Hutcheson v. Atherton

Decision Date13 January 1940
Docket NumberNo. 4529.,4529.
Citation99 P.2d 462,44 N.M. 144
PartiesHUTCHESONv.ATHERTON et al.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; Bryan G. Johnson, Judge.

Suit by L. F. Hutcheson, a taxpayer, against A. L. Atherton and others, the duly qualified and acting Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, N. Mex., to enjoin the issuance of bonds. From a judgment dismissing the complaint as to the first cause of action and permanently enjoining defendants from issuing the proposed bonds for construction of an auditorium, defendants appeal and plaintiff cross-appeals.

Affirmed.

The statute authorizing erection of juvenile detention homes in counties of first class, of which there are nine, held not invalid on ground the statute is a “local” or “special law” since the classification is a reasonable one, or at least is not so unreasonable as to seem arbitrary or capricious. Laws 1939, c. 75; Const. art. 4, § 24.

Owen B. Marron, Dist. Atty., and Donald B. Moses, Asst. Atty., both of Albuquerque, for appellants.

Sam Dazzo, Scott H. Mabry, and Rolando J. Matteucci, all of Albuquerque, for appellee.Coors & Adams, Rodey & Dickason, and Simms, Modrall & Seymour, all of Albuquerque, amici curiae.

SADLER, Justice.

The validity of two bond issues about to be negotiated by the board of county commissioners of Bernalillo County is involved in this suit. The plaintiff, a taxpayer, seeks to enjoin issuance of the bonds. His first cause of action challenges an issue in the amount of $50,000.00, to be sold for the purpose of raising funds to erect a juvenile detention home under the authority of L.1939, c. 75. The second cause of action questions the right to issue bonds to the amount of $250,000.00, the proceeds to be used to construct an auditorium in Bernalillo County pursuant to authority contained in L.1939, c. 149. The members of the board of county commissioners of Bernalillo County, as such board, are the defendants.

The claimed invalidity of the proposed fifty thousand dollar issue is set forth in paragraph 3 the first cause of action, as follows:

“That Chapter 75, Session Laws of 1939 of State of New Mexico, is repugnant and violates Article IX, Section 10, and Article IV, Section 24, Constitution State of New Mexico in the following:

“a. That the limiting of detention homes for juveniles to first class counties is an unreasonable classification;

“b. That because of said limitation, the said statute becomes special in character;

“c. That a juvenile detention home is not a necessary public building within the contemplation of Article IX, Section 10, New Mexico Constitution.”

The proposed two hundred and fifty thousand dollar issue is assailed in the second cause of action upon the following grounds, to-wit:

“That Chapter 149, Session Laws 1939, is repugnant and unconstitutional in the following:

“a. That an auditorium is not such a necessary public building within the contemplation of Article IX, Section 10, Constitution of State of New Mexico.

“b. That the purpose expressed therein is a direct aid to a public or private corporation within the scope of Article IX, Section 14, Constitution State of New Mexico.

“c. That the subject of the act is not expressed in the title thereof.”

These challenges to the validity of the proposed bond issues were met by separate demurrers sufficient to invoke judgment of the trial court as to each ground urged to support injunctive relief. The demurrer was sustained in its entirety as to the first cause of action involving the fifty thousand dollar issue for erection of a juvenile detention home. As to the second cause of action, however, a split ruling resulted, the trial court sustaining the first ground of the demurrer and overruling it as to the second and third grounds. This was as much as to say that the proposed auditorium was a necessary public building within the purview of Const. Art. IX, § 10, but that the plan announced for financing its construction involved extending aid to a public or private corporation contrary to the provisions of Const., Art. IX, § 14; and, also, that the subject of the act, L. 1939, c. 149, was not expressed in its title as required by Const., Art. IV, § 16.

The plaintiff and the defendants having declined to plead further, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the complaint as to the first cause of action and permanently enjoining defendants from issuing the proposed bonds for construction of an auditorium. Both sides have appealed, the plaintiff complaining of the injunction awarded, the defendants of the injunction denied.

We shall dispose of the appeals in the order in which the matter was presented below, considering first the proposed fifty thousand dollar issue for construction of a juvenile detention home. It is assailed in plaintiff's first cause of action. This results in now taking up one phase of his cross-appeal.

