Lowery v. Manhattan R. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1885
• Parties: LOWERY, an Infant, etc. v. MANHATTAN R. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

99 N.Y. 158

1 N.E. 608

LOWERY, an Infant, etc.

v.MANHATTAN R. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Filed May 8, 1885.

RAPALLO, J., dissenting.

Hugh L. Cole, for appellant, Manhattan R. Co.Osborn E. Bright, for respondent, Joseph Lowry.

MILLER, J.

The principal question arising upon this appeal relates to the right of the plaintiff to recover for the injuries sustained. The claim of the defendant is that the cause of the injury was too remote to authorize a recovery of any damages whatever, and it is urged that the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint made by the defendant's counsel on the ground stated, as well as in the charge to the jury that if they believed ‘that the coal and ashes fell from the defendant's locomotive through any negligence on the part of the defendant, its servants or agents, and, falling upon the horse, caused him to become unmanageable and run against the plaintiff, inflicting injuries upon him, then the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for his damages occasioned thereby.’ The same question was also raised by the defendant's counsel by a request to the judge to charge that ‘if the jury believed the accident occurred through the driver's error of judgment in endeavoring to obtain control of his horse the plaintiff cannot recover,’ which was refused and an exception duly taken to the decision. It is urged by the appellant's counsel that where there is an intermediary agent or medium between the primary cause of the injury and the ultimate result, the rule of law to be applied is that, where the original act complained of was not voluntary or intentional, or one of affirmative illegality, or in itself the cause of criminal complaint, but was caused by negligence, the responsibility is limited to the necessary and natural consequencesof the act, and that when, beyond that, they are or may be modified or shaped by other causes, they are too remote to be the foundation of legal accountability.

The injury sustained by the plaintiff was caused by reason of fire falling from a locomotive of the defendant upon a horse attached to a wagon in the street below, and upon the hand of the driver. The horse became frightened and ran away, and the driver attempted to guide his movements, and drive him against a post of the elevated railroad so as to stop him. Failing to accomplish this, he intentionally turned the horse and attempted to run him against the curbstone to make it heavy for him, and so arrest his progress, but the wagon passed over the curbstone instead of being arrested by it, and threw the driver out, and ran over and injured the plaintiff. It will be seen that the injury was not caused directly by the defendant, but was produced through the instrumentality of the horse and driver, the latter of whom, it appears, was doing all that lay in his power, and exercising his best judgment, in attempting to stop the frightened animal, and to prevent any further injury; and the question we are called upon to consider here is whether, in view of the fact that the plaintiff may have been injured by reason of the management of the horse by the driver, in consequence of which it was diverted from the natural course it might otherwise have taken, the defendant is relieved from responsibility for the result of the accident.

It may be assumed that at that time the driver, who was smarting from the effects of the burning coal which had fallen upon his hands, and startled by the suddenness of the accident, may have been somewhat disconcerted by the peril in which he was placed, and therefore was unable to manage and control the infuriated animal as he might otherwise have done. The law, however, makes allowances for mistakes and for errors of judgment which are likely to happen upon such an emergency. It does not demand the same coolness and self-possession which are required when there is no occasion for alarm or a loss of self-control. Where a person is traveling upon a train of cars and a collision has taken place, or is likely to occur, and he, under the excitement of the moment, jumps from the train and thereby increases his own danger and chances of injury, although the act of attempting to escape is very hazardous and negligent, yet it is an instinctive act which naturally would take place when a person seeks to avoid great peril, and, though wrong in itself, that fact does not relieve the company from liability if its negligent conduct and a sense of impending danger induced the act.

In the case under consideration the driver was passing along in pursuit of his customary business, driving his horse, when suddenly the falling of the fire upon himself and the horse placed him in a position of great danger, and he was justified in attempting to save his own life and protect himself from injury. If he made a mistake in his judgment, the company was not relieved from liability. If he had allowed the horse to continue on its own way, it is by no means clear that a similar, if nor greater, injury might not have been inflicted upon some other person than the plaintiff. It is impossible to determine what the result might have been in such a case, and therefore it is indulging in speculation to say that the driver's act, under the circumstances, was not the best thing that could have been done. In such cases it is difficult to disconnect the final injury from the primary cause, and say that the damages accruing are not the natural and necessary result of the original wrongful act. The defendant was chargeable with an unlawful act, which inflicted an injury upon the driver and the horse in the first instance, and ultimately caused the injury sustained by the plaintiff. The injury originally inflicted was in the nature of a trespass, and the result which followed was the natural consequence of the act. So long as the injury was chargeable to the original wrongful act of the defendant, it is not apparent, in view of the facts, how it can avoid responsibility. There was no such intervening human agency as would authorize the conclusion that it was the cause of the accident, and therefore it cannot be said that the damages were too remote.

The company would clearly be liable for any direct injury arising from the falling of the burning coals upon the horse if it had been left to pursue its own course uncontrolled by the driver, and there would seem to be no reason why it would not be equally liable when the driver seeks to control the horse, and exercises his best judgment in endeavoring to prevent injury. That he failed to do so for want of strength, or by reason of an error of judgment, does not prevent the application of the principle which controls in such a case. It may, we think, be assumed that such an accident might occur in a crowded street where conveyances are constantly passing, and that the driver of the horse, who might possibly be injured by the defendant's unlawful act, would seek to guide the animal, and, if possible, prevent unnecessary injury. The action of the driver, in view of the exigency of the occasion, whether prudent or otherwise, may well be considered as a continuation of the original act which was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and the defendant was liable as much as it would have been if the horse had been permitted to proceed without any control whatever. W...