Huffman v. Dexter Axle Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 85A02–1207–CT–586.,85A02–1207–CT–586.
• Parties: Linda HUFFMAN, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Huffman, Deceased, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. DEXTER AXLE COMPANY, Appellee/Defendant, and Evans Equipment Company, Appellee/Third–Party Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

990 N.E.2d 947

Linda HUFFMAN, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Huffman, Deceased, Appellant/Plaintiff,
v.
DEXTER AXLE COMPANY, Appellee/Defendant,
and
Evans Equipment Company, Appellee/Third–Party Defendant.

No. 85A02–1207–CT–586.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 31, 2013.

[990 N.E.2d 950]

Todd A. Richardson, Joseph P. Rompala, Lewis & Kappes, P.C., R.T. Green, Blackburn & Green, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Paul V. Esposito, Clausen Miller PC, Chicago, IL, Matthew R. Shipman, Bloom Gates & Whiteleather, LLP, Columbia City, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION
PYLE, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Linda Huffman (“Linda”), individually and as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Jerry Huffman (“Huffman”), appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dexter Axle Company (“Dexter”) on Linda's claim of negligence.

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.¹

ISSUE

Whether summary judgment was properly granted to Dexter.

FACTS

Dexter manufactures axles for mobile homes. Dexter's axles are transported to their customers by commercial truck. Dexter employs its own truck drivers as well as independent trucking companies to deliver its axles. Dexter retained Evans Equipment Company (“Evans”), Huffman's employer, to deliver axles. Before shipping axles, Dexter banded together a number of axles to create “bundles”; these bundles were then loaded onto flatbed trailers by Dexter forklift operators. The banding around the axles did not connect the bundles to the trailers. To connect or secure the axles to the trailers, Dexter employees or the truck drivers placed additional straps around the axles.

The trailers were loaded by either the “drop-and-hook” or the “live-load” method. Using the “drop-and-hook” method, a truck driver left an empty trailer at Dexter's facility for loading at a later time. Upon the truck driver's return, the driver hooked his truck to the loaded trailer. If the “live-load” method was used, a driver's trailer remained hooked to the tractor as axles were loaded. With “live loads,” Dexter employees or the truck driver strapped axles to the trailer as the axles were loaded. For “drop-and-hook” loads, Dexter strapped approximately 95% of the loads hauled by outside carriers.

During the first couple of years that Dexter used Evans to deliver its axles, Evans used the “live load” method. However, Evans subsequently switched to the “drop-and-hook” method. Drivers left straps with the trailer, and Dexter secured the axles to the trailer. However, because Evans's drivers began losing straps left at other facilities, Evans decided to no longer leave straps with dropped trailers, including trailers left with Dexter.

Within a couple of months of the changed procedure, a Dexter employee asked Evans to leave one set of straps with Dexter. Those straps would be used for the next Evans load, and the Evans driver picking up the load would leave his own straps for a future load. Evans initially

[990 N.E.2d 951]

adopted Dexter's suggestion. Ultimately, Evans abandoned the procedure, and Dexter stopped strapping dropped trailers delivered by Evans.

On Sunday, March 12, 2006, Huffman arrived at a Dexter facility located in North Manchester, Indiana, to pick up a flatbed trailer loaded with axles. Dexter was not open for business and no one else was at the facility. However, Huffman, as well as other truck drivers, had access to pick up loads. The bundles were stacked in several layers and, consistent with Dexter's practice for Evans's loads, were not strapped or secured to the trailer. Sometime later, another trucker and motorist arrived at the facility and found Huffman lying on the ground next to his truck. A bundle of axles were found on the ground near Huffman and the trailer. The Sheriff's department responded to the scene; Huffman was dead upon their arrival. A coroner determined Huffman's death to be an accident.

On July 17, 2007, Linda filed a complaint against Dexter alleging that Huffman died as a result of Dexter's negligence. On September 14, 2007, Dexter filed its first answer, generally denying the allegations in Linda's complaint. With leave of the trial court, Dexter filed an amended answer, raising as an affirmative defense that Huffman and Evans were the cause of the accident by failing to secure the axles.²

On December 13, 2011, Dexter filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it owed no duty to Huffman and that Huffman had been responsible for the injuries which caused his death. On February 10, 2012, Linda filed a response asserting that Dexter owed a duty to Huffman as a business invitee and designated evidence that Dexter violated Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations when loading the axles in question. Linda also alleged that the remaining issues of causation and comparative fault were questions for the fact-finder to determine.

On March 28, 2012, Dexter filed a reply, designating additional evidence arguing that it owed no duty to Huffman. Dexter also argued that OSHA regulations were inapplicable and that any duty Dexter owed was extinguished when Evans requested that Dexter not secure loads that were to be picked up by Evans's drivers. On April 12, 2012, Linda filed a reply addressing the points raised by Dexter's March 28th filing. Specifically, Linda reemphasized her argument that Dexter owed Huffman a duty and claimed that Dexter could not disregard its duty to comply with OSHA regulations by arguing that it and Evans agreed not to strap the axles onto the trailer.

On June 20, 2012, the trial court issued a general order granting Dexter's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Linda's complaint against Dexter. On July 20, 2012, Linda filed a notice of appeal, explaining that the trial court's June 20th order did not resolve all claims against all parties and was not certified as final. Linda requested that the trial court certify the order as final for the purposes of appeal. The trial court did so on July 31, 2012, entering final judgment in favor of Dexter. Thereafter, Linda filed a supplemental notice of appeal.

DECISION

When reviewing a trial court's order granting summary judgment, we apply the same standard used in the trial court.

[990 N.E.2d 952]

Kopczynski v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928, 930 (Ind.2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the designated evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from [the designated evidence] are construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Gunkel v. Renovations, 822 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.2005). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth ..., or if the undisputed facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009) (internal citations omitted).

“To prevail on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) that it breached the duty; and (3) that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the breach.” Winfrey v. NLMP, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004). “This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. “However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim.” Pelak v. Indiana Indus. Servs., Inc., 831 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

A trial court's grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a presumption of validity” and an appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 762. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the designated evidence. SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne–Allen Cnty. Airport Authority, 831 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Ind.2005), cert. denied. Yet, appellate courts must carefully review a trial court's grant of summary judgment so as not to improperly deny a party his/her day in court. Gunkel, 822 N.E.2d at 152.

We address Linda's arguments opposing summary judgment separately.

A. Duty Owed to Huffman

Linda asserts that on the day of the accident, Huffman was a business invitee, and, therefore, Dexter owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for Huffman's protection while at Dexter's facility. Dexter counters that it was not negligent under the theory of premises liability because no natural condition on the land caused the accident, and Dexter did not control the premises at the time of the accident. Further, Dexter argues that Huffman's duty to secure the load extinguished Dexter's general duty as a landowner and that Evans's instructions to stack the axles without straps, in combination with Huffman's activity around the trailer, caused the accident and Huffman's subsequent death.

In deciding whether Dexter owed a duty to Huffman, it is important to determine Huffman's status when he entered Dexter's property on the day of the accident. When a person enters upon the land of another, he enters as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser. Rhoades v. Heritage Investments, LLC, 839 N.E.2d 788, 791 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. “The person's status on the land defines the nature of the duty owed by the landowner to the visitor.” Id. “A landowner owes the highest duty of care to an invitee, that duty being to exercise reasonable care for

[990 N.E.2d 953]

the invitee's protection while he is on the premises.” Id.

To determine whether...