The statutory authorization for this bond issue is to be found in L.1939, c. 75, the first section of which reads: Section 1. That the Board of County Commissioners of first class counties in this state are hereby authorized and empowered to establish and equip juvenile detention homes and for that purpose to issue bonds of such counties in any sum necessary, not to exceed $50,000.00. Such juvenile detention homes are hereby declared to be necessary public buildings.”

Section 2 of the act provides that the proceedings for calling, holding and canvassing the results of an election to determine whether such bonds are to be issued, the manner of issuance, the terms and provisions of the bonds, the sale thereof, the levy of taxes for the payment thereof, and the manner and time of payment, shall all be the same as at the time is provided by law with respect to bonds issued for the purpose of building court houses, and that, in general, all the provisions of law with respect to county court house bonds shall, so far as pertinent, apply to the bonds authorized by the act. The proposal to issue the bonds was thus duly submitted to the qualified electors of Bernalillo County, and a majority of them voted in favor of issuance.

[1] The first and second grounds of demurrer to the first cause of action, renewed before us as assignments of error, are so interdependent that a decision as to one resolves the other. The first is, that confining to first class counties the authorization contained in L.1939, c. 75 to issue bonds for the construction of detention homes for juvenile delinquents, constitutes an unreasonable classification. If it does, the statute is a local or special law in contravention of Const. Art. IV, § 24, which is made the basis of the second ground of demurrer. Counsel for defendants have not pointed out the particular class of local or special laws inveighed against in the constitution which it is claimed this measure offends. It is only local or special laws relating to enumerated subjects and those to which a general law can be made applicable, that are proscribed by the constitution. Scarbrough v. Wooten, 23 N.M. 616, 170 P. 743. In as much, however, as laws “regulating county, precinct or district affairs” constitute one of the enumerated subjects, we will treat the questioned legislation as falling under it and, if local or special, it is, of course, invalid.

The argument put forward by the plaintiff is that there is no reasonable basis for the discrimination claimed to exist as between first class counties and those of lower rank in the scale adopted by the legislature for the purpose of fixing the salaries of county officers. The second state legislature (L.1915, c. 12) enacted what is known as the county salary law. As amended it appears now as Article 32 of Chapter 33, New Mexico Statutes Annotated, Compilation of 1929; New Mexico Supplement, (1938) by W. H. Courtright Publishing Co., and L.1939, Chapters 58, 97, 107, 120, 128 and 221. The basis of the classification into first, second, third, fourth and fifth class counties is the assessed valuation of taxable property within the several counties. Plaintiff says this may serve very well as a ground of classification and be deemed reasonable for the purpose originally employed, the fixing of salaries for county officers, but that it is wholly arbitrary and capricious as a yard stick for determining what counties shall not be permitted to provide themselves with homes for juvenile delinquents. The legislature, runs the argument, could as well authorize certain counties to provide jails and deny the privilege to others. Poverty stricken counties, they assert, have a problem in juvenile delinquency, as well as the wealthier counties of the state, the difference being one of degree only.

[2][3] Such argument, addressed to the legislature whose duty it is in the first instance to determine such matters, might have been very persuasive in moving it, upon a question of policy, to reject the classification made. When it has spoken, however, the question of wisdom or unwisdom in its decision is usually settled. Its voice is supreme upon the subject of classification for purposes of legislation so long as there is to be found any reasonable basis for the distinction employed. The fact that it appears unreasonable to the courts is not decisive. Is it so wholly devoid of any semblance of reason to support it, as to amount to mere caprice, depending on legislative fiat alone for support? If so, it will be stricken down as violating constitutional guaranties. But the fact that the legislature has adopted the classification is entitled to great weight.

“If the classification is reasonable, it is valid. It is in the first instance a legislative question as to whether or not the classification is reasonable; that is, could it have seemed reasonable to the Legislature even though such basis seems to the court to be unreasonable, or is it arbitrary and unjust? ***

“This question is...

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    ...if the classification is practical and not palpably arbitrary.' This language was repeated and approved in Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d 462 (1940), wherein the court further stated the question to '* * * Is it so wholly devoid of any semblance of reason to support it, as to a......
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