health status report before placing him in the DDU, which is located at Cedar Junction as is the DSU where he was previously housed. Alston requires the preparation and review of health status reports only before an inmate is transferred to an entirely different institution. Likewise, Stone does not clearly grant DuPont the right to physically use the prison law library. It requires that all inmates have supervised access to the law library unless "special circumstances" dictate otherwise. Such circumstances may well encompass DuPont's confinement in the DDU.

DuPont v. Fair and the Hoffer and Cepulonis cases relate only to inmates in the DSU, but DuPont alleges that they apply because the DDU is really a pretextual DSU. DuPont's arguments on this point are not persuasive. The affidavit by defendant DOC Commissioner Dubois to which he points affirmed that the DDU is distinct from the DSU in its disciplinary purpose. The list of comparisons between the DSU and DDU which DuPont submitted to the district court actually describes significant differences between the two units. Finally, while the DDU may have effectively replaced the DSU at Cedar Junction, Commissioner Dubois testified in a deposition in a different case (which is in the record before us) that he did not establish the DDU in order to evade legal obligations applicable to the DSU.

In his objections to the magistrate's report, DuPont raised an argument based on Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995), which had just then been decided, and which the district court did not discuss in its opinion accepting the report and recommendation. DuPont asserts that confinement in the DDU is an atypical and significant deprivation, giving him a due process liberty interest under Sandin, which defendants violated when they put him in the DDU. The present record does not contain sufficient information to permit evaluation of this claim. ⁴ For that reason, a remand to consider the Sandin claim makes no sense. Accordingly, we affirm the denials below on the basis of the arguments originally presented to the district court, but do so without prejudice to DuPont's right to seek preliminary injunctive relief anew based on Sandin. We remind him, however, that the district court has directed him to comply fully with Loc. R. 7.1 in filing motions and supporting memoranda in that court, and that district courts "are entitled to demand adherence to specific mandates contained in the [local] rules." See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir.1994).

Equal Protection. On appeal, DuPont asserts that the particular law library access restrictions placed on him as a DDU inmate violate his equal protection rights because other inmates in "disciplinary segregation," i.e., inmates in the "locked down max end and segregation blocks 9 and 10," have greater library access. This bare allegation does not establish that the inmates he refers to are situated similarly enough to DDU inmates to require similar law library rights. See Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 304 n. 8 (8th Cir.) (the district court should not presume that inmates in administrative segregation for their own protection are necessarily similarly situated with protective custody inmates), cert. denied, 1996 WL 375894 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996). ⁵

Mail Rights While in Strip Cell. On three occasions in 1994, defendants put DuPont in a strip cell for periods ranging from four to eleven days, during which time DuPont's incoming mail was allegedly withheld and he was also denied writing materials. We evaluate the withholding of incoming mail under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989), and the restriction on outgoing mail (i.e., the denial of writing materials) under Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Because the withholding of mail was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and the restriction on outgoing mail furthered a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and was no greater than necessary, we find no constitutional violation. DuPont was placed in a strip cell due to intransigence sufficiently serious to require the use of chemical agents. Restricting his mail privileges helped the state maintain order and security in the DDU by ensuring that unpleasant consequences flowed from such misbehavior. See, e.g., Little v. Norris, 787 F.2d 1241, 1243-44 (8th Cir.1986) ("The purpose of withholding personal mail is to make punitive isolation unpleasant, and thereby discourage improper behavior and promote security within the prison."). Given the limited privileges of DDU inmates, which must be earned, defendants may have had few other alternatives for inducing persistently disobedient inmates like DuPont to behave. Moreover, the withdrawal of mail privileges was temporary. DuPont was given his mail and permitted to write letters after leaving the strip cell. His confinement was also relatively short in duration, lasting 11 days or less. The restriction was content neutral, applying to all incoming and outgoing correspondence. DuPont was permitted attorney visits and his attorney could keep him informed about pending cases. He has not asserted the actual loss of any cause of action due to his inability to write letters or draft legal documents while...