Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. McKee

• Citation: 99 Ind. 519
• Decision Date: 21 January 1885
• Docket Number: 11,371
• Parties: Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company v. McKee
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

99 Ind. 519

Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company v. McKee

No. 11,371

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 21, 1885

From the Knox Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

A Iglehart, J. E. Iglehart and E. Taylor, for appellant.

G. G Reily, W. C. Niblack, W. R. Gardiner and S. H. Taylor, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott J.

The complaint of the appellee contains, among others, the following allegations:

"Plaintiff further says that the defendant Dwyer was at the day aforesaid, and for more than a year prior thereto had been, the agent and employee of said railroad company for the purpose of detecting, arresting and prosecuting all persons who should, in any way, unlawfully obstruct the railroad aforesaid in said county. That on the -- day of November, 1882, the railroad track aforesaid was obstructed by some person or persons unknown to this plaintiff, and without his knowledge, direction or consent, and thereupon said railroad company directed the defendant Dwyer to arrest the persons who had so obstructed said road and cause them to be criminally prosecuted for such obstructions in the courts of said county; that pursuant to said direction so received from said company, and in the discharge of his authority as the agent and employee of said railroad company as aforesaid, the defendant Dwyer thereupon proceeded to detect and arrest and prosecute criminally in the courts of said county the person or persons who had so obstructed the railroad aforesaid, and in so doing said Dwyer assaulted, arrested and falsely imprisoned plaintiff at said county on the -- day of December, 1882, without any legal authority so to do, upon the charge made by said Dwyer against him, said plaintiff, of unlawfully obstructing said railroad in said county at the day the same was obstructed, as aforesaid, to wit, on the -- day of November, 1882; that thereupon said Dwyer placed handcuffs upon his wrists, and in company with others, in said Dwyer's employ, by threats of personal violence to him, said plaintiff, and by catching hold of the plaintiff's person, compelled the plaintiff to go with him, said Dwyer, from his home in Knox county, Indiana, distant from Emison's Station about three miles, to said station, in the night over a dark road, in the woods where it was cold and disagreeable, at which station said Dwyer compelled said plaintiff to get into a car on said railroad provided by said railroad company for that purpose, and said Dwyer thereupon, by means of said car, carried said plaintiff upon said railroad a distance of ten miles, at which point said Dwyer put said plaintiff off of said car in the woods, in the middle of the night, and in the darkest kind of a night, from which point said plaintiff was compelled to and did wander home, a distance of twelve miles, on foot as best he could."

The appellant, in support of its assault upon the complaint, invokes the general rule, that a principal is not responsible for the torts of an agent unless committed while engaged in the performance of duties within the scope of his agency. This general rule is too well settled and too firmly grounded in principle to be the subject of debate, and if this case is within it there is no necessity for discussion. But whether the case is within the rule is the question, and not whether there is such a rule as that asserted.

The liability of the principal is not affected by the fact that the tort was wilfully committed, for it is now firmly settled that whether the wrong results from negligence or is the product of wilfulness, the principal is responsible if it was committed within the line of the agent's duty. Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Burdge, 94 Ind. 46; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 371; S. C., 47 Am. R. 149; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19; Am. Ex. Co. v. Patterson, 73 Ind. 430; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246; Indianapolis, etc., R. W. Co. v. Anthony, 43 Ind. 183; Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116; S. C., 10 Am. R. 103; Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 90 N.Y. 588; S. C., 43 Am. R. 185; Hoffman v. New York Cent., etc., R. R. Co., 87 N.Y. 25; S. C., 41 Am. R. 337; Quigley v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 11 Nev. 350, vide p. 364; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546; S. C., 42 Am. R. 33.

A principal is responsible for the acts of the agent performed within the line of his duty, whether the particular act was or was not directly authorized. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kelly, supra; Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jackson, supra; Am. Ex. Co. v. Patterson, supra; Noblesville, etc., G. R. Co. v. Gause, 76 Ind. 142; S. C., 40 Am. R. 224. In speaking of a question like the one before us, the Court of Appeals of New York said: "It matters not that he" (the agent) "exceeded the powers conferred upon him by his principal, and that he did an act which the principal was not authorized to do, so long as he acted in the line of his duty, or being engaged in the service of the defendant, attempted to perform a duty pertaining, or which he believed to pertain to that service." Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc., R. W. Co., 90 N.Y. 77 (43 Am. R. 141). It may be that the statement we have quoted needs some qualification, for we suppose that the belief of the agent would not make the principal responsible if it was in fact not well founded, but in the main the statement correctly states the law.

The rules we have stated lead to the conclusion that the principal is liable for the tort of the agent, where the particular act, although wilful and not directly authorized was within the line of the agent's duty; but if the act was an independent one, and not within the scope of the agency, the person injured can not compel the principal to respond in damages. It results from these fundamental doctrines, that where the principal confers a general authority upon the agent to make arrests for injuries to property, and the agent, in exercising that general authority, forcibly and wrongfully arrests an innocent person, the principal who conferred the general authority is liable for the injury consequent upon the wrongful act. There are cases fully recognizing the principle upon which this conclusion is founded. The English statute authorizes the servants of railway companies to make arrests in certain cases, and it was held, in Goff v. Great Northern R. W. Co., 30 L. J. C. L. 148, that a railway corporation was responsible for the tort of its servants in arresting and imprisoning an innocent man. Addison, in commenting upon the general doctrine, says: "In the ordinary course of affairs, the company must determine whether they will submit to what they believe to be an imposition, or use this summary power for their protection; and...