State v. Murphy, Docket: Cum-09-240

• Decision Date: 25 March 2010
• Docket Number: Docket: Cum-09-240
• Citation: 2010 ME 28,991 A.2d 35
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Morris D. MURPHY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

991 A.2d 35

2010 ME 28

STATE of Maine v. Morris D. MURPHY.

Docket: Cum-09-240

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: January 14, 2010.

Decided: March 25, 2010.

David A. Weyrens, Esq. (orally), The Hallett Law Firm, Portland, ME, for Morris Murphy.

Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney, Jonathan R. Liberman, Student Intern (orally), Jennifer Norbert, Asst. Dist. Atty., Portland, ME, for the State of Maine.

Panel: ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN,^* and JABAR, JJ.

LEVY, J.

¶ 1 Morris D. Murphy appeals from a judgment of conviction of operating while license suspended or revoked (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(D) (2008), entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Cumberland County, Beaudoin, J.) upon a finding of guilty by a jury. Murphy contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him by admitting in evidence, over his objection, a written certificate from the Secretary of State as prima facie proof that a notice of his suspension had been sent to him—a necessary element for conviction. Based on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), Murphy argues that the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of the certificate because it was testimonial hearsay. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 We review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Bouchard, 2005 ME 106, ¶ 10, 881 A.2d 1130, 1134.

¶ 3 On October 15, 2008, Officer Christopher Woodcock, a police officer with the Cumberland Police Department, observed a vehicle stop at a road that intersects Route 100 in Gray. Believing that he had pulled the same driver over days earlier for operating after suspension, Officer Woodcock turned his vehicle around and increased his speed in an attempt to view the vehicle's license plate number. He soon regained visual contact with the vehicle and eventually came upon it, with Murphy still inside, parked in a driveway. After running the car's license plate, Officer Woodcock confirmed that Murphy's license was suspended. He made contact with Murphy and obtained his license, registration, and insurance information.

¶ 4 Murphy was charged with, and pleaded not guilty to, operating while license suspended or revoked (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(D),¹ and unlawful use of a license (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2102(1) (2009). Before trial, Murphy moved in limine to exclude from evidence a certificate issued by the Secretary of State, asserting that the admission of the certificate would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.² The court denied Murphy's motion.

¶ 5 At trial, the State and Murphy stipulated that Murphy's license was suspended on October 15, 2008, when Officer Woodcock pulled him over. The State's case consisted of Officer Woodcock's testimony and three exhibits that were admitted in evidence: (1) Murphy's driver's license, which was admitted without objection; (2) the certificate from the Secretary of State; and (3) a copy of the letter from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles that notified Murphy of his suspension and the opportunity for a hearing. Over Murphy's renewed objection, the court admitted in evidence the certificate and the copy of the suspension notification letter. The certificate stated, among other things, that according to the Secretary of State's records regarding operators' licenses and registrations, "notice of suspension was sent to Murphy by regular mail, no later than September 5, 2008 in accordance with the provisions of 29-A MRSA Section 2482(1)." The copy of the suspension notification letter established the same fact.

¶ 6 The jury found Murphy guilty of both counts. On the count of operating while license suspended or revoked, he was sentenced to forty-eight hours in the county jail and a $500 fine, and on the count of unlawful use of a license, a twenty-four-hour concurrent jail sentence was imposed. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

¶ 7 On two previous occasions we have held that the admission of a sworn certificate by the Secretary of State as prima facie proof that an operator had been sent written notice of the suspension or revocation of his or her right to operate does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See State v. Tayman, 2008 ME 177, ¶ 24, 960 A.2d 1151, 1158; see also State v. Morin, 598 A.2d 170, 172 (Me.1991). Murphy contends that admission of the certificate violated his Sixth Amendment rights because it was testimonial hearsay and that he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the Secretary of State. He urges us to conclude that our prior decisions, which involved the admission of certificates nearly identical to the one at issue in this case, have been effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. 2527. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court's majority held that certificates from the state's chemists reporting that substances found on a defendant were determined, after laboratory analysis, to be cocaine, were a form of testimony that triggered the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 2530, 2542. The State responds that our earlier decisions remain binding precedent because "tthe maintenance of driving records does not entail the exercise of judgment and risks of error that take place in a laboratory test."

¶ 8 We proceed by (A) reviewing recent developments in Confrontation Clause principles applicable to this case; (B) considering whether our decisions in Tayman and Morin retain their vitality after the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz; and (C) concluding that Murphy's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.

A. Confrontation Clause

¶ 9 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which is applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by hearsay evidence that bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded in Roberts that the transcribed testimony of a witness from a preliminary hearing was admissible at the trial where the witness was unavailable and the defendant had had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 58, 73, 100 S.Ct. 2531.

¶ 10 After Roberts, we considered whether the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State from establishing that a defendant had been sent notice that his license or right to operate had been suspended by admitting a certificate of the Secretary of State, which summarized the content of records, and a copy of the suspension notification letter. Morin, 598 A.2d at 172. The defendant in Morin did "not suggest that the Secretary of State or a deputy must testify at every trial; he argued, however, that the confrontation clause requires at a minimum that certified copies of the actual records, rather than a certificate summarizing the contents of the records, be offered." Id. at 172. Applying the reliability standard articulated in Roberts, we concluded that the certificate and the letter at issue were "inherently trustworthy as a data compilation of a public agency setting forth its regularly conducted and recorded activity" and, thus, their admission did not offend the Confrontation Clause. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 More recently in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court reconsidered the notion that the reliability of hearsay evidence may be sufficient to protect a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). There, the Court held that the admission of a tape-recorded statement made to police by a woman whose husband had stabbed a man violated the husband's Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court explained that the underlying purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to prevent the use of ex parte testimonial statements as evidence against the accused, and that the Confrontation Clause bars the "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Confrontation Clause was thus deemed to guarantee the opportunity for cross-examination as the procedural mechanism for testing the reliability of evidence:

To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.

Id. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354; see also State v. Gorman, 2004 ME 90, ¶ 46, 854 A.2d 1164, 1175 (recognizing "that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the Confrontation Clause ... because Confrontation Clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis").

¶ 12 Crawford treated "testimony" as being "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quotation marks omitted). Several types of testimonial statements subject to the right of confrontation were identified:

Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants

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