Bueford v. Resolution Trust Corp.
Decision Date | 16 April 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-1708,92-1708 |
Citation | 991 F.2d 481 |
Parties | 61 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 881, 122 A.L.R.Fed. 815, 61 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,189, 61 USLW 2690 Charlotte BUEFORD, Appellant, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, as Receiver for United Federal Savings Bank of Iowa, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Thomas Mann, Jr., Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellant.
Richard B. Sobol, New Orleans, LA, argued (Terrence D. Brown, Des Moines, IA, on the brief), for appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
This appeal results from the district court's dismissal of Bueford's employment discrimination action against the Resolution Trust Corporation. The district court found that Bueford's failure to exhaust the administrative procedure detailed in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) deprived it of jurisdiction, and therefore dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.
On March 14, 1990, Bueford filed an employment discrimination action in the District Court of Polk County, Iowa, pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and to section 601A.16 of the Code of Iowa (1989). In her complaint, Bueford alleged that she was wrongfully terminated from her job with United Federal Savings Bank of Iowa ("United Federal") as a result of age and race discrimination. She properly exhausted administrative remedies, and received a right to sue letter from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission. Appendix at 10. Bueford then filed suit in the district court. While the matter was still pending, the Office of Thrift Supervision appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") as the receiver for United Federal. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, the RTC notified Bueford's attorney of the receivership, as required by the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, ("FIRREA") 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3). 1 This letter notified Bueford that:
all persons, firms, corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts, estates, or other entities of whatever nature, who may have claims against the Association, are directed to present any such claims, together with legal proof thereof, to the Resolution Trust Corporation.... Any such claim not presented to the Resolution Trust Corporation before June 30, 1991, may be barred. 2
Appendix at 55-56. On May 14, 1991, the RTC was substituted as the real party in interest in Bueford's employment discrimination case.
The RTC removed the action from the Iowa District Court to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(11). The RTC then moved for a change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). On June 19, 1991, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. On September 27, 1991, the RTC filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In this motion, the RTC contended that Bueford's failure to exhaust the administrative procedures as mandated by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the case. The district court granted the RTC's motion to dismiss with prejudice, and this appeal ensued.
Bueford appeals the district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal of her case contending that: (1) FIRREA does not mandate administrative review; (2) FIRREA does not apply to pending actions; (3) the RTC is estopped from asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (4) if FIRREA does mandate administrative review, the requirement violates due process; and (5) the RTC failed to comply with the statutory notice provisions. Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is a question of law, and we review de novo. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir.1990).
The language of FIRREA clearly indicates that unless administrative procedures are complied with, no court shall have jurisdiction to evaluate a claim brought against a failed banking institution for whom the RTC has been appointed receiver. 3 Every court that has considered the issue has found exhaustion of FIRREA's administrative remedies to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in district court. See Henderson v. Bank of New England, 986 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.1993) ( ); Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union Local 2 v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C.Cir.1992) (); Meliezer v. RTC, 952 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir.1992) ( ); RTC v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir.1991) ( ); Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 391 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 582, 116 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991). 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that where Congress has imposed an administrative exhaustion requirement by statute, the exhaustion of those procedures is mandatory. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 579, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 1371, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989).
We agree with the conclusion reached by the other circuits. The language of the statute makes it clear that administrative exhaustion is required before any court acquires subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought against the RTC as receiver for a failed banking institution. 5
Bueford claims that even if administrative exhaustion is required under FIRREA, she is exempt from these procedures because her case was pending at the time the receiver was appointed. She contends that the application of FIRREA's administrative requirements to a pending case would constitute a retroactive application of the statute and therefore would be improper. We do not agree.
Section 1821(d)(6)(B) provides that a claim which has not been presented to the RTC by the end of the statutory period shall be deemed disallowed, and no further appeal will be possible. This bar specifically includes: "an action commenced before the appointment of the receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B)(ii). 6 We find this language to clearly indicate that FIRREA is to be applied to pending actions. See Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir.1992) ( ); RTC v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir.1991) (per curium) (FIRREA's administrative claims procedures must be complied with, even in cases where suit was filed prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also FDIC v. Kasal, 913 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.1990) (, )cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119, 111 S.Ct. 1072, 112 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1991). We conclude, therefore, that the plain language of the statute mandates its application to Bueford's employment discrimination action.
Bueford contends that the RTC's active participation in the underlying lawsuit estops it from raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 She bases this contention on the fact that the RTC filed various motions with the district court. The RTC's participation, she reasons, indicates consent to the jurisdiction of the district court, and constitutes a waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Having consented to the jurisdiction of the court, Bueford concludes, the RTC has waived any objections to subject matter jurisdiction and is estopped from subsequently raising such objections.
We cannot agree with Bueford's analysis. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlike many other objections to the jurisdiction of a particular court, cannot be waived. It may be raised at any time by a party to an action, or by the court sua sponte. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) () FIRREA contains an exhaustion requirement as a pre-requisite for suit in any court, and the statute contains no waiver provision. See FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 136 (3d Cir.1991). Therefore, the RTC cannot, by its own conduct or otherwise, be estopped from raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(D), the RTC may reject Bueford's claim unless it is proven "to the satisfaction of the receiver," a standard which Bueford contends is unconstitutionally vague. She further interprets FIRREA as preventing an appeal to the district court in the event that the RTC should deny her claim. Therefore, she contends that requiring her to exhaust FIRREA's administrative remedies amounts to a deprivation of her right to due process. If her analysis of FIRREA were correct, we might be inclined to agree that FIRREA implicates due process concerns. However, Bueford has misinterpreted the statute. 8
Bueford relies 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(5)(D) and (E) 9 for her contention that an administrative determination to disallow a claim under FIRREA cannot be reviewed by a court of law. These sections do lend themselves to the interpretation advanced by Bueford, and were we to consider them in isolation, we might be persuaded by her arguments. However, it is a basic tenet of statutory construction that provisions are to be read in context. Furthermore,...
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