Ex parte Woodward Iron Co.

Decision Date14 February 1924
Docket Number6 Div. 978.
Citation211 Ala. 111,99 So. 649
PartiesEX PARTE WOODWARD IRON CO. v. WOODWARD IRON CO. CROWDER ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied April 17, 1924.

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Bessemer Division; J. C B. Gwin, Judge.

Petition of the Woodward Iron Company for certiorari, to review the judgment of said court in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by L. B. Crowder and another against the Woodward Iron Company. Writ denied, and judgment affirmed.

Huey &amp Welch, of Bessemer, for petitioner.

Beddow & Oberdorfer, of Birmingham, opposed.

BOULDIN J.

This proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law is prosecuted jointly by the dependent father and mother of a deceased employee.

The point is raised that under section 14, subsecs. (3) and (3A) Acts 1919, p. 218, compensation must be paid to dependents "in the order named," that the mother is named before the father, and for this reason compensation must go to the mother only, especially where the minimum fixed by statute is allowed. This contention misconceives the effect of the above provisions of the statute.

Subsection (12) of the same section reads:

"If the deceased employee leave no widow or child or husband entitled to any payment hereunder, but should leave a parent or parents, either or both of whom are wholly dependent on the deceased, there shall be paid if only one parent, twenty-five per centum of the average weekly earnings of the deceased, and if both parents, thirty-five per centum of the average weekly earnings of the deceased to such parent or parents."

It will be noted that the amount of compensation is determined by whether one or both parents are dependent. If both are dependent the statute makes the compensation payable to both.

Subsection (13) of the same section names another group of possible dependents, and provides for payment of compensation to one, or, if more than one, an increased compensation, to be divided between them.

Subsections (5) to (11), inclusive, also fix the order and provide the manner of payment to legal and actual dependents therein named.

Taken together, the clear purpose is that payments shall be made to dependents, total or partial, in the order named in subsection (3), but in amount and manner fixed by the subsections following and other provisions of the statute.

In section 21, subsec. (2), p. 225, it is provided that the employer may suggest adverse claimants not before the court, require them to interplead, and have all claims settled in the one proceeding, to the end that he shall receive a full discharge upon payment of the amount awarded.

In this summary proceeding, all persons claiming as members of a defined class of dependents may unite in the same complaint. Others, who claim in common with or in opposition to any party plaintiff, may intervene and set up their claims, or, failing so to do, the employer may bring them in by interpleader. The determination of the judge filed with the clerk should contain a statement of the law and facts and conclusions upon these several issues. Section 28, p. 227.

The question of first moment in this case is whether the parents were partial dependents of the deceased employee. The findings of the trial judge upon this issue were:

"The evidence shows that the deceased, Grady Crowder, was working for the defendant and killed by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; that he and defendant are subject to the compensation law and the defendant has had notice or knowledge of the accident; that Grady was living with his father and mother, L. B. Crowder and wife, had been working 33 days and earned 78.45 or 14.16 per week up to time of his death; that he had bought groceries and supplies for the house, with check from the commissary, and had only $10 cash due him on the only pay day he had, giving $5 or $6 of that to his father; that he was 26 years old but had not agreed to pay any board, nor had he agreed to furnish parents with any supplies or money.
"The evidence further showed that L. B. Crowder, the father, was working for same defendant regularly for past 12 months, had earned $1,295.45 or $24.91 weekly, was in debt for doctor's bill and other things and had been paying them; had paid about $150 to doctors, $50 to $60 for medicine, $100 for domestic servant, washing and housework, and from $100 to $200 on other debts during the past twelve months; that it cost from $100 to $125 per month to run the home.
"It is ordered and decreed by the court that L. B. Crowder and wife were not wholly dependents of deceased, but that he was contributing to their support at the rate of $10 per week; that they were partial dependents, having a total income of $34.91 per week including the contribution of $10 by the deceased."

Subsection (3A), § 14, Acts of 1919, p. 218, defines partial dependents thus:

"Any member of a class named in subdivision (3), who regularly derived part of his support from the earnings of the deceased workman at the time of his death and for a reasonable period of time immediately prior thereto shall be considered his partial dependent and payment of compensation shall be made to such partial dependents in the order named." In Pushor et ux. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 149 Minn. 308, 183 N.W. 839, a minor son turned over his earnings to his mother to be used with other income for ordinary family expenses. The court said:
"The statute was construed and applied in Fleckenstein Brewing Co. v. District Court, 134 Minn. 324, 159 N.W. 755, where the facts were substantially the same as here. 'The test of dependency,' said the court, 'is not whether' the boy's parents 'could support life without' his 'contributions, *** but whether they regularly received from his wages part of their income or means of living.' It seems to us that the rights of the parties are determined by that case. It was cited with approval in Milwaukee Basket Co. v. Industrial Commission (Wis.) 181 N.W. 308, where the facts were almost identical with those in the case at bar. The deceased workman was a 19 year old boy, one of a family of six children
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17 cases
  • Ex parte Hacker
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 12 June 1947
    ... ... attendant circumstances' and is a question of fact to be ... determined by the trier or triers of the fact. Ex parte ... Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 111, 99 So. 649; McCleskey & ... Whitman v. Howell Cotton Co., 147 Ala. 573, 42 So. 67; ... Alford v. Creagh, 7 Ala.App. 358, ... ...
  • Woodward Iron Co. v. Dean
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 5 April 1928
    ... ... certiorari, of appellate jurisdictions, are prescriptions of ... the statute. The latter procedure may be aided or illustrated ... by a bill of exceptions under the act and to its desired end, ... in the case recognized by this court. Ex parte ... Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co. (Greek's Case), 207 Ala. 219, ... 92 So. 458; Ex parte L. & N.R. Co., 208 Ala. 216, 94 So. 289; ... Ex parte Mt. Carmel Coal Co., 209 Ala. 519, 96 So. 626; Ex ... parte Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 77, 99 So. 97; Ex parte ... Paramount Coal Co., 213 Ala. 281, 104 ... ...
  • Mobile Liners, Inc. v. McConnell
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 23 January 1930
    ...107 So. 837; Ex parte L. & N. R. Co., 208 Ala. 216, 94 So. 289; Ex parte Gadsden Car Works, 211 Ala. 82, 99 So. 725; Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 111, 99 So. 649. We of opinion that the trial court was well within reasonable tendencies of the evidence that decedent, at the time of h......
  • Ross v. Industrial Accident Board
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 28 April 1938
    ... ... Indiana State Highway ... Commission, 101 Ind.App. 32, 198 N.E. 125; Crowder ... v. Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 111, 99 So. 649; ... Alexander v. State Compensation Commission, 113 ... W.Va ... ...
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