Cameron v. Tomes

Decision Date08 October 1992
Docket NumberNo. 92-1343,92-1343
Citation990 F.2d 14
PartiesRobert E. CAMERON, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Henry TOMES, et al., Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Elisabeth J. Medvedow, Asst. Atty. Gen., Com. of MA, with whom Scott Harshbarger, Atty. Gen., Com. of MA, was on brief, for defendants, appellants.

David M. Rocchio with whom Robert D. Keefe, Mark G. Matuschak, and Hale and Dorr were on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.

Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

This case was brought by Robert Cameron, who is currently detained in the Massachusetts Treatment Center for the Sexually Dangerous ("the Treatment Center"). The defendants, whom we refer to as "the state," are officials who are responsible for the Treatment Center. In substance, Cameron complains that his conditions of confinement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and his asserted constitutional "right to treatment."

After a bench trial the district court granted injunctive relief and the state appealed. We modify the injunction in accordance with this opinion and, with certain clarifications, otherwise affirm most of the relief ordered by the district court. Our decision is based upon the district court's findings but rests upon somewhat different legal grounds.

I. THE FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On December 13, 1978, Cameron was convicted in Vermont of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sexual assault--apparently attempted rape--and sentenced to a term of six to twenty years. He was then extradited to Massachusetts and convicted on September 12, 1979, for assault with intent to rape, kidnapping, and other crimes, and sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years, commencing after the Vermont sentence. On being paroled by Vermont on July 12, 1982, Cameron began serving his Massachusetts sentence, which at the time of trial was set to expire in the year 2002. 1

After serving several years in a Massachusetts prison, Cameron on November 14, 1985, was adjudged by the Massachusetts Superior Court to be a sexually dangerous person under M.G.L.A. c. 123A, and committed to the Treatment Center for a period of one day to life. The occasion for the commitment is not described. The Treatment Center, one of several facilities located at MCI Bridgewater, has a checkered history, much of it embroiled in litigation, e.g., Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir.1991), and M.G.L.A. c. 123A itself has an uncertain future. 2 Most of the Treatment Center's inhabitants have underlying criminal convictions, and it is administered jointly by the Departments of Mental Health and Corrections to address both the medical and security aims of the Center. Cameron's stay at the Treatment Center appears to have been even more unhappy than normal.

Although the parties agree on little else, it appears that Cameron who is 50 years old and a Vietnam veteran suffers from severe psychological disorders. In the words of the district court, "Cameron suffers from a borderline or mixed personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. There is also no dispute that as a result ... he may often act in a paranoid and confrontational manner." Cameron v. Tomes, 783 F.Supp. 1511, 1517 (D.Mass.1992). Psychological treatment is available at the Treatment Center--indeed, its availability is provided for under a consent judgment entered many years ago 3--but Cameron found what was offered unsuitable until 1989 when he established a working relationship with a therapist.

In the meantime, Cameron brought the present suit in 1986 challenging his conditions of confinement. Counsel was assigned, his claims evolved, and in December 1991 and January 1992, the district court conducted a six-day bench trial in the case. In his opinion issued on February 14, 1992, the district judge declared that Cameron had a "constitutional right to minimally adequate treatment [for his mental disorders] based upon the exercise of professional judgment." 783 F.Supp. at 1516. The court rejected a motion to dismiss by the state, which had argued that no such constitutional right existed. Id. It also rejected the state's res judicata defense, id. at 1516-17, based on the Langton case where a different district judge had found that the Treatment Center was in general compliance with the consent decree. See Langton, 928 F.2d at 1208-16.

The district court then ruled that, on a number of issues, those in charge of the Treatment Center had made judgments about Cameron and enforced policies against him without, or contrary to, the advice of the medical professionals involved in his treatment. 783 F.Supp. at 1518-25. The district court made specific findings relating to Cameron's access to outside medical care, the use of shackles and an armed guard in transporting him, his housing in the facility, physical searches of him, and similar matters. The court then granted injunctive relief on ten different matters. Id. at 1526-27.

First, and most broadly, the court ordered the pertinent administrative board within the Treatment Center to conduct an immediate review of his current sexual dangerousness, appropriate treatment and conditions, and his request to participate in what is called the community access program. 783 F.Supp. at 1526. This injunctive provision ended by stating: "All final decisions on Cameron's long-term treatment, including his participation in the community access program, must be made by a qualified professional, or with due respect and regard for the judgment of a qualified professional." Id.

Several other decree provisions are similarly qualified. The court suspended the use of shackles and an armed guard in transporting Cameron for outside medical care unless and until "a qualified decision maker determines through the exercise of professional judgment that such restraints are professionally acceptable, based on a weighing of [the state's] needs along with Cameron's treatment needs." 783 F.Supp. at 1526. Prohibited, under a similar condition, were subjecting Cameron to a restrictive internal movement policy, to an intrusive search procedure previously used and so-called "oral cavity searches," and to the "current disciplinary system" of the Treatment Center. Id. at 1526-27.

Finally, without any qualification as to professional judgment, the court ordered that Cameron be allowed medical treatment at Veterans Administration facilities for specific medical conditions, that he be allowed housing in the maximum privilege unit of the Treatment Center without consenting to share a room, and that a handicapped accessible room be immediately made available to him. 783 F.Supp. at 1526. This last direction, as well as several of the others, was related to physical disabilities suffered by Cameron, including the amputation of a leg due to infection while Cameron was in the care of the state.

II. DISCUSSION

Res Judicata. The state's threshold objection to the suit is that Cameron's claims are encompassed by prior litigation and are therefore barred as res judicata. Emphasizing the "claim preclusion" branch of res judicata, the state's brief says that one of the consolidated district court cases embraced by Langton--Bruder v. Johnston--was a class action suit concerning the right to treatment for all persons confined at the Treatment Center as of 1987. Cameron, says the state, was a member of the class and the state prevailed in that case on the ground that treatment was adequately provided.

We agree with the district court that the state has made no showing that Cameron's claim is barred by res judicata. Cases on res judicata, ample in many areas, are fairly sparse where preclusion of distinctive individual claims is urged based upon an earlier class action judgment. But in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2801-02, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984), the Supreme Court confirmed what common sense would suggest: a class action judgment--there, in a discrimination case--binds the class members as to matters actually litigated but does not resolve any claim based on individual circumstances that was not addressed in the class action. Id. at 880-82, 104 S.Ct. at 2801-02.

Under Cooper, we think that res judicata plainly does not apply in this instance. The several law suits and years of proceedings embraced by Langton require pages to describe, but the suits were concerned with fairly general issues (e.g., physical plant, sequestration, equality of treatment) and with specific claims of individuals other than Cameron. 4 The closest that that litigation came to this case was (1) endorsement of a general requirement of treatment set forth in state regulations, (2) rejection of a charge that the authorized absence program was underutilized, and (3) rejection of a general attack on the "double bunking" requirement. These claims dealt with the general condition of inhabitants of the Treatment Center. If Langton has anything else in common with this case, the state has not mentioned it.

This case, by contrast, rests primarily on Cameron's claims that his unusual situation requires special accommodations: specifically, that his physical disability affects his need for outside medical visits, freer movement within the Treatment Center, and separate bunking arrangements adapted to his handicap, and that his mental condition (what lay people would probably call paranoia) makes ordinary physical searches, disciplinary arrangements and other constraints unsuitable, indeed psychologically dangerous, for him. There is no suggestion by the state that these issues peculiar to Cameron were actually litigated in the Langton case.

Thus, the state's claim reduces itself to the argument that Cameron had to litigate those issues in the earlier cases or forever hold his peace. To describe this claim is to refute it: class action...

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