990 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), 91-56448, U.S. v. Marvich
|Citation:||990 F.2d 1263|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael P. MARVICH, Claimant-Appellant. Real Property Located at 2695 Canary Drive, Costa Mesa, California, Defendant.|
|Case Date:||April 09, 1993|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
Decided April 13, 1993.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; No. CV-90-1305-AWT, A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge, Presiding.
Before HALL, WIGGINS and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Michael Marvich appeals the district court's judgment of civil forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) in favor of the United States. The district court found that the defendant real property, Marvich's home, was used, or intended to be used, to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession or concealment of controlled substances in violation of Title 21 U.S.C., subchapter I, and that Marvich knew of such use.
The district court's judgment followed a non-jury trial at which direct testimony was taken by witness declarations, and at which all witnesses were cross-examined and examined on re-direct. Prior to trial, Marvich moved to suppress evidence found at the defendant property based upon alleged Fourth Amendment violations; Marvich's motion was heard concurrently with the trial and later denied. After trial, Marvich filed objections to the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and moved for a new trial. The district court overruled Marvich's objections and denied his motion, finding both "meritless." We affirm the district court's judgment of forfeiture.
Marvich's primary contention is that all of the evidence on which the forfeiture is based is the fruit of an illegal entry into and search of the defendant property pursuant to a warrant to arrest Collin Lee Quick. Marvich argues that the arrest warrant for Quick as a "parolee at large" was invalid because Quick was not on "parole" as defined by California law, and also argues that a Ninth Circuit panel in United States v. Quick, No. 88-5166, erroneously found that Quick was a parolee.
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